- As the diplomatic temperature continues to rise in the South Atlantic, Simon Jenkins suggests that the Falklands are “the Elgin marbles of diplomacy” and a “post-imperial anachronism” that should lead Britain to the negotiating table. Hugo Rifkind, meanwhile, explains why he won’t be shedding tears for Argentina’s President, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, while The Economist highlights her failure to see the current crisis as an economic rather than a political opportunity.

- Rob de Wijk explores (pdf) the future options for NATO as it come to terms with changing geopolitics. Andrew J. Bacevich, meanwhile, cites a failure to sufficiently “reignite Europe’s martial spirit” and carve a global role for NATO in the 21^st Century as cause for the US to draw back engagement in the alliance. Let it return to its origins and “devolve into a European organization, directed by Europeans to serve European needs”, he argues.

- Elsewhere, the London Review of Books blog offers reaction to plans for the new US Embassy in London. Associated Press, meanwhile, has news of an internal State Department report criticising its media operations.

- Finally, VoxEU explores the emergence of “cloud computing” and its potential impact on our lifestyles, business innovation, and economic growth. Charles Leadbeater assesses the associated rise of “cloud culture” and the importance of guarding this new space from the overbearing influence of government and big business. Elsewhere, over at Brookings Mark Muro wonders if the rise of Amazon’s Kindle could be a “symbol of American decline”.

Quentin Peel had a slightly bizarre column in the FT yesterday, bemoaning the Europeans’ paltry response to Obama’s request for more boots on the ground in Afghanistan. As he notes, European governments are “terrified of offending hostile public opinion that cannot understand – and has never understood – why their soldiers are dying in such a distant land”. He continues [emphasis added],

Part of the problem is that the Nato allies went into the war in 2003 without a common strategy, or a common narrative. Countries such as Germany and the Netherlands persuaded their parliaments that the job was about peace-keeping, not fighting Taliban insurgents. Germany and France also sent special forces to join the US in Operation Enduring Freedom – fighting the Taliban and hunting for al-Qaeda – but they kept it secret.

The British, Dutch and Danes are now much more open that it is a real war, and that Nato’s survival is on the line. Others, including the Germans, are not. There is a logical reason.

“The more the Europeans build it up as make-or-break for Nato, or suggest ‘our security is on the line’, the more they set themselves up for failure,” says a European diplomat. “By keeping it low key, they keep an exit strategy.”

The danger for Nato is two-fold. Without greater European commitment, the war will be “Americanised”, and risk becoming yet more unpopular in Europe. As for the alliance, it is becoming a “coalition of the willing” by default. The fundamental assumption of Nato solidarity is called into question. That is more dangerous than losing the war.

Um – what? How on earth can losing the war be less dangerous than erosion of Nato solidarity, given that Nato doesn’t seem to be able to find anywhere else in the world, besides Afghanistan, where it clearly still has a role?

If policymakers in Nato member states are really going to set out a compelling narrative about why we’re at war in Afghanistan, then surely that narrative needs to rest on what Nato’s trying to achieve in Afghanistan.  “Safeguarding Nato coherence” does not seem a very satisfactory answer to that question.

Earlier in the week, Charlie talked about the Tories’ weakness on foreign and defense policy. In many ways, he gave voice to a view felt across the British foreign and defence community. That the Tories do not have a serious and detailed set of national security policies that can be turned into government action. The contrast to the Obama administration is stark. The Democratic President has been able to populate his administration with America’s finest foreign policy thinkers, all of whom have thought deeply about what a Democratic foreign policy should look like.

The Tories are not the only ones blame for the dearth of policy thinking. The British system of government militates against party-based subject-mater expertise. Parties are meant to develop the broad strokes of ideas, which will then be developed and implemented by officials if they enter government. It is therefore very difficult for the Opposition to attract experienced foreign policy thinkers. The pay is low and the rewards are not as attractive as in the U.S. The most a future British Prime Minister can offer is junior ministerial portfolio, working to a senior politician whose background may not be well-suited for a security-related job.

But one issue can be parked at the Tories’ door. Having canvassed a wide section of the London-based foreign policy community, the one issue that keeps coming up time and again is the Tories’ euro-scepticism. As one senior (and decidedly euro-sceptic) thinker told me: “The Tories are rowing back on the pragmatic NATO-EU policy that Malcolm Rifkind developed when he was Defence Secretary.” A widely-respected senior military commander told me only two days ago: “It’s as if a veil descends across their faces when Europe comes up. They don’t even want to engage. But this is not about a European army; it’s about being able to work with allies.”

