As the once so secure Arab regimes appeared to be falling like dominoes in the face of popular demands for regime change (read: freedom and democracy), the abundant commentary in the Western media often used analogous revolutionary moments in time to outline the importance of events, or offer guidance to US and European leaders on ways to resolve their foreign policy conundrum (how to support democracy and human rights without threatening the stability needed for security and economic growth). From the fall of apartheid to the violent suppression of student protests at Tiananmen Square and the ousting of South-American generals, most recent ‘liberation events’ have featured in numerous articles but none more so than the 1989 fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe.
At first glance, the analogy seems apt. Then and now we see populations rising up against autocratic regimes propped up by vast security forces and the financial, military and political tutelage of a superpower. At closer inspection however, the differences are significant enough to suggest that the smooth trajectory from Warsaw Pact to Lisbon Treaty will not be afforded to the current batch of freedom seeking populations. Three main differences stand out.
One, these days there is no Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s policies of Glasnost and Perestroika were not so much informed by popular demands for reform but rather proved to be the loosening of reigns necessary for people to believe that change was possible and that the risks involved in protesting and demanding change were manageable. Of course, for Gorbachev, demokratizatsiya did not necessarily mean free elections and a multi-party system but once change was happening, Mikhail did not stand in its way. In fact, in no uncertain terms did he make it clear to the leaders of Central and East European countries that violence against their own populations would not (or no longer) be accepted.
Today’s revolutionary moment is not the result of Barack Obama’s June 2009 speech in Cairo but, more likely, the popular response to the West’s lack of follow-up to that speech in the years since. Western leaders now speak of a need for ‘greater democracy’ in the Arab states (suggesting that there are different grades of democracy) but can’t quite stop themselves from suggesting that some political parties (e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood) may not be amenable to the kind of democracy that they have in mind. And now that the falling of dominoes has been halted by one Arab leader who doesn’t hesitate using his Western-bought weaponry to bomb his own citizens there is much rhetoric but no ‘uncertain terms’ that such action will not be tolerated. The signal this sends, not only to Gaddafi but also to other, still remaining, autocratic rulers, is far from uncertain. Want proof? Watch the West’s reaction to the Saudi ‘interventions’ in Yemen and Bahrain.
Two, the institutional memory that was crucial to the successful transition from single communist party rule to an effective multi-party democracy in Central and Eastern Europe is not present in the Arab states today. In countries like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, etc. autocracy was preceded by a functioning democracy and so when communism fell, the switch back, both for political leaders and the wider population, was relatively easy save for some refresher courses on modern forms of party organization and election campaigning. In the Arab states, autocracy was preceded by colonial rule which suggests that the Russian model (democracy in name but strong-man rule in practice) is more likely.
Of course, the absence of an innate understanding by the Arab populace of the principles of democracy does not mean that democracy cannot blossom in these countries. The real question will be whether or not the Arab peoples will be allowed the time and space to find a form of democracy that works for them. Early indications, such as Egyptian army suggestions for early elections (thus preventing the opposition movement from properly organizing themselves) and Western dismissals of calls for a Marshall plan-type support programme for the region, would suggest that that time and space will be limited.
And finally three, the Arab states do not have EU membership to look forward to. The prospect of EU accession provided not just the promise of economic prosperity but also a blueprint for state-building. With most outcomes, from economic regulatory processes to civil liberty legislation, predetermined, political debate was largely constrained to issues of reform pace and path. Vested interests had little room for manipulating transition in their favour. Again, Russia is the exception here as well as the example that Arab states must try to avoid.
These key differences between Central and Eastern Europe then and the Middle East now, would suggest that reform in the Arab states will be harder, if not near to impossible, and thus the fear has to be that the early successes in Tunisia and Egypt will turn out to be more reminiscent of the Prague Spring than the fall of the Berlin Wall. There is however one positive that Arab youths can take from the Central and East European experience and that is the example of Solidarno??.
When Lech Wa??sa and his fellow steelworkers organized themselves in the mid-70s to demand greater freedom they had no idea that their determination would see the end of communist rule some fifteen years later. The same sense of determination appears present on the Arab street today and if some of the other lessons from the Solidarno?? experience can be replicated there (i.e. the coming together of intellectuals, labour and religious leadership; the manifest rejection of the use of violence; and a strong sense of realism in terms of timing and scope of demands for reform), there is less reason to doubt that autocratic rule in the Middle East will become an aberration of the past in the not too distant future.
