NATO says it is dropping former British defense secretary Geoff Hoon from a group of experts drawing up the alliance’s new strategic concept.

Hoon is among three former Cabinet ministers who have been suspended from Britain’s ruling Labor Party over allegations they tried to trade access to government officials for cash…

NATO spokesman James Appathurai says Hoon had been nominated to the group by the British government. Appathurai says given Hoon’s suspension “he has been asked to end his participation in the group.”

Via @David_Stringer

- Rob de Wijk explores (pdf) the future options for NATO as it come to terms with changing geopolitics. Andrew J. Bacevich, meanwhile, cites a failure to sufficiently “reignite Europe’s martial spirit” and carve a global role for NATO in the 21^st Century as cause for the US to draw back engagement in the alliance. Let it return to its origins and “devolve into a European organization, directed by Europeans to serve European needs”, he argues.

- Elsewhere, the London Review of Books blog offers reaction to plans for the new US Embassy in London. Associated Press, meanwhile, has news of an internal State Department report criticising its media operations.

- Finally, VoxEU explores the emergence of “cloud computing” and its potential impact on our lifestyles, business innovation, and economic growth. Charles Leadbeater assesses the associated rise of “cloud culture” and the importance of guarding this new space from the overbearing influence of government and big business. Elsewhere, over at Brookings Mark Muro wonders if the rise of Amazon’s Kindle could be a “symbol of American decline”.

Part of the problem is that the Nato allies went into the war in 2003 without a common strategy, or a common narrative. Countries such as Germany and the Netherlands persuaded their parliaments that the job was about peace-keeping, not fighting Taliban insurgents. Germany and France also sent special forces to join the US in Operation Enduring Freedom – fighting the Taliban and hunting for al-Qaeda – but they kept it secret.

The British, Dutch and Danes are now much more open that it is a real war, and that Nato’s survival is on the line. Others, including the Germans, are not. There is a logical reason.

“The more the Europeans build it up as make-or-break for Nato, or suggest ‘our security is on the line’, the more they set themselves up for failure,” says a European diplomat. “By keeping it low key, they keep an exit strategy.”

The danger for Nato is two-fold. Without greater European commitment, the war will be “Americanised”, and risk becoming yet more unpopular in Europe. As for the alliance, it is becoming a “coalition of the willing” by default. The fundamental assumption of Nato solidarity is called into question. That is more dangerous than losing the war.

Um – what? How on earth can losing the war be less dangerous than erosion of Nato solidarity, given that Nato doesn’t seem to be able to find anywhere else in the world, besides Afghanistan, where it clearly still has a role?

If policymakers in Nato member states are really going to set out a compelling narrative about why we’re at war in Afghanistan, then surely that narrative needs to rest on what Nato’s trying to achieve in Afghanistan.  “Safeguarding Nato coherence” does not seem a very satisfactory answer to that question.

The Tories are not the only ones blame for the dearth of policy thinking. The British system of government militates against party-based subject-mater expertise. Parties are meant to develop the broad strokes of ideas, which will then be developed and implemented by officials if they enter government. It is therefore very difficult for the Opposition to attract experienced foreign policy thinkers. The pay is low and the rewards are not as attractive as in the U.S. The most a future British Prime Minister can offer is junior ministerial portfolio, working to a senior politician whose background may not be well-suited for a security-related job.

But one issue can be parked at the Tories’ door. Having canvassed a wide section of the London-based foreign policy community, the one issue that keeps coming up time and again is the Tories’ euro-scepticism. As one senior (and decidedly euro-sceptic) thinker told me: “The Tories are rowing back on the pragmatic NATO-EU policy that Malcolm Rifkind developed when he was Defence Secretary.” A widely-respected senior military commander told me only two days ago: “It’s as if a veil descends across their faces when Europe comes up. They don’t even want to engage. But this is not about a European army; it’s about being able to work with allies.”

This policy may play well to the Conservative base and parts of the press. There will certainly be plenty of people who will applaud such policies.

But nobody wants a European army, not even the French (if you think they do, you have probably not discussed the issue with French policy-makers). The point is different. Britain needs to work with allies in NATO and the EU to forge new security policies to counter new and old threats. That is certainly going to be what the new U.S administration wants. To start off by being so dismissive of everything European will not be helpful. Instead the Tories should develop a European security concept that does not cross their (rightly) anti-federal red-lines, but opens up room for negotiation.