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News from Lebanon:

BEIRUT: Poland has said it may withdraw its troops from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), prompting fears of a “crunch” in international peacekeeping resources as governments slash spending in the face of the global financial crisis. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said Saturday that his government would “certainly take a decision” this year on the continued presence of almost 500 troops that the country contributes to UNIFIL.

Last month Poland announced it would cut its contribution to a peacekeeping force in Chad in a bid to save money.  “We will consider whether it makes sense to continue certain foreign missions,” Tusk said.

His comments come as his government announced it is cutting spending by almost $5 billion as the global economic crisis deepens, and there are fears that other countries could follow suit and seek to save money by withdrawing troops from expensive overseas peacekeeping missions.

Last week France announced cuts in such missions around the world, including the withdrawal of two naval vessels from UNIFIL’s maritime contingent, which patrols Lebanese waters to prevent arms smuggling into the country by sea.

The problem stems from the way the countries are reimbursed for the peacekeepers they provide. The UN offers a fixed amount for each solider that a country contributes to a peacekeeping mission, regardless of how much it costs the country to pay the soldier.

The system means that poorer countries are able to contribute troops without cost to their domestic budget. But in richer countries, where soldiers earn more than the UN’s reimbursement, national governments are footing the bill for contributing troops to the missions.

On this reckoning, the financial crisis means that the West will increasingly demand that poor countries take on peacekeeping – more UN and AU missions, then, and less from NATO. Poor governments may well respond with enthusiasm, as UN subsidies will help keep their generals happy. Peace operations will remain low-tech and dogged by fights between “those who pay” and “those who play”… Not a happy picture.

Once upon a time the Conservative Party was the natural home for national security policy. Not anymore. A combination of factors including the very necessary rebranding of the party; a focus on climate change, health and education has meant national security policy (in its broadest sense: defence, foreign affairs, and intelligence) is now, arguably, Cameron’s weakest policy area.

When David Cameron became leader of the Conservative Party in 2005, he deliberately set out a different vision than that of his predecessors by focusing on policy areas such as health, education and climate change. This was both a reflection of a shift in strategy – to move the Tories away from its ‘nasty party’ image but also because some of the best minds in the Conservative Party were thinking progressively on these issues (health in particular).

During this process of change national security policies largely became second order issues for the new leader. Cameron delegated these policy areas to colleagues, safe in the knowledge, he assumed, that each would be managed by a safe pair of hands. But he underestimated two forces at play. First the decline in knowledge and experience among Conservative MPs (which is still more than the Labour and the Liberal Democrats combined) in these policy areas and second; a lack of fresh and innovative thinking on national security within the party.

Arguably David Cameron’s first mistake was to assume that experience comes with expertise and sound judgement. In a speech to the think tank IISS on terrorism and national security he was quick to make reference to the ‘wealth of experience’ he had, citing numerous Lords and Dames he had recruited. The message was clear: I’m young and fresh but I have experienced politicians and practitioners on tap. But I’m reminded of a brilliant quote by Chris Donnelly, the former special adviser at NATO – who’s now at Oxford University:

In a period of stability and slow evolution our greatest asset is our experience. But at times of revolution our experiences can be fatal baggage. We can no longer assume that, because something we did worked well in the past, it is likely to continue to do so in current circumstances. If we are to survive living in a revolution, we will need to make a correspondingly revolutionary shift in the way we think about both the risk and the response.

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From New York magazine’s blog:

During the election season we heard a lot about “60″ — that magic number of Senate seats that would allow the Democrats to block any filibuster, and, Republicans feared, tax the American people into submission. When all the votes were tallied, they came up just one seat short (assuming Al Franken eventually gets his seat). So close! Reasonably, the Democrats should be able to attract at least one measly Republican to their side, but who wants to even deal with that? Luckily, President Obama has come up with a solution: Fill the empty Commerce Secretary post with Republican New Hampshire Senator Judd Gregg. As we know, our wonderful system calls for New Hampshire’s Democratic governor to pick Gregg’s successor in such an event, and one would assume he’d choose another Democrat. And voilà, 60!

