AFRICOM: “Throwing a rock at a hive of bees” Mark Weston
February 16, 2009 | More on Africa, Conflict and security | 7 comments
The US’s new Africa Command (AFRICOM) has made a promising start: its strategic advice to the Ugandan army for its recent offensive against the Lord’s Resistance Army not only failed to defeat the rebels, but resulted in the deaths of over 900 civilians.
AFRICOM – “the culmination of a ten-year thought process within the Department of Defense” – was set up, according to its website, to “help African nations, the African Union and the regional economic communities succeed.” A laudable goal – no doubt drawing on the US army’s great success in helping communities in Iraq and Afghanistan to thrive. “The designers of U.S. Africa Command,” they say, “clearly understood the relationships between security, development, diplomacy and prosperity in Africa.”
All good stuff. So what does AFRICOM choose as one of its first missions? A military operation against a guerrilla army that has eluded the Ugandan government for decades and has a long history of murdering innocent civilians in reprisal attacks. The US contributed intelligence (yes, really), advice and $1m in fuel.
When the operation failed, of course, and the rebels scattered, they punished local communities. Strangely, despite its claim to understand the links between development and security, and to “incorporate humanitarian organisations” in its activities, AFRICOM didn’t think to advise its Ugandan and Congolese partners, or UN peacekeepers, to protect civilians. Medecins Sans Frontieres says UN peacekeepers in Congo did nothing to protect people, while the UN says it doesn’t have the resources to do so. As Richard noted last week, some communities were able to defend themselves, though without any help from AFRICOM or its partners. But many couldn’t.
A UN official said the operation was as effective as throwing a rock at a hive of bees. Given that civilians’ security is a crucial prerequisite to their development, which in turn is crucial for both stemming the flow of recruits to the LRA and increasing communities’ resilience against it, it would appear AFRICOM’s leaders would benefit from going back to school and having a closer look at those links between development and security, rather than just throwing force at the problem.

















I think Europeans (and Afrcians) will have to help the Obama administration out of the Rumsfeldian mess that i AFRICOM. What about JFC Africa, a joint command with NATO, so that European may help temper matters…
I’d be interested to hear what Africans think about AFRICOM. Many would see it as neo-imperialism, I’d imagine.
The views of Africans matter, but as always it depends on who you ask. The truth is simple, though: the US will continue to engage African governments in military relationships, both for operational ends and to provide security assistance. They have done so for decades and will continue. The point is therefore whether Africom is a better vehicle in so far as it provides greater visibility and third-country in-put or not. Labels such a “neo-imperialism” are great on placards, but less useful as a guide to these tough policy questions.
I don’t think it’s inevitable that the US should continue to have a military presence in Africa, let alone step up its presence. Its involvement in past decades has been about propping up dictators with military and financial support in the face of the Soviet threat. This imperative no longer exists. America, moreover, has been chastened by its military adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it has a new president who seems keen to repair his country’s image in the world (and besides, Uganda doesn’t have an AMERICOM to ensure its own security).
What Africans think is fundamental to the success of the US’s Africa policy. If American involvement is not welcomed by people on the ground, its operations will fail, as we have seen in Iraq. If America is seen as a neo-imperialist power that continues to intrude in African affairs for its own ends, supporting nefarious governments as it did during the Cold War, it will turn young Africans against it (having joined in and perpetuated the devastating war in eastern Congo, Uganda’s Museveni is no saint).
Last week I gave a talk to the UK’s Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism, about the security situation in West Africa. In the discussion afterwards, they talked about the narratives Muslim extremists have used so effectively to recruit people to their cause. It is easy to envisage a scenario whereby continued US military interference in Africa becomes part of a long-term historical narrative of Western exploitation and abuse of the continent (taking in slavery, colonialism, the Cold War and AFRICOM). As demographic changes produce massive cohorts of young African adults with no jobs to go to and therefore in search of both outlets for their frustration and someone to blame, such a narrative will increase the supply of willing recruits to radical groups, and AFRICOM will have weakened rather than strengthened America’s security.
Mark,
I simply do not agree with parts of your assesment. I spent time in DC as AFRICOM was under development and nothing I saw or heard by way of briefings, assesments or programmes lead me to think that the Obama administration will want to terminate its security-related policies and programmes.
The programems will continue not because there are any dictators to prop up (though I would, as you would expect, object to your one-sided description of fifty years of US Africa policy), but because of terrorism concners and the belief that building effective and accountable security institutions is front and centre of the continent’s governance challenge. We know there are at least two international terrorist groups operating in West Africa: Hezbollah, which has long-standing, historic ties to the Lebanese diasporas centered in Abidjan, Ivory Coast and dominating trade throughout the region; and al Qaeda. A high-ranking former Labour minister event told me he thought Al Qaeda’s core would re-locate to Somalia in the next 2-3 years.
The terrorist threat in Africa is, of course, not uniform across the continent, but is notably more substantial in the northern half of the continent, where Islam is more present and state formation more problematic. No doubt a purely CT or security policy will not be enough. The US needs to focus more on the region’s own unique problems and need to emphasize state building and poverty reduction rather than military matters (though it should be remembered Bush oversaw the largest EVER expansion of US aid to Africa). But military matters will continue have a role, in part as a provider of security assistance to African states.
So bottom-line, the US is going to continue to have an African security policy. You may be right, AFRICOM could become part of what you call the “long-term historical narrative”. They clearly need your assistance and ideas to avoid such a trap.
Interesting stuff. I realise Somalia (which is in east Africa, not west, by the way) is a threat, and is probably too far gone to adopt a purely developmental rather than a security prospective. Elsewhere, I agree a continued US military presence is likely, but am not sure that it will be of great benefit either to the US or Africa. I think any consistent threat from sub-Saharan West Africa will come in the long-term, rather than the short, and that such a threat, particularly as the US hasn’t had a great record of picking decent African governments to support in the past (cf Mobutu and others), may be exacerbated by US militarism in the short-term.
I’ll post my talk up later today. Would be interested to hear your views.
I look forward to reading it. The comment on Somalia should have read: “in addition, a high-ranking….”. There are many things I don’t know, but I think my African geography is all right or at least better than my spelling…