What Happens Now?
Time to deliver the post-2015 development agenda

Alex Evans and David Steven

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The world faces old and new security challenges that are more complex than our multilateral and national institutions are currently capable of managing. International cooperation is ever more necessary in meeting these challenges. The NYU Center on International Cooperation (CIC) works to enhance international responses to conflict, insecurity, and scarcity through applied research and direct engagement with multilateral institutions and the wider policy community.

CIC’s programs and research activities span the spectrum of conflict insecurity, and scarcity issues. This allows us to see critical inter-connections and highlight the coherence often necessary for effective response. We have a particular concentration on the UN and multilateral responses to conflict.
Table of Contents

What Happens Now?
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Introduction  3
The Story So Far        3
Key Moments in 2015         9
Navigating the Rapids        14
Political Objectives for 2015  16
Conclusion  19
Endnotes  20
“[A] goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win.”

John F. Kennedy in 1962, announcing the US’s decision to land on the moon before the end of the decade

“Don’t believe the hype, it’s a sequel”

Public Enemy in 1988, from the album, It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back
Introduction

This September, the world's leaders will gather in New York for a United Nations summit at which they will agree a new development framework to replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which expire at the end of 2015.

We already know much about what will replace them, with countries debating a proposal for 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that are intended to “constitute an integrated, indivisible set of global priorities for sustainable development.” Intergovernmental negotiations are also underway on how the new goals should be financed and on the global partnership that will be needed to implement them between 2016 and 2030.

A great deal, however, remains unclear. Will this much more ambitious set of goals and targets really drive delivery? Does the new agenda create a narrative that will resonate beyond the UN's negotiating rooms? What role will be played by poor, middle income, and rich countries? And given that this year will also see a major climate summit, will the world enter 2016 more or less able to tackle shared challenges?

This is the third in a series of What Happens Now? papers from the Center on International Cooperation. Like the previous papers, it provides a guide for all those interested in the debate on the post-2015 development agenda – including for those who have not followed the process closely, a set of players who will become especially important as the new agenda's start date approaches. It is after all domestic actors who will be primarily responsible for delivering the new goals and targets, not the ministries of foreign affairs and international development who have led on the post-2015 negotiations.

The paper:

- Tells the story so far, including the MDGs' track record, the origin of the post-2015 agenda, highlights of the process to date, and an overview of milestones over the remainder of the year.
- Argues that there are unlikely to be major changes from the proposed 17 goals and 169 targets, but that there is much to play for on implementation and financing.
- Calls for all stakeholders to look past the negotiation endgame, to 2016 and beyond: without an early commitment to delivery, the new agenda risks being discredited before it has got off the ground.

The Story So Far

The MDGs' legacy

The 1990s were dubbed the 'lost decade' for development, and with reason. The end of the Cold War saw many donors reduce spending: Official Development Assistance (ODA) shrunk from 0.32% of OECD countries' national income in 1990 to 0.22% in 2000. US aid spending more than halved as a proportion of GNI over the same period. This was also the heyday of austere structural adjustment programs, imposed by the IMF and World Bank as conditions of lending, and the period in which developing world debt reached crisis levels.

By contrast, the MDG era has been a golden one:

- Aid spending rebounded to close to its 1990 level (though even before the financial crisis, donor countries never exceeded the 0.32% of GNI that they spent in 1990).
- The Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative saw low income countries’ debt as a proportion of national income fall from 69% in 2000 to 29% today.
- Above all, the MDGs have coincided with spectacular progress on reducing poverty in its many dimensions.

The impact of the MDGs themselves, however, remains contentious. The improvement in wellbeing is too large and widespread to be denied. In 1990, 43.5% of people in developing countries lived on less than $1.25 a day. By the end of this year, this is projected to fall to 13.4%, comfortably exceeding the MDG target to halve extreme
poverty. All regions will also have met the target, apart from Sub-Saharan Africa, which is likely to see extreme poverty fall from 56.6% to 40.9% and, at current rates of progress, will not have halved global poverty until the mid-2020s.5

Other social indicators have also moved in the right direction. Global hunger fell by around 100 million people over the decade to 2012, in spite of two global food price spikes during that period.6 Striking progress has been made in tackling diseases like HIV, polio, and tuberculosis, and in access to safe water and sanitation.7 Children have received the greatest benefit from these trends. 17,000 fewer children died every day in 2013 than in 1990,8 while primary school enrollment has risen from 82% in 1999 to 90% in 2010.9

But the MDGs are not without their doubters:

• The development community has failed to conduct a systematic review of the value added by global goals and targets to business-as-usual trajectories, relying instead on evidence-free assertions of their worth (Ban Ki-Moon: “the MDGs have been the greatest anti-poverty push in history”).10 As a result, many assume that poverty has fallen purely as result of Chinese growth and other market trends. Some analysis suggests this is mistaken. Sumner and Tiwari find the goals had a “substantial but uneven” influence on pro-poor policy,11 while Wang and co-authors find an “undoubted” impact on child mortality, for example.12 The case, however, is far from proven.

• Progress has also been patchy. The world will not achieve many key MDGs in full, including those on hunger, child mortality, primary school enrollment, and in particular maternal mortality.13 Globally, the maternal mortality ratio fell by 45% between 1990 and 2013, far short of the MDG target of reducing the ratio by three-quarters by 2015.14 Similarly, the child mortality rate dropped by 47% between 1990 and 2012, and would have to drop a further 20 percentage points to reach the 2015 target.15 Certain countries and groups have also been left behind by the MDGs. Fragile and conflict-affected states have done especially poorly, with the 2015 OECD States of Fragility Report arguing that, “nearly two-thirds of countries and economies on the list of fragile states are expected to fail to halve poverty by 2015…one-fifth of countries on the list will reduce child mortality by two-thirds and just over a quarter of countries on the list will halve the number of people who do not have access to clean water.”16

• The MDGs are also criticized for being unbalanced. Many African governments believe the agenda has focused too much on social indicators rather than on the broader economic transformation their citizens demand.17 Above all, the world has gone backwards on environmental sustainability as it has moved forward with economic and social development. The world has already passed four of the Stockholm Resilience Center’s ‘planetary boundaries’ – on biodiversity, land use change including deforestation, altered biogeochemical cycles due to overuse of fertilizer, and climate change – and is rapidly heading towards a fifth, on ocean acidification.18

Yet despite these shortfalls, the MDGs will surely be regarded by generations to come as a success story. They have opened up space for policies that support more inclusive patterns of development, have underpinned greater aid spending and debt relief, and – in some sectors – have helped animate new types of global and regional partnership for development.