It’s a clever but slightly crass move — nobody even knows what the Commerce Secretary does anyway, so who cares who’s in there? And Obama will fundamentally alter the balance of power in the Senate in his favor with what appears to be another bipartisan gesture.

Last week, I saw the leader of the Hungarian opposition, Viktor Orban, call for a new central European security alliance against Russia.

This video interview shows Derick Ashong, an Obama supporter, getting approached by a (presumably pro-Clinton) interviewer outside Obama and Clinton’s third debate in February last year.  Here’s how the New York Times described what happened next:

“So why are you for Obama?” he asked. It was clear from his approach that he expected a dimwitted answer, an expectation that he was about to talk to another acolyte smitten by Senator Obama’s rock star persona.

But, as it turned out, Mr. Ashong, who was raised in Ghana and elsewhere, was glad to be asked. For almost six minutes — about a century in broadcast television years — Mr. Ashong, who has an immigrant’s love of democracy and the furrowed brow of a Brookings fellow, held forth on universal health care, single-payer approaches and public-private partnerships.

“A lot of these H.M.O.’s are publicly traded companies anyway, but I don’t think we want to create a market for health care per se, like we don’t want to create a futures market in health care,” he said. And so on.

Cute stuff. Highly informative. But not the kind of political discourse that generally captures a wider audience.

But here’s the weird part. On Feb. 2, the interview of Mr. Ashong was posted on a YouTube channel called “The Latest Controversy,” where supporters of both Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton and Senator Obama are asked very aggressively to justify their choice of candidates. The video blew up, drawing more than 850,000 views. And after that huge response to his policy analysis, Mr. Ashong decided to double down and explain the emotional component of his support for Obama in a follow-up video that was posted Feb. 11 and received 300,000 views.

Taken together, that means a guy who was looking to (anonymously) show a little love for a candidate was able to look into the camera for more than 13 minutes combined and draw in more than a million clicks with an impassioned but reasoned pitch.

Ashong will be in the UK next month, and speaking at a meeting of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Conflict Issues.  Details: 6.30pm on 26 February in the Grand Committee Room in Parliament. More from the NYT piece after the jump. (more…)

Nick Stern isn’t going to like this, but there’s a new Stern on the climate block: Todd Stern , who is set to be announced as the US’s new climate envoy.

(Todd) Stern has set out a fairly clear road map for US engagement in the climate process (nb. these are his personal pre-appointment views, not those of Obama or Clinton). He thinks the US should:

• Start with domestic policy - get the National Academcy of Sciences to recommend (and review on regular basis) a stablization target; legislate cap and trade, not a carbon tax; supplement with regulation on energy efficiency and tex incentives for R&D.
• Use domestic policy as a lever in the international arena – negotiating first with a core group of countries (the ‘E8′ – Brazil, China, EU, India, Japan, Russia, South Africa and the US); then building a post-Kyoto framework on the back of their agreement, with binding long-term targets for all developed and ‘as many advanced developing countries as possible,’ and a built-in mechanism to ratchet those targets up over time (and as scientific findings dictate).

Stern is fairly tough on China. The country needs to accept targets (calculated on what basis is a question he does not address), but he makes lots of positive noises. Joint action on a climate can form the basis of a new strategic partnership between the 800-pound gorillas, but only if it is elevated from “traditional place in the second tier of mutual concerns.”

Throughout, of course, he has an eye on the US Senate and ratification. Bottom up targets and sectoral agreements should be deployed if they can suck more countries into a climate deal, as this will shut up antsy Senators. Access to carbon markets should be used as another tool that creates an incentive for developing country participation.

But there needs to be a stick too, Stern believes – and that stick is trade. Unilateral tarrifs on carbon-intensive goods would be ‘profoundly alienating’ and ‘a prescription for mutual recrimination, not progress’, especially after the US has spent so many years in the climate wilderness. But:

Considered in a mutilateral context…the idea…is more interesting. Today, the carbon content of goods is not captured in their price…If the premise of a climate regime were that countries must capture those social costs by putting a price on carbon, whether by means of a cap-and-trade program, a carbon tax, or equivalent policies to cut emissions, tarrifs could then be imposed on the exported products of any country that lacked such policies.