Here is how. Turn ESDP into a civilian effort. From Iraq to Afghanistan it is clear that Britain and NATO need more civilian expertise. NATO will never be allowed to “go civilian” by France, Italy and Germany (as NATO decisions are by consensus). So let ESDP become the vehicle to deliver the much-needed civilian effect – the lawyers, judges, engineers etc. that are needed to engage in counter-insurgency operations. The current, small EU military missions in the Balkans and Chad can remain, but the EU should not deploy any more of these. Instead, the Tories should pledge support for hiring civilian experts and setting up the necessary bureaucratic arrangements for ESDP to get these civilian experts to work alongside NATO’s soldiers and the UN. 

That way, the Tories can show (future allies) they are willing to deliver some pragmatic EU policies, avoid duplication with NATO and provide much-needed assistance in places like Afghanistan.

BEIRUT: Poland has said it may withdraw its troops from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), prompting fears of a “crunch” in international peacekeeping resources as governments slash spending in the face of the global financial crisis. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said Saturday that his government would “certainly take a decision” this year on the continued presence of almost 500 troops that the country contributes to UNIFIL.

Last month Poland announced it would cut its contribution to a peacekeeping force in Chad in a bid to save money.  “We will consider whether it makes sense to continue certain foreign missions,” Tusk said.

His comments come as his government announced it is cutting spending by almost $5 billion as the global economic crisis deepens, and there are fears that other countries could follow suit and seek to save money by withdrawing troops from expensive overseas peacekeeping missions.

Last week France announced cuts in such missions around the world, including the withdrawal of two naval vessels from UNIFIL’s maritime contingent, which patrols Lebanese waters to prevent arms smuggling into the country by sea.

The problem stems from the way the countries are reimbursed for the peacekeepers they provide. The UN offers a fixed amount for each solider that a country contributes to a peacekeeping mission, regardless of how much it costs the country to pay the soldier.

The system means that poorer countries are able to contribute troops without cost to their domestic budget. But in richer countries, where soldiers earn more than the UN’s reimbursement, national governments are footing the bill for contributing troops to the missions.

On this reckoning, the financial crisis means that the West will increasingly demand that poor countries take on peacekeeping – more UN and AU missions, then, and less from NATO. Poor governments may well respond with enthusiasm, as UN subsidies will help keep their generals happy. Peace operations will remain low-tech and dogged by fights between “those who pay” and “those who play”… Not a happy picture.

When David Cameron became leader of the Conservative Party in 2005, he deliberately set out a different vision than that of his predecessors by focusing on policy areas such as health, education and climate change. This was both a reflection of a shift in strategy – to move the Tories away from its ‘nasty party’ image but also because some of the best minds in the Conservative Party were thinking progressively on these issues (health in particular).

During this process of change national security policies largely became second order issues for the new leader. Cameron delegated these policy areas to colleagues, safe in the knowledge, he assumed, that each would be managed by a safe pair of hands. But he underestimated two forces at play. First the decline in knowledge and experience among Conservative MPs (which is still more than the Labour and the Liberal Democrats combined) in these policy areas and second; a lack of fresh and innovative thinking on national security within the party.

Arguably David Cameron’s first mistake was to assume that experience comes with expertise and sound judgement. In a speech to the think tank IISS on terrorism and national security he was quick to make reference to the ‘wealth of experience’ he had, citing numerous Lords and Dames he had recruited. The message was clear: I’m young and fresh but I have experienced politicians and practitioners on tap. But I’m reminded of a brilliant quote by Chris Donnelly, the former special adviser at NATO – who’s now at Oxford University:

In a period of stability and slow evolution our greatest asset is our experience. But at times of revolution our experiences can be fatal baggage. We can no longer assume that, because something we did worked well in the past, it is likely to continue to do so in current circumstances. If we are to survive living in a revolution, we will need to make a correspondingly revolutionary shift in the way we think about both the risk and the response.