Perhaps most of all, the MDGs have been resonant and stood the test of time amongst a policy community that is notorious for its susceptibility to fashions and fads – providing both a consistent ‘strategic language’ for development practitioners, and a powerful story that has helped to keep developed country publics relatively supportive of aid spending and development priorities.
The birth of the post-2015 agenda

While informal discussions of a successor framework to the MDGs have been underway for at least five years, debate began in earnest at the Rio summit on sustainable development in 2012, which identified the need for a set of new SDGs that would address the social, economic, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development in a balanced way. These goals were to be:

“Action oriented, concise and easy to communicate, limited in number, aspirational, global in nature and universally applicable to all countries.”

In the lead-up to the summit, the UN Secretary-General had proposed asking a small group of “eminent persons” to develop a blueprint for the new development agenda. However, this elicited strong pushback from governments – and in particular from the G77* – who were determined that UN member states, not the Secretary-General, should be in the driving seat through a formal intergovernmental process.

The result was two parallel initiatives. Member states used the Rio outcome document to launch an ‘Open Working Group’ to prepare a proposal for the Sustainable Development Goals, while the Secretary-General convened a High-level Panel with the Presidents of Indonesia and Liberia, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, as co-chairs.

In May 2013, the Panel reported first, even as governments were still wrangling over which countries should be represented on the Open Working Group. Despite its cumbersome name – *A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty And Transform Economies Through Sustainable Development* – the report was well received. It proposed five ‘transformative shifts’ – ending poverty by ‘leaving no-one behind’; putting sustainability at the heart of global development; transforming economies so that they created greater opportunities and more inclusive patterns of growth; building peaceful societies and effective, open, and accountable institutions; and a new global partnership with the political will, capacity, and legitimacy to deliver the new agenda. It also called for a ‘data revolution’ to allow for better decision-making and accountability.

The Panel’s work was supplemented by other early inputs, including a report prepared by experts from more than 50 UN entities and international organizations, an expert-led report from the Sustainable Development Solutions Network, and reports based on consultations with the private sector, the UN regional commissions, and the public through the MyWorld survey, which had heard from over 7 million people by March 2015.

In July 2013, the Secretary-General reported to the General Assembly that common ground was emerging. The new development agenda would be universal in nature, with all countries taking responsibility for delivering goals and targets at home – rather than just in the world’s developing countries, as with the MDGs. It would be much more ambitious than the MDGs, taking on a broad set of economic, social, and environmental challenges, while making an end to poverty its highest priority. And the process should be concluded, he proposed, with a major summit in 2015 to finalize the new agenda and galvanize action – just as the Millennium Summit had done when it adopted the MDGs.

The Open Working Group’s proposed SDGs

In many ways, however, these contributions were a sideshow. The main action was in the Open Working Group, where 70 governments – sharing 30 ‘seats’ – immersed themselves in an intensive and exhausting debate about goals and targets.

In the early days, expectations were low about the Open Working Group’s ability to agree anything, with some observers predicting it would not be able to agree specific proposals. But its Co-Chairs – the Permanent Representatives to the UN from Kenya and Hungary – were always confident they could get much further than that, promising that they would produce a ‘near final’ set of goals and targets for General Assembly consideration.

*A group of 134 developing countries in the UN – “provides the means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues.”*
Many outsiders, and some governments, failed to heed this message. Their influencing strategies were timed for a culmination of the debate on goals and targets in 2015, on the assumption that the real horse-trading would start only when the deadline of the September summit began to loom. When the Open Working Group wrapped up its deliberations in July 2014 after a marathon final session, it began to dawn on them that much of the UN membership regarded the job as done. The G77 was quick to hammer this point home. The Open Working Group had reached an agreement through “painstaking and intensive work,” the G77 argued. It should be preserved in full and not re-opened or renegotiated.

So what had the Open Working Group proposed? Its goals are shown in box 1, with each goal having between 5 and 19 targets. Each target will eventually be “further elaborated through indicators focused on measurable outcomes.” The proposal is described as being “action oriented, global in nature and universally applicable” in accordance with the brief from the 2012 Rio summit. (Rio’s other criteria – a limited number of goals that would be easy to communicate – appears to have fallen by the wayside, however.)

### Box 1: The Open Working Group’s proposed Sustainable Development Goals

| Goal 1 | End poverty in all its forms everywhere |
| Goal 2 | End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture |
| Goal 3 | Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages |
| Goal 4 | Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all |
| Goal 5 | Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls |
| Goal 6 | Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all |
| Goal 7 | Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all |
| Goal 8 | Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all |
| Goal 9 | Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation |
| Goal 10 | Reduce inequality within and among countries |
| Goal 11 | Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable |
| Goal 12 | Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns |
| Goal 13 | Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts |
| Goal 14 | Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development |
| Goal 15 | Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss |
| Goal 16 | Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels |
| Goal 17 | Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development |
The OWG’s proposal:

- Takes the unfinished business of the MDGs as its starting point. As a result, many of its targets are ‘zero-based’. While the MDGs aimed to halve extreme poverty by 2015, for example, the Open Working Group wants to “eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere” by 2030. This has considerable normative and strategic implications. Zero-based targets establish a de facto ‘social floor’ – a minimum set of living standards that must be delivered by 2030. They also focus attention on those who face the highest barriers to escaping poverty.

- Makes the core MDG agenda considerably more ambitious. The Open Working Group has proposed that all children should be educated from pre-primary level through to the end of lower secondary school, despite the fact that progress has stalled in many countries on delivering universal primary education. With 40% of those in primary school not learning the basics, it has also called for a shift in emphasis from access to quality in education. Many of the other poverty and social development goals see similar increases in ambition, setting targets that imply very substantial increases to business-as-usual outcomes.

