by Richard Gowan | Jan 21, 2009 | Africa, Conflict and security
Last year, I wrote a couple of posts (here and here) warning of a rift between African countries and the West over how to administer peace and justice on the continent. That was coming out into the open over Darfur and Zimbabwe, forcing Western liberals to balance a commitment to “African ownership” with their desire to stay involved in African affairs. Now, a trenchant critique of “African solutions to African problems” rhetoric comes from Tsoeu Petlane, a South African scholar:
As we enter a New Year, we have to acknowledge that the “African solutions for African problems” approach has had some glaringly painful failures. The continuing crises in Somalia, in Zimbabwe, in Darfur and in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the surrounding Great Lakes region all demonstrate the weaknesses of the way “African solutions” have been implemented in 2008. These weaknesses must be addressed in 2009. The year ahead should be one of rethinking how Africa deals with problems in a manner that is effective and restores the continent’s image and initiative.
Petlane anatomizes the problem thus:
There are three key reasons for failure: an almost unquestioning adherence to protecting state sovereignty, dependency on forces outside the continent and lack of leadership. Together, these stifle innovation, limit the effectiveness of proposed solutions and alienate potential allies.
First, the continent’s endorsement of the leaders of collapsed or collapsing states such as Zimbabwe, Somalia and the DRC, far from promoting sovereignty, negates it.
Sovereignty resides in the people, who only delegate it to leaders. In a situation in which the expression of this sovereignty is denied the people, such as in Zimbabwe; where those entrusted with it are unable to exercise it practically, such as in the DRC; or where the institutions supporting it are in question, such as in Somalia, protecting a government makes no sense – it allows a regime to maintain a veneer of statehood only on the basis of recognition by others. Thinking beyond this paradigm is urgently needed.
Second, while African leaders appear united in calling for indigenous solutions, few have demonstrated a conceptual or practical commitment to the notion. Their initiatives and solutions have depended on Africa’s “partnership” with the nebulous “international community”. A major component of this “community” comprises the very same former colonists who, we claim, have (i) “created” Africa’s problems by colonising them, (ii) “interfered” in Africa’s internal affairs, (iii) shaped the international system to serve their own interests (in trade, economy and international relations), (iv) dictated values of good governance and economic performance that are “foreign” to Africans, and (v) “abandoned/marginalised” Africa by withdrawing aid and political support after the Cold War.
This kind of dependency – developing solutions on the basis of actions of others, and blaming them when things don’t work – points to our lack of good leadership.
(more…)
by Richard Gowan | Jan 12, 2009 | Climate and resource scarcity, Cooperation and coherence, Global system, North America
From the State Department (with some explanatory notes added by GD):
Statement by Secretary Condoleezza Rice
Washington, DC
January 9, 2009
January 11 marks the 100th anniversary of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. We note with pride the century of cooperation with Canada in managing water quality, quantity, and environmental health along our 5,525-mile border. The Treaty also established the International Joint Commission, which has played a vital role as an independent steward of these shared resources. Comprised of Commissioners from both countries, the Commission has been an outstanding example of collaborative governance and stewardship *, facilitating cooperation, preventing and resolving water-related disputes, and approving and overseeing operation of several major dams and hydropower stations along the border.
Millions of Americans and Canadians depend on the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River system for drinking water, trade, jobs, recreation, and more. Through the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement and the International Joint Commission, our two nations are working diligently to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem.**
The Boundary Waters Treaty remains vibrant as it enters its second century. Recent International Joint Commission initiatives such as International Watershed Boards provide opportunities for local stakeholders to build networks that can prevent or resolve problems at the community level. The Treaty continues to be a model for managing shared resources***and a tribute to the enduring friendship between the United States and Canada.****
* The reference to “governance and stewardship” may signify a career State drafter trying out a few liberal, internationalist phrases so as to be ready for the next administration. Had this been drafted in 2003, it’d probably have referred to “the joint commitment of freedom-loving nations to God’s aquatic gift to mankind”.
** I’ve read this a number of times, but it does indeed appear to be a positive reference to international environmental regulation by the Bush administration. I assume they think Dick’s too busy burning stuff to get pissed about this one.