The Europeans will welcome Stern’s appointment with open arms – the Brits in particular.  John Ashton, the UK’s climate envoy, gets name checked by his new US counterpart – and it wouldn’t surprise me to see the two working hand in hand…

Last year, I wrote a couple of posts (here and here) warning of a rift between African countries and the West over how to administer peace and justice on the continent. That was coming out into the open over Darfur and Zimbabwe, forcing Western liberals to balance a commitment to “African ownership” with their desire to stay involved in African affairs. Now, a trenchant critique of “African solutions to African problems” rhetoric comes from Tsoeu Petlane, a South African scholar:

As we enter a New Year, we have to acknowledge that the “African solutions for African problems” approach has had some glaringly painful failures. The continuing crises in Somalia, in Zimbabwe, in Darfur and in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the surrounding Great Lakes region all demonstrate the weaknesses of the way “African solutions” have been implemented in 2008.  These weaknesses must be addressed in 2009. The year ahead should be one of rethinking how Africa deals with problems in a manner that is effective and restores the continent’s image and initiative.

Petlane anatomizes the problem thus:

There are three key reasons for failure: an almost unquestioning adherence to protecting state sovereignty, dependency on forces outside the continent and lack of leadership. Together, these stifle innovation, limit the effectiveness of proposed solutions and alienate potential allies.

First, the continent’s endorsement of the leaders of collapsed or collapsing states such as Zimbabwe, Somalia and the DRC, far from promoting sovereignty, negates it.

Sovereignty resides in the people, who only delegate it to leaders. In a situation in which the expression of this sovereignty is denied the people, such as in Zimbabwe; where those entrusted with it are unable to exercise it practically, such as in the DRC; or where the institutions supporting it are in question, such as in Somalia, protecting a government makes no sense – it allows a regime to maintain a veneer of statehood only on the basis of recognition by others. Thinking beyond this paradigm is urgently needed.

Second, while African leaders appear united in calling for indigenous solutions, few have demonstrated a conceptual or practical commitment to the notion. Their initiatives and solutions have depended on Africa’s “partnership” with the nebulous “international community”. A major component of this “community” comprises the very same former colonists who, we claim, have (i) “created” Africa’s problems by colonising them, (ii) “interfered” in Africa’s internal affairs, (iii) shaped the international system to serve their own interests (in trade, economy and international relations), (iv) dictated values of good governance and economic performance that are “foreign” to Africans, and (v) “abandoned/marginalised” Africa by withdrawing aid and political support after the Cold War.

This kind of dependency – developing solutions on the basis of actions of others, and blaming them when things don’t work – points to our lack of good leadership.

(more…)

From the State Department (with some explanatory notes added by GD):

Statement by Secretary Condoleezza Rice
Washington, DC
January 9, 2009

January 11 marks the 100th anniversary of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. We note with pride the century of cooperation with Canada in managing water quality, quantity, and environmental health along our 5,525-mile border. The Treaty also established the International Joint Commission, which has played a vital role as an independent steward of these shared resources. Comprised of Commissioners from both countries, the Commission has been an outstanding example of collaborative governance and stewardship *, facilitating cooperation, preventing and resolving water-related disputes, and approving and overseeing operation of several major dams and hydropower stations along the border.

Millions of Americans and Canadians depend on the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River system for drinking water, trade, jobs, recreation, and more. Through the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement and the International Joint Commission, our two nations are working diligently to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem.**

The Boundary Waters Treaty remains vibrant as it enters its second century. Recent International Joint Commission initiatives such as International Watershed Boards provide opportunities for local stakeholders to build networks that can prevent or resolve problems at the community level. The Treaty continues to be a model for managing shared resources***and a tribute to the enduring friendship between the United States and Canada.****

* The reference to “governance and stewardship” may signify a career State drafter trying out a few liberal, internationalist phrases so as to be ready for the next administration. Had this been drafted in 2003, it’d probably have referred to “the joint commitment of freedom-loving nations to God’s aquatic gift to mankind”.

** I’ve read this a number of times, but it does indeed appear to be a positive reference to international environmental regulation by the Bush administration. I assume they think Dick’s too busy burning stuff to get pissed about this one.