- Takes seriously the need for an economic transformation. The MDGs were far from silent on core economic priorities, promising decent work for all and the development of “an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system.” Little was done to implement these targets, however, leaving many countries – Africa in particular – to complain that the MDGs were skewed towards social priorities. The SDGs, by contrast, push for a greater focus on jobs, productivity, industrialization, infrastructure, energy, and other structural drivers of growth.

- Brings inequality to the heart of the framework, above all in Goal 10’s call to reduce inequality both within and among countries. This was a highly contentious area during the negotiations, but one that also reflected the high degree of topicality surrounding the issue, with Thomas Piketty’s book Capital topping best-seller lists around the world, many NGOs campaigning almost exclusively on this aspect of the post-2015 agenda, and political leaders including Barack Obama placing strong emphasis on the issue at home (if not in the SDG negotiations).

- Includes a commitment to peaceful societies, effective institutions, and access to justice. The debate about ‘Goal 16’ was extremely contentious and threatened to prevent the Open Working Group from reaching a consensus. Some countries saw peace and stability as fundamental to the new agenda, while others argued that security was dealt with elsewhere in the UN and feared a Western-led threat to their national sovereignty. In the end, the former group prevailed, with targets that will require very substantial reductions in violence and unprecedented successes in state building.

- Goes further on environmental sustainability than the MDGs. Where the MDGs had just one goal for environmental sustainability (with no mention made of climate change), the Open Working Group proposed four goals that have environment at their heart (climate change, oceans and marine resources, terrestrial ecosystems, and ‘sustainable consumption and production’), and also explicitly referenced sustainability in goals for agriculture, water and sanitation, energy, economic growth, and industrialization.

All told, the Open Working Group’s proposed framework looks very different to the MDGs. The scope of the agenda implies substantial changes to the lives of all 7 billion global citizens, rather than just the billion or so who live in absolute poverty. The sheer number of the goals and targets has also caused unease. “It wouldn’t be right to describe this as a Christmas tree,” the Center for Global Development’s Charles Kenny observed; “It is perhaps closer to a plantation of Christmas trees.”

The UK Prime Minister has fought a lonely battle for fewer goals. “Too many to communicate effectively, too many to inspire and rally people, and too many to use as
a guide for prioritizing action,” he has complained. This is a minority position among governments, despite some private support for the UK position, but there is broader sympathy for the UK’s argument that the proposed agenda is not SMART (Specific, Measurable, Actionable, Realistic, Time-bound). Targets such as those to “facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration,” “strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world’s cultural and natural heritage,” or “enhance global macroeconomic stability including through policy coordination and policy coherence” fail rather obviously in this regard.

As a result, a ‘technical proofing’ exercise has been proposed, that might be taken forward as part of the work of the UN Statistical Commission on possible indicators. Its scope is controversial, however. Some experts believe that substantial improvements to targets are needed, with one expert review finding that 54% of current targets need to be strengthened to bring them in line with existing international agreements, or make them more measurable or implementable, while 17% require wholesale revision. The G77, however, remains concerned that even a review that was confined to technical issues could upset the political bargain that underpins the current set of goals and targets. It has also argued that the goal framework should not be compromised in order to make it easier to communicate, as “form must always follow substance.”

The post-2015 co-facilitators have identified some targets that they believe could be improved, and it is possible that this will allay concerns about the scope of the exercise.

The process for developing indicators will itself open up some contentious debates, despite attempts to claim this is purely a technical process. The UN Statistical Commission has already ruffled some feathers with an initial assessment of proposed indicators, though its defenders would point out that the more imprecise targets leave it with an impossible job. It is far from clear that anyone is thinking about the political implications of some of the proposed indicators (on the proportion of citizens paying bribes to public officials, for example, or their satisfaction with public services) or about how data collection systems could be built to make massively increased data collection cost effective (harmonized household surveys, greater use of technology, etc.). It is sobering to realize that just measuring 169 targets may be too expensive and complex for many countries. If that is the case, delivery will surely be far beyond them.

The ICESDF and the SG’s Synthesis Report

Somewhat overshadowed by the Open Working Group, another discussion was underway in the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing (ICESDF). While the OWG was looking at what the world should aim to achieve in the post-2015 agenda, the ICESDF was instead looking at how it could be done and how much it would cost.

The ICESDF report, published in August 2014, argued that the world is awash with finance, with $22 trillion in annual global savings and public and private, and domestic and international financial flows all growing considerably since the MDGs were agreed. The problem was not a lack of money, then, but rather the challenge of directing investment towards sustainable development opportunities that delivered less attractive short-term returns than less sustainable alternatives. To address this, it proposed “a toolkit of policy options and financial instruments” that could be used within national development strategies and as part of a renewed partnership for sustainable development.

While the report did not set out to present a comprehensive agenda for delivering the SDGs, it did help to put a number of key delivery proposals firmly on the agenda, including:

- The idea of a global safety net to eradicate extreme poverty, with an estimated price tag of $66 billion a year.
- A call to focus ODA where the need is greatest, in particular on Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and other countries in special circumstances.
- A stronger focus on improving the supply of ‘bankable projects’ as targets for private sector investment in developing countries.
• A renewed call to strengthen international tax cooperation in areas like country-based reporting, transparency of company ownership, and automatic exchange of tax information.

• An improved global system for handling sovereign debt restructurings.

The Open Working Group and ICESDF wrapped up their work within a month of each other, passing the baton to the Secretary-General who had promised to synthesize all inputs into the post-2015 debate and present them back to member states. This was something of a poisoned chalice. Behind the scenes, the Secretary-General’s team came under considerable pressure to use the report to open up political space for a revision of the goals and targets, but there was powerful pushback from a number of governments who made it clear the Secretary-General had no mandate to unpick their work.

The result was a compromise, with the synthesis report arguing for the need to “frame the goals and targets in a way that reflects the ambition of a universal and transformative agenda.” It proposed keeping 17 goals, but rearranging them in a way that would create a stronger narrative and act as a spur for implementation. Exactly how this was to be done was not clear, but a process of clustering was envisaged around six “essential elements” that the Secretary-General asked members states to deliberate on in order to arrive at the concise and aspirational agenda mandated by the Rio 2012 summit (see box 2).

Box 2: The SG’s six “essential elements” for delivering the SDGs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dignity</th>
<th>To end poverty and fight inequalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>To ensure healthy lives, knowledge, and the inclusion of women and children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>To grow a strong, inclusive, and transformative economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planet</td>
<td>To protect our ecosystems for all societies and our children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>To promote safe and peaceful societies, and strong institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>To catalyze global solidarity for sustainable development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ‘essential elements’ have not been dismissed, but neither have they made much impact on subsequent negotiations. In part, this may be because the proposed clustering would inevitably be unbalanced (only one goal in both the justice and partnership clusters, for example) and arguably arbitrary (how do they relate to the three dimensions of sustainable development?).

But the battle to find a way to communicate the new agenda is not over, and proposals will continue to be made for how the goals can be edited, clustered, or somehow reframed. However, it seems increasingly unlikely that anyone will devise a formula sufficiently compelling to persuade the Open Working Group’s many supporters that they should be prepared to accept big changes.

Key Moments in 2015

As we enter the final year of negotiations, the debate on the new global development agenda to 2030 will take place along three tracks.

The Finance for Development conference, 13-16 July

First, there are the intergovernmental negotiations leading up towards the third International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD) which will be held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 13 to 16 July 2015.

This meeting is aimed at “high-level political representatives, including Heads of State and Government, and Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, as well as all relevant institutional stakeholders, non-governmental organizations and business sector entities.” According to an ‘elements paper’ published in January 2015, the main focus will be on domestic resource mobilization; private finance, from both domestic and international sources; international public finance; trade; technology, innovation and capacity building; sovereign debt; and the systemic issues that have been exposed by a string of economic and financial crises.
The process is being co-facilitated by the UN Permanent Representatives of Norway and Guyana, with preparatory negotiating meetings on the outcome document due to take place in New York in April (in advance of which a ‘zero draft’ of the outcome document has been published) and June. However, the process is still struggling to gain momentum:

- The decision to hold the summit in advance of the SDG summit in September was not universally welcomed, and is also at odds with the precedent of the first FfD summit in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002 – which took place two years after the MDGs were agreed. However, many developing countries were keen to have a clearer picture of the financing outlook before the SDGs themselves were finalized, and this view carried the day.

- There is an unresolved tension over whether the conference is purely about finance, or should take on a broader suite of implementation questions – especially given that the 17th SDG also covers delivery and financing. Some governments think Addis should take the lead on the latter issues too, with results then ‘plugged in’ to the post-2015 track; others argue that means of implementation (MOI) – especially in non-financial areas such as technology facilitation – need to remain central to the post-2015 negotiations.

- A much bigger question is what the FfD summit can deliver in terms of headline results. This has led to a lot of head scratching. The commitment from rich countries to increase aid spending will presumably be reiterated, but few show any appetite to join the five members of the 0.7% club – though there may be scope at least to increase the share of aid spent on Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Poorer countries could make a commitment to collecting the taxes needed to meet social welfare needs, helped by a greater global commitment to stemming the illicit financial flows that erode their tax base. Something could be done to report and monitor private investment and other business commitments. Overall, there is a real risk of a somewhat underwhelming package, with the political incentives for countries to make far-reaching ‘offers’ far from clear.

- This is exacerbated by the UN’s marginal role on economic governance. The post-2015 agenda has implications for all aspects of the way the global economy is run, but economic governance is not managed from New York. To the extent that it is under any collective control, the key decision-making bodies are the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Trade Organization, the G20 and G7, and a new generation of institutions that the BRICS countries are building. There is a role for the UN, as the only body with a universal membership; but there is little collective understanding of what the UN’s comparative advantage might be.

Inevitably, much of the text consists of exhortations to do better (“to encourage innovation, countries should remove barriers to entrepreneurship”) or broad promises that would need to become much more specific in order to exert real impact on policy (“we will adopt policies to internalize [environmental] externalities”). But there are commitments that either have teeth, or could be given them:

- A social compact is proposed that would aim to ensure that “every woman, every child and every family has access to a minimum package of essential services.” This would require every country to spend at least $300 per person and 10% of GDP on this aim by 2025.

- This commitment requires countries with low levels of taxation – below 20% of GDP – to raise more money (a target of halving the gap to 20% by 2025 is proposed),
as part of a package of measures to strengthen domestic resource mobilization.

• It would also require action to reduce illicit financial flows and tax evasion substantially. The zero draft makes welcome commitments to working with the G20 on its Base Erosion and Tax Shifting (BEPS) action plan and to developing a methodology for measuring illicit flows. It does not take the next step, however, of setting targets in this area for access to new systems for automatic exchange of tax information to be extended to all countries rather than just developed and emerging ones.

• Initiatives are also proposed in areas such as infrastructure (“a global initiative” to scale up investment in sustainable and resilient transport, communication, water and sanitation, energy, etc.) and education (a strengthened Global Partnership for Education to be focused on fragile and conflict affected states).

It is far from clear how significant a milestone the Addis conference will be – or even, who will go. The Ethiopian government believes that the conference offers a critical opportunity for Africa, as its countries assert their importance as the next generation of growth economies. A major push to bring together as many finance ministers as possible could also alert them to the responsibility they will bear for delivering the sustainable development agenda. Above all, the FfD summit needs to build political momentum, as the first of the big political showpieces in 2015.

The UN Summit for the Adoption of the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 25-27 September

Second, a parallel intergovernmental negotiation will prepare for the UN Summit for the Adoption of the Post-2015 Development Agenda to be held in New York from 25-27th September.

This summit will be built on the model of illustrious predecessors such as the Earth and Millennium Summits (and will presumably also have acquired a more compelling name by then). The opening of the summit has already been delayed by a couple of hours to ensure that the Pope will be able to address it. Most of the world’s leaders will attend, while a panoply of celebrities, philanthropists, and Nobel Peace Prize winners will be used to build media profile.