A second point is that there is also a struggle for influence and competing agendas between different factions within the Party. Knowledge on these policy areas is spread thinly between nine poles of power. Here’s the breakdown:

Pole One: Ed Llewellyn – David Cameron’s Chief of Staff and de facto National Security Adviser to the Conservative Leader.  Ed Llewellyn, Cameron’s chief of staff, was aide to Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten, however, and also adviser to Paddy Ashdown whilst he was in Bosnia. It was Ed who pulled together Cameron’s speech in Pakistan outlining the Conservative foreign policy doctrine;

Pole Two: Pauline Neville-Jones, Shadow Security Minister and National Security Adviser to David Cameron. Dame Pauline Neville Jones was Policy Director at the FCO and spent a few months as Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee;

Pole Three: James Arbuthnot, Chair of the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence;

Pole Four : Dr Liam Fox, Shadow Defence Secretary (there for political reasons).

Pole five: The shadow defence team: Gerald Howarth, Dr Andrew Murrison  and  Dr Julian Lewis;

Pole Six : Patrick Mercer – a former Army Officer and Radio 4 defence correspondent who latterly was Shadow Homeland Security Minister.

Pole Seven: Dean Godson makes way for the new man at Policy Exchange – Garvan Walshe, Deputy Research Director & Senior Fellow for International Security;

Pole Eight: William Hague – by virtue of the size of his staff relative to most other front bench teams he is able to focus a very broad set of issues, though he seems to concentrate most of his time on non-proliferation.

Pole Nine: the wider Conservative security and defence community made up of Lords, academics and public affairs agencies.

Given the size of the community it is very sad that not more work has been done. There needs to be much more effort  behind the scenes to pull these polls together and develop a stronger narrative on national security and defence issues with the aim of setting out coherent and progressive policy ideas. But herein lies the rub. Only a handful of those mentioned above would feel comfortable in discussing the future of a progressive defence policy for example, what it would include, and the impact it would have on transatlantic relations and the EU.

And this leads me on to a third point – the policy vacuum. Unquiet World was a stab at formulating a set of ideas and recommendations under a broad national security framework. The report was written by a plethora of individuals – and while this is not a problem in itself there was seemingly no editorial control and the end result looked like a mash of policy areas bound together with sticky tape rather than a coherent thoughtful approach.

While it clearly has been a political decision to concentrate on other policy issues this shouldn’t prevent those in the party thinking and exploring new ideas and policies. And this process doesn’t need to happen in the full glare of the media but could happen in the think tank community (which Conservative think tanks have published any really thoughtful pieces on the subject and to what effect?), or in academia.  For example, the Party is due to publish a National Security Green Paper soon. Now I would guess that when it is announced David Cameron will begin by saying … ‘the first priority of a government is the nation’s security’… or words to that effect before outlining some of the more obvious threats followed by some ideas for change but will it be all forgotten after the last camera is turned off? Will there be seminars, meetings and conferences that explore the paper in detail? My guess is no.

And lastly – as a final point, David Cameron needs to flesh out his liberal conservative foreign policy as laid out in his JP Morgan speech and then in Pakistan. As John Bew suggests:

Of all the oxymorons currently doing the rounds, ‘liberal conservatism’ is one of the slipperiest. It is this phrase which forms the crux of the Conservative party’s approach to international affairs but about which we have had little in the way of concrete definition. It slips off the tongue but leaves us little the wiser as to the criteria by which a future Conservative government might intervene on the international stage.

Conservative national security and defence policy has been left on the back burner. This was partly because Cameron, on becoming leader, felt there were strong foundations in place on which he could build his new philosophy as well as his shadow front bench teams. But this was not the case.

2009 is the year in which Cameron must be bold, not just on issues of health, education and climate change but in the once natural policy area of the Conservative Party which has been seriously neglected in recent times.

During the election season we heard a lot about “60″ — that magic number of Senate seats that would allow the Democrats to block any filibuster, and, Republicans feared, tax the American people into submission. When all the votes were tallied, they came up just one seat short (assuming Al Franken eventually gets his seat). So close! Reasonably, the Democrats should be able to attract at least one measly Republican to their side, but who wants to even deal with that? Luckily, President Obama has come up with a solution: Fill the empty Commerce Secretary post with Republican New Hampshire Senator Judd Gregg. As we know, our wonderful system calls for New Hampshire’s Democratic governor to pick Gregg’s successor in such an event, and one would assume he’d choose another Democrat. And voilà, 60!

It’s a clever but slightly crass move — nobody even knows what the Commerce Secretary does anyway, so who cares who’s in there? And Obama will fundamentally alter the balance of power in the Senate in his favor with what appears to be another bipartisan gesture.