*** Well yes, it’d be easier to resolve resource conflicts if the opponent was always Canada.

**** This is most likely a coded reference to the fact that the Canadian Conservative government is one of the few regimes on earth that may actually be sorry to see the Republicans go…

Last year I argued that: a quadripartite parliamentary select committee on national security should be created – bringing together existing select committees that focus on UK national interests, security and defence policy. The good news is that this idea is currently being toyed with in Westminster and Whitehall. The bad news is that I’m not sure our politicians are really up to overseeing such a complex system and ensuring it is made accountable to the British public.

I’ve been trawling through the uncorrected evidence of a session on national security and resilience. The evidence session was undertaken by the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence. In the hot seats were Rt Hon Bob Ainsworth (then a Minister at the MoD), Admiral Lord West (Minister for Security and Counter-Terrorism), and a range of senior officials from Government departments. I don’t think I have ever read a more thoroughly depressing, lightweight, evidence session, which not only fails to ask the important questions but largely fails to hold Ministers and officials to account. Below are the more amusing questions and exchanges from the session.

No.1: Know your brief (Ministers)

Chairman: National Security Strategy, who owns it?

Mr Ainsworth: The lead department for national security in the United Kingdom is the Home Office.

Mr Jenkin: (HCDC):  Does not the Home Office lead inevitably lead us to a rather narrow definition of what a National Security Strategy is, given that, for example, our foreign policy is crucial to our national security?

Lord West: If I could just clarify – the Home Office does not lead on the whole National Security Strategy. We are responsible for the counter-terrorist aspect of it and specific Home Office duties.

Mr Jenkin: That would explain why the NSS is a bit of a Christmas tree because there is no single minister responsible for creating coherence in the National Security Strategy?

No.2: Losing the war on terror.

Mr Holloway: You have got doctrines, plans, committees, initiatives, X, Y and Z and of course it all sounds absolutely marvellous, but the reality is that we are not winning the war on terror. Do you not think we could be doing rather more in terms of dealing with the drivers of radicalisation and be a little more sensitive in our foreign policy because it might actually make your job rather easier?

No.3: ‘Overarching title’ – what a great title!

Mr Jenkins: When I heard the term “overarching strategy” I thought that is a great title, a great term. Within that do we have different departments reporting, like stovepipes, up to the top, or have the departments changed their policy, and are they working closer with each other so there are departments working at every level? How has that approach changed the operation of the MoD; and has the MoD felt its role in working through the Home Office is somewhat restrained; or is it quite happy to do that; or would it like more contacts, please?

No.4: Mum’s the word

John Smith: Without giving away any secrets, can you say hand on heart that this new joined-up approach to the national security threats on our country has actually prevented or deterred actual threat of attack or security threats against us, since you have been taking this new approach?

No.5: The Government’s ‘dilusional’ talk

Mr Holloway: Admiral, I worry about this because I think some of this talk is possibly dilusional. If you talk about having a joined-up approach in Afghanistan, which I know a tiny bit about; I lose faith in everything else you are saying about what else is happening behind the scenes. As a military man you and, I guess, I, in my pathetic military career, were always told if you wanted to win an insurgency you did not need coordination forums, focus groups, secretariat, yet more self-licking lollipop process; we were told that you had to have unity of command and unity of purpose. Do we have either in the UK at the moment on this – unity of command and unity of purpose?

No.6: Where is this coordinator?

Mr Jenkin: We have mentioned Robert Hannigan a few times and he is this coordinator. Why is he not here answering for the government on this?

No.7: Red teaming for beginners

Mr Holloway: Do you have groups of people who sit around working up potential scenarios of things that terrorists might do, areas that are vulnerable?

No.8: Spot the question

Mr Jenkin: My question follows on from this which is that we all know from the polling evidence that the public does not really like being stirred up about this subject. It makes politicians get accused of trying to frighten the public for some sort of political reasons and it is regarded with great suspicion. Is there a danger that, because we all want to avoid doing that, we are actually not giving this the profile in government that it really deserves and that we do not want to have a national security minister in the Cabinet because that would add to the anxiety of people and raise people’s suspicions more, but have we actually not got to face it and have we also not got to recognise that the public need to be made aware of these dangers because, the more aware the public is of these dangers and risks, the more alive they are to those risks and in fact the safer we will be?

A couple of posts ago, Charlie drew our attention to the fact that a new report would be recommending the appointment of a Minister for Security Diplomacy. “What the f*** is security diplomacy?”, our resident security expert asked.