The main business of the summit will be the adoption of the new goals. Given that the Open Working Group’s proposal is likely to be adopted in its entirety, or with minor modifications, this raises the question about what months of negotiations ahead of the summit are intended to achieve. According to the Permanent Representatives of Kenya and Ireland, who lead these negotiations, their main purpose is to integrate the goals into a broader framework capable of mobilizing the political will and resources that are needed for their implementation. Aside from ‘technical proofing’ and discussion of indicators (discussed above), this will mean:

• An attempt to forge a declaration that is concise, memorable, and inspiring. This is likely to take the form of a call to action that will “recall the foundation of the UN 70 years ago and draw parallels with the scale of the challenge faced today and the response now decided on by world leaders,” while emphasizing the relevance of the new agenda to “ordinary people around the world.”

• A further push on ‘means of implementation’ (MOI) for the post-2015 agenda. This aspect of the summit’s work will depend heavily on what has – or has not – been achieved at the FfD summit in Addis Ababa, with a significant risk that things could go sour in New York if the Addis outcome is widely perceived as disappointing. (In particular, there is the potential for the charged issue of ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities’ to re-emerge as a key flashpoint issue, as it threatened to at points during the OWG negotiations.)

• Debate about the nature of the public-private partnerships that will be expected to help deliver the new agenda. The Open Working Group called for the development of new generation multi-stakeholder
partnerships capable of mobilizing the knowledge, expertise, technologies, and finance needed to meet the new goals.\textsuperscript{55} The UN membership has an ambivalent relationship to the partnerships it has already created, with some governments questioning their legitimacy, and others their effectiveness.\textsuperscript{4} The proposed goals cannot be delivered, however, without very broad private sector and citizen engagement, while the launch of new partnerships could offer tangible and newsworthy ‘deliverables’ for the September summit.

- Discussion about arrangements for “follow up and review” – in other words, how (or indeed whether) governments plan to hold themselves accountable for the commitments they are making. Like their predecessors, the SDGs will not be binding: they are not part of a treaty. But the development agenda must have some teeth to be credible. Some countries are pushing hard for greater accountability, given the failure to meet all the MDGs or to provide the finance that was promised to pay for them. Others, by contrast, are nervous about even using the words ‘accountability’ or ‘monitoring.’\textsuperscript{56}

**The wider political context**

A relatively small group of policymakers, and those who seek to influence them, have been immersed in the design of the post-2015 agenda for a couple of years now. It is easy for them to assume that awareness of what they are doing is high, but outside the relevant departments in foreign and development ministries, this is far from being the case. Ask a senior official from a domestic ministry for their views on the SDGs, and you are likely to receive a blank look.

This is starting to change. A few countries have begun to run cross-departmental processes to explore the implications of the proposed goals framework for national policy. Civil society groups with a national mandate, as well as some bigger businesses, are now starting to engage while non-specialist media has also begun to cover the issue. Over the coming months, this process will intensify:

- Prompted by the need to prepare leaders and ministers for their trips to Addis and New York, national political systems will continue to wake up to the domestic implications of the obligations that they are being signed up to. Some richer countries will be in for a shock when they realize that, unlike the MDGs, this is a framework for 7 billion people, with the implication that they will need to set out plans for achieving the goals at home.

- action/2015 [sic], a global civil society coalition that currently has a membership of 1,200 organizations, is determined to make the new development agenda ‘famous,’ with a plan to use traditional and social media, product packaging, and the education system to “get a concise version of the Goals to everyone on the planet.”\textsuperscript{57}

- As new voices enter the debate, opposition to the goals will intensify. Some ‘latecomers’ will disagree with specific aspects of the proposed agenda, but others will object to its very existence. It should be remembered that there is a persistent and vocal lobby that regards Agenda 21, a largely forgotten action plan developed at the Earth Summit in 1992, as a “destructive and insidious scheme” to dilute national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{58}

For the UN, meanwhile, 2015 is also about more than just development. From 30 November to 11 December, a major climate change summit will be held in Paris. As at the ill-fated Copenhagen summit in 2009, most countries are expected to send their leaders, with President Obama one of the first to commit to attending.\textsuperscript{59} Ban Ki-Moon has promised that Paris will deliver a “meaningful universal climate agreement” and that it will “galvanize transformative action in all countries to reduce emissions and build resilience to the adverse impacts of climate change.”\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{4} A recent review of 330 partnerships found that 38% are inactive, while only 24% have activities that are a direct match for the partnership’s stated vision and goals. http://icscentre.org/downloads/14_10_02_Multi-Stakeholder_Partnerships.pdf
There are many links between the post-2015 and climate processes, with long arguments in the Open Working Group about whether and how climate should be included in the SDGs given the need not to step on the toes of negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. (In the end, the climate goal was included but with an explicit deferral to the UNFCCC as “the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change.”) The most important cross-overs are political, however:

- Even those who are most optimistic about the prospects for an ambitious global deal in Paris accept that it will not be enough to put the world on track to keep emissions below 2°C. The post-2015 era will be one of growing climate impacts due to the failure to meet the objective of climate stabilization that governments signed up to within the UN in 1992. A new commitment to sustainable development will inevitably be seen in this light.

- Charged discussions about finance for development in Addis, and potentially New York, as well will take place in parallel with equally contentious negotiations about climate finance in the run-up to Paris. The interests of Least Developed Countries will be especially important on both tracks, with a real risk that a 2015 ‘double disappointment’ on aid flows and climate finance could generate a walkout in Paris.

- The ‘atmospherics’ of the post-2015 and climate negotiations will also inevitably influence each other, as the UN prepares for two major summits in just 100 days. Some observers still believe that the two processes can be kept in separate silos, but lines are already becoming blurred and will become more so as heads of state become involved. In the best case, a successful post-2015 summit will pave the way for similar success in Paris. In the worst, the UN could enter 2016 seriously weakened.

As ever, there is much else on the international agenda, with the usual round of meetings such as the World Bank/IMF Spring Meetings (April), the G7 (in Germany in June), the High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (June/July), and the G20 (in Turkey in November), each of which will be used to build political momentum on one aspect or another of the post-2015 agenda.

In June, three processes – the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, the Review of the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture, and the High Level Panel on the Humanitarian System – will report on aspects of the UN’s peace and security mission, with each having important implications for implementation of the peaceful societies SDG. These, and other initiatives, form part of Ban Ki-Moon’s commitment to making the UN ‘fit for purpose’ to deliver the new agenda.

And to add another multilateral pressure point to the latter part of the year, there is a WTO Ministerial Conference in Nairobi in December, where the WTO is once again promising a decisive breakthrough on the long-delayed Doha round. With the additional risk that an international crisis could emerge to absorb scarce political bandwidth during the run up to the New York summit, the post-2015 process cannot be viewed in isolation from the broader political context.

What happens elsewhere will have a critical influence on any last minute political horse-trading, and on how the new development agenda is perceived when it is launched in September 2015.
Navigating the Rapids

The political context

Against this backdrop, what kind of political strategy should governments, multilateral leaders, civil society groups, and other stakeholders be employing as attempts to agree an ambitious, coherent, and compelling post-2015 agenda enter their final stages?

At present, there is a leadership deficit. It is hard to identify a single national leader showing serious personal commitment to securing a breakthrough on the post-2015 agenda – a dynamic that needs to be challenged and reversed, and quickly, as the world enters the critical decision-making period.

OECD countries are not yet feeling real political pressure to deliver – either in terms of a financing deal at Addis, or on implementation more generally. With most only paying lip service to the 0.7% aid target, they badly need to bring something new to the table if they are to convince others that they take the new development agenda seriously.

That means creating political incentives for leaders and finance ministers to get involved – the only ones with authority to cut through the instinctive caution of negotiators. IMF managing director Christine Lagarde’s announcement that she will attend the Addis summit is a good start. The World Bank/IMF spring meetings, the G7 finance ministers meeting (Dresden, 27-29 May 2015), and the 2015 Global Forum on Development (Paris, 1 April 2015) all provide opportunities for richer countries to put their money (or a renewed commitment to systemic reform) where their mouth is.

Stronger pressure from civil society is vital to pushing OECD countries to go further, given that global NGOs primarily influence developed countries. In July and September, action/2015 may be able to push one or two contentious issues over the line, but most (and possibly all) major decisions will already have been made by then. A distinctive set of ‘asks’ for OECD countries is badly needed now – with the right balance struck between ambition and political feasibility.

What emerging economies want from, and can contribute to, the post-2015 agenda remains unclear. The world’s major middle-income powers will play a pivotal role in determining the success of a new global development agenda. Brazil feels a strong sense of ownership of the Rio 2012 summit, and has been a strong advocate for its outcome document to be used as the basis for the new goals and targets. China is one of the world’s most important sources of development finance and has enormous influence over the G77. India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey – all G20 members – are becoming increasingly important development actors.

Collectively, the emerging powers also exert growing influence over the UN development system, as they position a growing number of their nationals in leadership roles, increase funding support, and initiate and lead new types of partnership. However, they remain frustrated by their inability to achieve their reform objectives. Modest changes to IMF governance have foundered in the US Congress. Proposals for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism are also being resisted by the United States and other developed countries.

Then there are the related questions of what the principle of universality means for non-Western major powers and what role they will play in the global partnership that is supposed to deliver the post-2015 agenda. Many of the proposed targets will prove extremely stretching for countries that have become accustomed to attention being paid primarily to their development successes, rather than their shortcomings. It is far from clear what commitment they have to domestic implementation.

Internationally, there are also important unanswered questions. To what extent will the emerging powers contribute to multilateral, rather than bilateral, development assistance? Will they invest in existing global institutions, or continue to create alternatives such as the BRICS bank or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank? And will they emerge as ‘laboratories of sustainable development’, exporting models, technologies and new
approaches that can underpin the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals?\textsuperscript{27}

There is a possibility – probably a slim one – that 2015 could see emerging economies play a greater leadership role in return for substantial progress in their quest for seats at the top table of global governance, for instance by committing to spend some nominal level of aid and report on it transparently. But there is also a risk that 2015 could be seen as the year in which some or all of these countries begin to head for the exit of the multilateral development system.

Third, least developed countries and fragile states remain a crucial constituency in the post-2015 agenda.

The priorities of LDCs have become significantly clearer in recent months, focusing on a higher share of global ODA flows, progress beyond the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative on debt sustainability, greater investment in technology facilitation, and more focus on the obstacles to the poorest countries benefiting from the global trade system.

However, the LDCs may lack the political traction to secure significant wins in these areas, despite the moral imperative to do more to support the needs of the poorest countries (and the resonance that this will have in campaigning narratives over the coming months). In particular, it remains to be seen whether the LDCs can make the G77 work for them, or whether their interests will continue to be subsumed by the same old fights between the West and the rest, and by opposition from richer G77 members who resist any diversion of aid despite their increasing access to alternative sources of development finance.

The challenges facing fragile and conflict-affected states – some of which are also LDCs, others of which are more prosperous – are even greater. These countries face the most severe challenges in delivering the SDGs, with many stalled on MDG indicators (or seeing reverses). As the President of Liberia has argued, “The capacity of fragile states is weak, resources are scarce, and the imperatives of urgency are more intense because whatever you do is to ensure that you begin to consolidate those gains and begin to deliver to people in a much more timely fashion to manage expectations to prevent any chance of slipping back into conflict.”\textsuperscript{28} The Ebola epidemic has exposed how vulnerable these countries are (and, also, the risk that this creates for the rest of the international system).

But fragile states are far from being a coherent lobby within the UN (with even the term itself a perennially controversial one). The g7+ – an association of 20 conflict-affected countries – has set out a vision for the development architecture that it feels will help build peaceful states and societies,\textsuperscript{29} but has faced considerable resistance from the rest of the G77, partly because of suspicion at the role played by the OECD in convening this group. Conflict-affected countries achieved a notable success in ensuring that peace and stability was a pillar in the African common position on post-2015, but it remains to be seen whether the world’s most vulnerable countries will be able to mobilize to place themselves at the forefront of the closing stages of the post-2015 debate.
Political Objectives for 2015

Principles for the next nine months

Against this political backdrop, how can high-ambition leaders best approach the intensive period of agenda-setting and negotiation that now looms in front of them? Four principles should be followed.

Stop fighting losing or pointless battles.

Despite the shortcomings of the OWG’s proposed SDG framework, there appears to be no real prospect of reducing the number of goals and targets. The post-2015 co-facilitators have said that “it is clear that there is no support for re-opening the exhaustive negotiations we all had in the OWG.” This is now a red line for the G77, and support for major changes from other countries is patchy at best. Most importantly of all, it is far from clear that advocates for brevity are prepared to give up any of the goals and targets that matter to them. This provides no grounds for a political bargain.

This does not mean that no improvements should be sought. If there are targets that could be improved through re-wording, or that would not be missed if they were dropped altogether, then specific proposals should be made – rather than general exhortations to make the framework SMART-er. At present, those who are instinctively opposed to any changes have not seen anything that could persuade them that a real improvement is possible. As a result, suspicion of hidden agendas is rife. At the very least, those who resist changes will need to accede to a process to remove the x’s and y’s from the targets (e.g. by 2030, increase by x% the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills… for employment), and to align the SDGs with the FfD outcome (for example, if the proposed reduction in illicit financial flows is quantified ahead of Addis, as we have proposed).

In any case, it would be helpful to leave the window open for targets to be revised and strengthened in 2017 or 2018 after the agenda has begun to bed down. By then, it will be clear where delivery is being held back by a poorly structured target that does not motivate stakeholders to act or cannot tell them whether or not they are meeting their objectives.

Put concerted energy into narrative and communication.

The post-2015 agenda needs a resonant political narrative if it is to excite, inspire, and engage in the way the MDGs did. But as with arguments about the size of the agenda, the debate around narrative and communication remains nebulous and unsatisfying: there are many more exhortations about the ‘need to resonate’ than practical suggestions about how this can be done.

Credit is due to the Secretary-General for making a concrete recommendation: his ‘clustering’ proposal may not have attained launch velocity, but at least it put an option on the table. More of these options are now needed.

One way forward would be to ask an informal group of development, campaigning, and communication professionals to spend a week together exploring various ways of wrangling the goals and targets into a more compelling format. Options could then be properly tested – both with policymakers and the public in a representative set of countries – providing an input for negotiators that would inform their deliberations.

Tackle the ‘long crisis’ of globalization.

In the Millennium Declaration, leaders argued that “the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world’s people.” Global systems were capable of producing great prosperity, they believed, but the benefits and costs were unevenly shared, while patterns of development were frequently unsustainable.

15 years later, it is clear that globalization’s ‘long crisis’ has deepened. The world has suffered the latest in a string of financial shocks, inequality has become a central political challenge, and elites in many countries are increasingly seen as compromised or corrupt. The environment, in particular, is under severe stress, with the climate reaching the point where “severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems” seem close to inevitable.
Crisis, and the widespread public anger that has accompanied it, has created political space to address these challenges seriously. The FfD outcome document is deeply unconvincing on how the world can build a more resilient financial system. It also needs to go further on illicit financial flows and corporate tax avoidance, setting a stretching target for how far and how quickly they can be released. This is most likely to provide the Addis summit with its most important outcome, and would also form part of a political bargain where greater domestic resource mobilization is complemented by better quality aid and a reduction in globalization’s tendency to suck resources away from already fragile governments.

Or to take a third example, the inclusion of sustainable consumption and production in the SDGs gives policymakers an opportunity to get much more serious about reconciling the global economy with the planetary boundaries that define its safe operating space. But this requires more than a vague commitment in Addis to set up a ‘global initiative’ to invest in resilient infrastructure, price environmental externalities, or make businesses report on their environmental impact. Much more detailed financial and policy commitments are needed, combined with a clear signal that these proposals are backed by the business and financial communities.

Above all, switch the focus to delivery.

Apart from the communications challenges, a danger of having a large number of goals and targets is that governments will regard the new agenda as a ‘menu’ from which to pick and choose, rather than the “indivisible set of global priorities for sustainable development” that negotiators say they have devised.84

Developing countries may welcome this, given their emphasis on national control of development strategies, but will be less pleased if donor countries feel similarly free to select the parts of the SDG framework they like, and ignore the rest.

The bigger risk, though, may be not a failure to implement all the goals, but a slow start in delivering any of them. Few governments or international organizations have even begun to plan for implementation, and more or less all of them – including donors, who have a key stake in ensuring a smooth transition from the old to the new development agendas – are underestimating the strategic challenges of switching from the MDGs to the new agenda.

The President of the World Bank, for example, has been largely silent on the SDGs and the post-2015 agenda, as the Bank focuses on its own strategic goals (reducing $1.25 a day poverty to 3% by 2030, and income growth for the bottom 40% of the population in every country).85 In 149 speeches and other transcripts since the Rio 2012 summit, Jim Yong Kim has referenced the post-2015 agenda a grand total of seven times – of which four are about health, and the other three no more than passing mentions.86

The major bilateral donors, meanwhile, have begun to explore the delivery implications of the new agenda behind closed doors, but are far from being ready to press the green light on new programming. There are bright spots in some sectors (for example, the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) partnership or, for health, Every Woman Every Child), but others whose potential remains unproven (the Sustainable Energy for All initiative which was designed to deliver the energy SDG and has already had three years to demonstrate that the post-2015 agenda can turn billions of dollars of incremental investment into measurable impact).87

Delivery is an underrated part of the narrative and communications challenge. In September, the media will – quite rightly – be deeply skeptical of a laundry list of aspirational targets. Without high-profile commitments to delivery over the first five years of the new agenda, the longer-term vision to 2030 will struggle to gain credibility, while the world’s capacity to undertake collective action will continue to erode.

A tactical playbook

With these overarching principles in mind, what should our tactics look like?

First, it will be essential to set clear priorities and stick to them. A huge number of issues are on the table, each
with their own agendas, discussion and decision forums, technocratic ‘priesthoods’, and so on. There is no realistic prospect of a major breakthrough on all parts of the agenda. Instead, it will be necessary to focus on a small set of headlines, define what success looks like on each, and bring them together into a well-designed package that can be effectively communicated.

