Back when the US chaired the 2004 Sea Island G8, George Bush’s flagship proposal centred on the idea of a Greater Middle East Initiative, or GMEI (by way of a reminder, here’s what Brookings had to say about it then). At the time, there was heavy criticism – not only of of the GMEI’s optimistic hopes about democratisation, but also its dubious geographical assumptions: could Iran and Afghanistan really be lumped together with all the Arab countries?
But here’s the thing. If the idea of a Greater Middle East was clumsy, there’s still a case for coming up with some new geographical categories to reflect changed political realities in the region. In particular, it’s surprising that we still have no one category that draws together Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
All four countries would indisputably rank in any list of the ten countries with which British foreign policy is most concerned, given British military deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, ongoing concerns over Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and issues of state fragility in Pakistan.
More to the point, a solid grasp of regional dynamics and power relations is essential to understanding any of these countries. Iran is a key variable in prospects for the UK military deployment in southern Iraq. Both Iran and Pakistan are fundamental to Afghanistan’s future, and to the issues confronting NATO forces there. And from Iran’s own perspective, the presence of large US forces on both her western and eastern borders in unquestionably a factor in her security concerns and nuclear ambitions.
Yet western foreign policy institutions still tend to think in terms of the old regional categories. The ‘Middle East’ essentially refers to a bloc of Arab, mainly Sunni regimes that belong to the Arab League. Further east is a region usually thought of as ‘South Asia’: essentially, the Indian subcontinent, together with Pakistan.
Afghanistan doesn’t fit in very neatly, but can be (and usually is) bundled with South Asia. As for Iran, well, it’s essentially an anomaly as far as this typology is concerned.
These kind of questions about regional category are not just obscure, abstract issues for dinner party conversations. They matter, because foreign policy institutions organise themselves along regional lines – and forging a coherent, integrated regional strategy is inevitably be more difficult if responsibility for doing so is split between two parallel regional divisions.
So here’s an open question: over the next 3 to 5 years, will we see ministries of foreign affairs, national security councils and the UN Department of Political Affairs quietly reorganising so that each of them has a single department responsible for Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan?
