NATO to Hoon: sod off

NATO is not impressed by Geoff Hoon’s involvement in lobbygate:

NATO says it is dropping former British defense secretary Geoff Hoon from a group of experts drawing up the alliance’s new strategic concept.

Hoon is among three former Cabinet ministers who have been suspended from Britain’s ruling Labor Party over allegations they tried to trade access to government officials for cash…

NATO spokesman James Appathurai says Hoon had been nominated to the group by the British government. Appathurai says given Hoon’s suspension “he has been asked to end his participation in the group.”

Via @David_Stringer

On the web: skirmish in the Falklands, NATO futures, State Dept’s media relations, and “cloud computing”…

– As the diplomatic temperature continues to rise in the South Atlantic, Simon Jenkins suggests that the Falklands are “the Elgin marbles of diplomacy” and a “post-imperial anachronism” that should lead Britain to the negotiating table. Hugo Rifkind, meanwhile, explains why he won’t be shedding tears for Argentina’s President, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, while The Economist highlights her failure to see the current crisis as an economic rather than a political opportunity.

– Rob de Wijk explores (pdf) the future options for NATO as it come to terms with changing geopolitics. Andrew J. Bacevich, meanwhile, cites a failure to sufficiently “reignite Europe’s martial spirit” and carve a global role for NATO in the 21st Century as cause for the US to draw back engagement in the alliance. Let it return to its origins and “devolve into a European organization, directed by Europeans to serve European needs”, he argues.

– Elsewhere, the London Review of Books blog offers reaction to plans for the new US Embassy in London. Associated Press, meanwhile, has news of an internal State Department report criticising its media operations.

– Finally, VoxEU explores the emergence of “cloud computing” and its potential impact on our lifestyles, business innovation, and economic growth. Charles Leadbeater assesses the associated rise of “cloud culture” and the importance of guarding this new space from the overbearing influence of government and big business. Elsewhere, over at Brookings Mark Muro wonders if the rise of Amazon’s Kindle could be a “symbol of American decline”.

‘Nato solidarity more important than winning in Afghanistan’ (er…)

Quentin Peel had a slightly bizarre column in the FT yesterday, bemoaning the Europeans’ paltry response to Obama’s request for more boots on the ground in Afghanistan. As he notes, European governments are “terrified of offending hostile public opinion that cannot understand – and has never understood – why their soldiers are dying in such a distant land”. He continues [emphasis added],

Part of the problem is that the Nato allies went into the war in 2003 without a common strategy, or a common narrative. Countries such as Germany and the Netherlands persuaded their parliaments that the job was about peace-keeping, not fighting Taliban insurgents. Germany and France also sent special forces to join the US in Operation Enduring Freedom – fighting the Taliban and hunting for al-Qaeda – but they kept it secret.

The British, Dutch and Danes are now much more open that it is a real war, and that Nato’s survival is on the line. Others, including the Germans, are not. There is a logical reason.

“The more the Europeans build it up as make-or-break for Nato, or suggest ‘our security is on the line’, the more they set themselves up for failure,” says a European diplomat. “By keeping it low key, they keep an exit strategy.”

The danger for Nato is two-fold. Without greater European commitment, the war will be “Americanised”, and risk becoming yet more unpopular in Europe. As for the alliance, it is becoming a “coalition of the willing” by default. The fundamental assumption of Nato solidarity is called into question. That is more dangerous than losing the war.

Um – what? How on earth can losing the war be less dangerous than erosion of Nato solidarity, given that Nato doesn’t seem to be able to find anywhere else in the world, besides Afghanistan, where it clearly still has a role?

If policymakers in Nato member states are really going to set out a compelling narrative about why we’re at war in Afghanistan, then surely that narrative needs to rest on what Nato’s trying to achieve in Afghanistan.  “Safeguarding Nato coherence” does not seem a very satisfactory answer to that question.

Civilianise ESDP

Earlier in the week, Charlie talked about the Tories’ weakness on foreign and defense policy. In many ways, he gave voice to a view felt across the British foreign and defence community. That the Tories do not have a serious and detailed set of national security policies that can be turned into government action. The contrast to the Obama administration is stark. The Democratic President has been able to populate his administration with America’s finest foreign policy thinkers, all of whom have thought deeply about what a Democratic foreign policy should look like.

The Tories are not the only ones blame for the dearth of policy thinking. The British system of government militates against party-based subject-mater expertise. Parties are meant to develop the broad strokes of ideas, which will then be developed and implemented by officials if they enter government. It is therefore very difficult for the Opposition to attract experienced foreign policy thinkers. The pay is low and the rewards are not as attractive as in the U.S. The most a future British Prime Minister can offer is junior ministerial portfolio, working to a senior politician whose background may not be well-suited for a security-related job.

But one issue can be parked at the Tories’ door. Having canvassed a wide section of the London-based foreign policy community, the one issue that keeps coming up time and again is the Tories’ euro-scepticism. As one senior (and decidedly euro-sceptic) thinker told me: “The Tories are rowing back on the pragmatic NATO-EU policy that Malcolm Rifkind developed when he was Defence Secretary.” A widely-respected senior military commander told me only two days ago: “It’s as if a veil descends across their faces when Europe comes up. They don’t even want to engage. But this is not about a European army; it’s about being able to work with allies.”

(more…)

Credit crunch = peacekeeping crunch

News from Lebanon:

BEIRUT: Poland has said it may withdraw its troops from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), prompting fears of a “crunch” in international peacekeeping resources as governments slash spending in the face of the global financial crisis. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said Saturday that his government would “certainly take a decision” this year on the continued presence of almost 500 troops that the country contributes to UNIFIL.

Last month Poland announced it would cut its contribution to a peacekeeping force in Chad in a bid to save money.  “We will consider whether it makes sense to continue certain foreign missions,” Tusk said.

His comments come as his government announced it is cutting spending by almost $5 billion as the global economic crisis deepens, and there are fears that other countries could follow suit and seek to save money by withdrawing troops from expensive overseas peacekeeping missions.

Last week France announced cuts in such missions around the world, including the withdrawal of two naval vessels from UNIFIL’s maritime contingent, which patrols Lebanese waters to prevent arms smuggling into the country by sea.

The problem stems from the way the countries are reimbursed for the peacekeepers they provide. The UN offers a fixed amount for each solider that a country contributes to a peacekeeping mission, regardless of how much it costs the country to pay the soldier.

The system means that poorer countries are able to contribute troops without cost to their domestic budget. But in richer countries, where soldiers earn more than the UN’s reimbursement, national governments are footing the bill for contributing troops to the missions.

On this reckoning, the financial crisis means that the West will increasingly demand that poor countries take on peacekeeping – more UN and AU missions, then, and less from NATO. Poor governments may well respond with enthusiasm, as UN subsidies will help keep their generals happy. Peace operations will remain low-tech and dogged by fights between “those who pay” and “those who play”… Not a happy picture.