*** Well yes, it’d be easier to resolve resource conflicts if the opponent was always Canada.
**** This is most likely a coded reference to the fact that the Canadian Conservative government is one of the few regimes on earth that may actually be sorry to see the Republicans go…
by Charlie Edwards | Dec 22, 2008 | Influence and networks, UK
Last year I argued that: a quadripartite parliamentary select committee on national security should be created – bringing together existing select committees that focus on UK national interests, security and defence policy. The good news is that this idea is currently being toyed with in Westminster and Whitehall. The bad news is that I’m not sure our politicians are really up to overseeing such a complex system and ensuring it is made accountable to the British public.
I’ve been trawling through the uncorrected evidence of a session on national security and resilience. The evidence session was undertaken by the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence. In the hot seats were Rt Hon Bob Ainsworth (then a Minister at the MoD), Admiral Lord West (Minister for Security and Counter-Terrorism), and a range of senior officials from Government departments. I don’t think I have ever read a more thoroughly depressing, lightweight, evidence session, which not only fails to ask the important questions but largely fails to hold Ministers and officials to account. Below are the more amusing questions and exchanges from the session.
No.1: Know your brief (Ministers)
Chairman: National Security Strategy, who owns it?
Mr Ainsworth: The lead department for national security in the United Kingdom is the Home Office.
Mr Jenkin: (HCDC): Does not the Home Office lead inevitably lead us to a rather narrow definition of what a National Security Strategy is, given that, for example, our foreign policy is crucial to our national security?
Lord West: If I could just clarify – the Home Office does not lead on the whole National Security Strategy. We are responsible for the counter-terrorist aspect of it and specific Home Office duties.
Mr Jenkin: That would explain why the NSS is a bit of a Christmas tree because there is no single minister responsible for creating coherence in the National Security Strategy?
No.2: Losing the war on terror.
Mr Holloway: You have got doctrines, plans, committees, initiatives, X, Y and Z and of course it all sounds absolutely marvellous, but the reality is that we are not winning the war on terror. Do you not think we could be doing rather more in terms of dealing with the drivers of radicalisation and be a little more sensitive in our foreign policy because it might actually make your job rather easier?
No.3: ‘Overarching title’ – what a great title!
Mr Jenkins: When I heard the term “overarching strategy” I thought that is a great title, a great term. Within that do we have different departments reporting, like stovepipes, up to the top, or have the departments changed their policy, and are they working closer with each other so there are departments working at every level? How has that approach changed the operation of the MoD; and has the MoD felt its role in working through the Home Office is somewhat restrained; or is it quite happy to do that; or would it like more contacts, please?
No.4: Mum’s the word
John Smith: Without giving away any secrets, can you say hand on heart that this new joined-up approach to the national security threats on our country has actually prevented or deterred actual threat of attack or security threats against us, since you have been taking this new approach?
No.5: The Government’s ‘dilusional’ talk
Mr Holloway: Admiral, I worry about this because I think some of this talk is possibly dilusional. If you talk about having a joined-up approach in Afghanistan, which I know a tiny bit about; I lose faith in everything else you are saying about what else is happening behind the scenes. As a military man you and, I guess, I, in my pathetic military career, were always told if you wanted to win an insurgency you did not need coordination forums, focus groups, secretariat, yet more self-licking lollipop process; we were told that you had to have unity of command and unity of purpose. Do we have either in the UK at the moment on this – unity of command and unity of purpose?
No.6: Where is this coordinator?
Mr Jenkin: We have mentioned Robert Hannigan a few times and he is this coordinator. Why is he not here answering for the government on this?
No.7: Red teaming for beginners
Mr Holloway: Do you have groups of people who sit around working up potential scenarios of things that terrorists might do, areas that are vulnerable?
No.8: Spot the question
Mr Jenkin: My question follows on from this which is that we all know from the polling evidence that the public does not really like being stirred up about this subject. It makes politicians get accused of trying to frighten the public for some sort of political reasons and it is regarded with great suspicion. Is there a danger that, because we all want to avoid doing that, we are actually not giving this the profile in government that it really deserves and that we do not want to have a national security minister in the Cabinet because that would add to the anxiety of people and raise people’s suspicions more, but have we actually not got to face it and have we also not got to recognise that the public need to be made aware of these dangers because, the more aware the public is of these dangers and risks, the more alive they are to those risks and in fact the safer we will be?
by Daniel Korski | Dec 11, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, UK
A couple of posts ago, Charlie drew our attention to the fact that a new report would be recommending the appointment of a Minister for Security Diplomacy. “What the f*** is security diplomacy?”, our resident security expert asked.
I haven’t read the report, but the question got me thinking. What, indeed, is security diplomacy? I don’t mean in a traditional way — working with NATO; on security policy issues; and managing defence relationships. I mean in a 21st century kind of way. So here is my stab at what it could be.
One of the 21st century’s biggest national security challenges – and therefore diplomatic tasks — will be to affect people who we cannot affect. By that, I mean that European governments have to affect security outcomes in countries with whom they have only weak links or little leverage over. They have to do so because what happens in these countries affect our security, well-being, safety. . . you know the arguments.
Take the case of Pakistan and the country’s military-security establishment. Everyone acknowledges that working with the Pakistani military will be key in lessening Indo-Pakistani tensions, containing the Taliban insurgency, clamping down on WMD proliferation, and defeating Al Qaida. Everyone acknowledges that achieving these goals is vital to Britain’s and Europe’s security.
But there are only four countries that have any real leverage on Pakistan and her security establishment: the U.S, China, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Despite being Pakistan’s largest trading partner and a major donor, Europe has only limited leverage over Islamabad (and the military HQ in Rawalpindi), even if Britain is a (small) exception to the rule.
So the question becomes – how can Europe get the countries that do have leverage over Pakistan to act, or act in ways that may be beneficial to Europe’s interests? What incentives can be offered? Could the EU, for example, ask Turkey to lead diplomatic talks with Pakistan on the EU’s behalf, with the Turkish Prime Minister briefing the EU Heads of State? And if that is indeed what is needed, what can Turkey be offered in return?
If this is “security diplomacy” does it go beyond what it traditionally the focus of bilateral relationships and diplomacy in a non-polar world i.e. where we cannot rely on the hegemon to sway third-countries to its will? Many diplomats will argue that this is already what they doing. They are already lobbying diplomats in Beijing for China to help in Afghanistan etc.
But perhaps using the rubric “security diplomacy” makes this a concrete line of activity, ensures resources and prioritization? Much like the way Britain’s European network of embassies now focus primarily on how to leverage votes in the European Council rather than on, say, managing the UK-Romanian relationship, so implementing this kind of diplomacy may mean suborning the normal bilateral links in a number of cases (of which Pakistan is clearly one), to the so-called “diplomatic security interest”.
I am not arguing for a Minister for Security Diplomacy. Rather, I have long argued for a top-to-bottom assesment of the government’s capabilities, a National Security Review, rather than piecemeal solutions. But I’d be interested to hear what people think of the notion of security diplomacy.
by Daniel Korski | Dec 9, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Europe and Central Asia, Global Dashboard, Influence and networks, North America
Following Barack Obama’s election, the intellectual market has filled up with policy papers about how the U.S and Europe can cooperate on substantive issues like China, Russia, CT, climate change etc. But little time has been devoted to the way in which the EU and the U.S cooperate, that is, the institutions of the trans-Atlantic relationship.
NATO will continue to have an important role in the Euro-Atlantic community, but the North Atlantic Alliance is no longer the place where Americans or Europeans go to talk about big strategic questions. This is true not only for non-military topics such as the global financial crisis or climate change, but also for classic foreign policy problems.
In this paper I — and two other colleagues — have tried to lay out what kind of new institutions could boost U.S-EU cooperation. Recommendations include:
- That the President of the United States be invited once a year to the European Council
- Back-to-back EU and NATO summits
- That the US Secretary of State join the GAERC twice a year
- That American Cabinet officials be invited to European Commission meetings from time to time
- That US/PSC discussions be held alternately in Brussels and Washington.
- “Double-hatting” the EU Head of Delegation in Washington as an EU Special Representative
- Establishing a small European Legislatures Liaison Office in Congress, comprising representatives from the EP and national legislatures, as well as setting up Congress/EP task forces on key issues like Afghanistan/Pakistan and climate change.
- Setting-up a US-EU Conflict Prevention Task Force, with a permanent secretariat housed in Brussels.
- Establishing a NATO/EU School for Conflict, Post-Conflict and Stabilisation to provide training for deploying personnel
New transatlantic institutions cannot in themselves help the EU develop policies or come up with a better way of thinking strategically about foreign policy issues; but at a time of considerable transatlantic policy convergence, the absence of a solid framework for US-EU discussion will see both sides miss out on a valuable opportunity for cooperation on shared challenges.