Second, we need to **be clear about how the two big set pieces – in Addis and New York – are supposed to work together**. Having made the decision to have an FfD conference in advance of the September summit in New York, it makes no sense for the post-2015 agenda to steal its thunder. Moreover, if substantive MOI negotiations do take place as part of the post-2015 track, there will be substantially less pressure on countries to deal seriously at Addis.

On this note, third, **it is essential that finance ministers attend the Addis summit**, and that they show up there ready to seal a deal that prepares the way for their leaders to act in New York. Civil society groups and other opinion formers should make clear that there will be no excuses and no exceptions – and keep a public tally of which have and have not undertaken to participate. For every G20 economy, delegations should also include credible representatives from the business and financial communities; ministers or senior officials with responsibility for planning, long-term policy and so on; and relevant sub-national leaders (e.g. mayors of major financial centers).

Fourth, **policymakers urgently need to start looking beyond the formal outcome document from each summit**. In 2002, Monterrey yielded three different kinds of outcomes:

- **First, high impact announcements**, such as the US’s unveiling of the Millennium Challenge Corporation and its PEPFAR initiative on HIV and AIDS.
- **Second, a political narrative that helped to underpin longer term progress**, such as decade-long aid increases or the HIPC debt relief initiative.
- **And third, planting conceptual seeds for the future** – for instance in highlighting domestic resource mobilization as a key area in finance for development.

A similar sense of the key outcomes from Addis is now urgently needed too, with a focus on no more than four or five key elements in each of these three areas.

Fifth, **put delivery at the heart of the narrative for both post-2015 and FfD**. In part, this is about getting the high impact announcements right for both summits. For example, the FfD agenda could be brought alive through:

- A major commitment to a package of financial support needed to accelerate progress on the Rio+20 vision to ensure the **protection, survival, and development of all children to their full potential**, with a focus on the most vulnerable children. This would bring together work to transition to a revised global strategy for women’s and children’s health, proposals to strengthen the Global Partnership for Education, and a new initiative to launch a partnership and fund to end violence against children.

- A parallel set piece could bring together proposals on infrastructure and energy, offering a credible answer to the question of whether the new agenda has any levers to deliver an economic transformation. Sustainable Energy for All – the global partnership that has acted as a prototype for the new development agenda – could be re-launched in Addis and flesh put on the bones of the proposed new platform for infrastructure.

- An initiative that tackles the nuts and bolts of how governments with limited capacity can stem illicit financial flows and collect taxes, would capitalize on the political momentum that has been generated around this issue. Again, this would back up headline commitments in the outcome document, persuading skeptical audiences that they can lead to real-world benefits for vulnerable countries.
Creative approaches will also be needed to reach a satisfactory conclusion on accountability mechanisms – or ‘follow up and review’ for governments who are allergic to the A-word. The MDGs have benefited from global reporting in a format that is comprehensible to non-UN audiences (an annual assessment since 2005 and a ‘Gap Task Force Report’ since 2008). At Rio+20, governments committed to publishing a global sustainable development report. While the ‘prototype’ for this report was underwhelming, it could be repurposed as a flagship annual publication that assesses trajectories four or five clusters of SDGs on a regular cycle.

Rio+20 also set up a High Level Political Forum to “provide political leadership, guidance, and recommendations for sustainable development,” which meets annually at ministerial level and every four years for leaders, and a registry of commitments “by all stakeholders and their networks to implement concrete policies, plans, programs, projects and actions to promote sustainable development and poverty eradication.” Rather than set up further competing bodies, it seems essential that the Forum is established as an apex body for the broader set of regional, national and sectoral review mechanisms. This, surely, has to be the body where political and other leaders take responsibility for delivery of the new goals and targets.

Finally, it is essential to look beyond September. There is a real risk that the post-2015 process will make the same mistake as the 2005 reform agenda, when exhaustion set in following the 2005 World Summit, resulting in a crucial loss of momentum in implementing what had been agreed. On the other hand, new players are now coming in to the post-2015 agenda, with the capacity to bring fresh momentum.

Political strategies therefore need to look ahead all the way through 2016, with a delivery window to 2020. To begin with, they should start by looking at how the post-2015 agenda will be taken forward in major events next year. What will happen at G7, G20, High Level Political Forum, the World Humanitarian Summit, and so on? How will the SDGs agenda play into the selection process for the next UN Secretary-General, which will be underway in earnest next year? How will the World Bank be brought on board more seriously than it has been to date?

**Conclusion**

One way or another, 2015 will be a pivotal moment for the international community.

In hindsight, the new development agenda may be seen as an overhyped sequel that fails to match the promise of its more modest predecessor. In agreeing such broad and ambitious goals, governments have set the bar high. If they fail to show equivalent ambition when it comes to delivery, this will feed cynicism about multilateralism, confirming the UN as the pointless talking shop its critics have always claimed it to be. With major recent disappointments at Copenhagen in 2009, Rio in 2012, and on IMF reform in 2014, 2015 could become seen as the final straw – ‘the year we broke the international system’ – if the SDGs are largely ignored, the Paris climate deal is weak or non-existent, and the Doha trade round remains a ‘multilateral zombie.’

On the other hand, 2015 may yet emerge as a turning point towards a more sustainable future for all 7 billion (and counting) of the world’s people. In his ‘moon speech,’ John F. Kennedy spoke of the need for goals that “organize and measure the best of our energies and skills” and offer challenges that we are willing to accept, unwilling to postpone, and which we intend to win. We live in an era where the pace of technological and economic progress has left governance and social norms struggling to keep up. At its best, the post-2015 agenda could be a sign they are beginning to catch up – and that governments are ready to marshal behind a ‘grand strategy’ for addressing the global challenges that have the potential to derail human progress in the 21st century.

As work to design the new agenda enters its final stages, there remains much to play for.
What Happens Now? | Time to deliver the post-2015 development agenda

Endnotes


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Personal Communication

See Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by Mr Julio Mollinedo Claro, Minister Counselor of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the United Nations, available at http://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=140911b

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What Happens Now? | Time to deliver the post-2015 development agenda


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