I haven’t read the report, but the question got me thinking. What, indeed, is security diplomacy? I don’t mean in a traditional way — working with NATO; on security policy issues; and managing defence relationships. I mean in a 21st century kind of way. So here is my stab at what it could be.

One of the 21st century’s biggest national security challenges – and therefore diplomatic tasks — will be to affect people who we cannot affect. By that, I mean that European governments have to affect security outcomes in countries with whom they have only weak links or little leverage over. They have to do so because what happens in these countries affect our security, well-being, safety. . . you know the arguments.

Take the case of Pakistan and the country’s military-security establishment. Everyone acknowledges that working with the Pakistani military will be key in lessening Indo-Pakistani tensions, containing the Taliban insurgency, clamping down on WMD proliferation, and defeating Al Qaida. Everyone acknowledges that achieving these goals is vital to Britain’s and Europe’s security.

But there are only four countries that have any real leverage on Pakistan and her security establishment: the U.S, China, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Despite being Pakistan’s largest trading partner and a major donor, Europe has only limited leverage over Islamabad (and the military HQ in Rawalpindi), even if Britain is a (small) exception to the rule.

So the question becomes – how can Europe get the countries that do have leverage over Pakistan to act, or act in ways that may be beneficial to Europe’s interests? What incentives can be offered? Could the EU, for example, ask Turkey to lead diplomatic talks with Pakistan on the EU’s behalf, with the Turkish Prime Minister briefing the EU Heads of State? And if that is indeed what is needed, what can Turkey be offered in return?

If this is “security diplomacy” does it go beyond what it traditionally the focus of bilateral relationships and diplomacy in a non-polar world i.e. where we cannot rely on the hegemon to sway third-countries to its will? Many diplomats will argue that this is already what they doing. They are already lobbying diplomats in Beijing for China to help in Afghanistan etc.

But perhaps using the rubric “security diplomacy” makes this a concrete line of activity, ensures resources and prioritization? Much like the way Britain’s European network of embassies now focus primarily on how to leverage votes in the European Council rather than on, say, managing the UK-Romanian relationship, so implementing this kind of diplomacy may mean suborning the normal bilateral links in a number of cases (of which Pakistan is clearly one), to the so-called “diplomatic security interest”.

I am not arguing for a Minister for Security Diplomacy. Rather, I have long argued for a top-to-bottom assesment of the government’s capabilities, a National Security Review, rather than piecemeal solutions. But I’d be interested to hear what people think of the notion of security diplomacy.

Following Barack Obama’s election, the intellectual market has filled up with policy papers about how the U.S and Europe can cooperate on substantive issues like China, Russia, CT, climate change etc. But little time has been devoted to the way in which the EU and the U.S cooperate, that is, the institutions of the trans-Atlantic relationship.

NATO will continue to have an important role in the Euro-Atlantic community, but the North Atlantic Alliance is no longer the place where Americans or Europeans go to talk about big strategic questions. This is true not only for non-military topics such as the global financial crisis or climate change, but also for classic foreign policy problems.

In this paper I — and two other colleagues — have tried to lay out what kind of new institutions could boost U.S-EU cooperation. Recommendations include:

• That the President of the United States be invited once a year to the European Council
• Back-to-back EU and NATO summits
• That the US Secretary of State join the GAERC twice a year
• That American Cabinet officials be invited to European Commission meetings from time to time
• That US/PSC discussions be held alternately in Brussels and Washington.
• “Double-hatting” the EU Head of Delegation in Washington as an EU Special Representative
• Establishing a small European Legislatures Liaison Office in Congress, comprising representatives from the EP and national legislatures, as well as setting up Congress/EP task forces on key issues like Afghanistan/Pakistan and climate change.
• Setting-up a US-EU Conflict Prevention Task Force, with a permanent secretariat housed in Brussels.
• Establishing a NATO/EU School for Conflict, Post-Conflict and Stabilisation to provide training for deploying personnel

New transatlantic institutions cannot in themselves help the EU develop policies or come up with a better way of thinking strategically about foreign policy issues; but at a time of considerable transatlantic policy convergence, the absence of a solid framework for US-EU discussion will see both sides miss out on a valuable opportunity for cooperation on shared challenges.

It was a very busy weekend on Global Dashboard. So in case you missed it: