There is a parallel with the expenses claims of British parliamentarians. Caught with their hands in the till, some cried out that the system was to blame for letting them get away with it. For all the cheek of that response, there is a lesson in it.

Individuals must take responsibility for their sins. But if we’re serious about making sure that these things cannot occur again, it really isn’t enough to call for more ethics in business. In fact, I’m beginning to suspect that this is a way to avoid having to enact any real change. As the crisis seems to be settling down, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling has shied away from significant reform of the regulatory system and chose instead to blame bosses for being irresponsible. ‘Don’t worry,’ we seem to be being told, ‘we’ll just ask bankers not to be greedy any more.’ Forgive me, but I had hoped for something more robust.

It must be conceded that in sharp contrast to the plans of the British government, Barack Obama’s planned reforms are substantive and bold. But on a global level, concerns are growing that the opportunity for broader reform that this crisis provides is being missed as optimism returns alongside talk of ‘green shoots of recovery’. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), often described as the central bankers’ central bank, published its annual report on Monday. According to the FT, the BIS:

said it was vital that thought be given to the ongoing structure of the financial system while the patient was still on life support. Efforts so far, it concluded, had been a “messy mixture of urgent treatment designed to stem the decline, combined with an emerging agenda for comprehensive reform to set the foundations for sustainable growth”.

It highlighted two main risks: first, that not enough will be done to ensure a durable recovery from crisis; and second, that the emergency action to stabilise the financial system will undermine efforts to build a safer system.

The G8, too, is jumping on board the ‘return to ethics’ bandwagon. MBA graduates have set up their own code of ethics, taking inspiration from the medical profession’s Hippocratic Oath. This is welcome. We do need to create a public environment in which ethics and responsibility are more emphasised (and more respected), but to expect a firm whose raison d’etre is the pursuit of profit to apply the brakes is painfully naïve. Business (and politics) should be conducted on more ethical grounds. This year’s Reith Lectures, given by Michael Sandel, address this point well. But in the meantime (between now and hell freezing over), we need rules that acknowledge people’s tendency to ignore ethics, especially in the heat of the moment. The great theorists of capitalism itself, such as Adam Smith, knew well that the system wasn’t moral. But neither is capitalism immoral – it’s simply amoral. If we want a moral system, we have to bring in the morality ourselves. But to expect bankers to do so on their own is to invite a conflict of interest. We do not expect the players at Wimbledon to make line calls on their own shots and, similarly, we should not expect the financial sector to judge the morality or wisdom of its own practices.

This is an important moment, but it’s not a moment of a new ethical kingdom, or of a new form of capitalism. Instead, we need to return to an older scepticism about the role of private interests in our society and the degree to which the doctrine of self-regulation is a realistic solution.

Whether or not that’s right (and like Willem Buiter, Martin Wolf is also a good deal more downcast than the Lex team), it’s interesting to compare today’s Lex column with what they had to say about capital flows to emerging markets just a couple of days ago.  Here’s the bit that made me sit up:

Take Brazil and India, the globe’s ninth and 12th biggest economies, according to the International Monetary Fund’s latest estimates. While the developed world is expected to shrink by 2 per cent this year, the IMF reckons Brazil will grow by 2 per cent, and India by 5 per cent. Why? One answer is that they have stable banks, relatively closed economies, and large internal markets. This has insulated them from much of the global turmoil.

The contrast with East Asia is stark. Singapore’s economy shrank at an annualised 17 per cent rate at the end of last year, South Korea by some 20 per cent. Yet this is not for lack of capital. Asian economies, after all, are global creditors. Their economies have shrunk instead because they are heavily oriented towards collapsing international trade. Meanwhile, their local markets are undeveloped and weak. Asia’s challenge is how to best deploy its accumulated surpluses to boost domestic demand.

None of that amounts to a rationale for protectionism as a response to the crisis, of course; Buy America is still a stupid plan.  But the data does seem to me to put a question mark over a core plank of current orthodoxy in international development thinking.

For one thing that everyone agrees on in the development world is that integration in the global economy is a central route out of poverty.  (The disagreements have been about the extent to which such integration necessarily implies trade or financial liberalisation, not the more basic point about integration per se – hence the old argument over protection of infant export industries a la China or South Korea, where the subject of dispute is ‘how’, not ‘whether’).

There’s a kind of parallel here with last summer’s panic over export restrictions on food, when import-dependent countries that had placed their trust in the reliability of liquid international markets for food (like the Philippines) suddenly felt very burned when export restrictions appeared in over 30 countries.

In both examples, the underlying analytical issue is the apparent trade-off between growth and profitability in the good times and resilience when the shocks and stresses start to pile up.  Unfortunately, for countries that lack the benefit of Brazil and India’s insulation, it’s probably too late to think about putting buffers in place.  (If you wait until the panic buying is already underway before you start assembling a stash of canned food under the stairs, then you’re just making the problem worse…)

Thanks to Flickr user Oliver Ingrouille

Prepare to heave at this New York Times screed on how tough life is for bankers these days.

“Nobody in the investment banking world is expecting pity, or even a sympathetic ear, these days,” the article begins, before quoting banker after banker who not only feels  ”unfairly singled out“, but wants destitute home owners to accept the lion’s share of the blame:

Financiers tell their not-for-attribution account of the mortgage crisis like this: Americans undersaved and overspent for decades, relying on rising property values to bankroll their lifestyles.

But nobody on Wall Street forced United States homeowners to take out loans on houses they couldn’t afford, or refinance mortgages to spend money on cars they shouldn’t have bought.

Of course, others are at fault too. Ratings agencies failed to warn innocent financiers of the risks they were taking, while regulators… well, they should be ashamed of their many failings. Bankers did just one thing wrong. They trusted us too much – and we let them down.

Now they are spat on as they cross the sidewalk from their limousines and are too embarrassed to admit what they do at champagne receptions. “I’d almost rather say I’m a pornographer,” says one poor soul. “At least that’s a business that people understand.”

Then there’s the last devasting blow – having their bonuses cut:

“Fact is that this is a terrible way to make a living — except for the money,” Ken Miller, a former vice chairman at Credit Suisse First Boston and now a private investor, said. “The lifestyle is terrible — the hours, the sucking up. These guys must feel like they’re the victims of a capricious god.”

Yes indeed, Ken, it seems they do.

Having been to a few of these events, I must admit to being less than convinced that the sessions are really breaking out of the comfortable groupthink that can so easily characterise futures work.  Like Charlie, I’m starting to feeling a sense of deja vu each time I attend an awayday or brainstorming session that concludes that emerging economies are, well, emerging; that resources are becoming more scarce; that everything’s interconnected; and so on. 

I can see the utility of futures work that focuses on a pretty specific area – prospects for the pharmaceutical sector, say, or the future of UN peacekeeping – but I suspect that very big picture horizon scanning is only really helpful at this stage if it yields up insights or possibilities that are being ignored or overlooked.

For me, the really stand-out risk that barely got a mention in the events I attended was the possibility that serious erosion of states’ capacity and legitimacy undermines their ability to respond to all the global trends that we were discussing (viz. climate change, organised crime, economic meltdown, terrorism, energy scarcity – you know, the usual list).

Normally, when we think about state fragility we assume that we’re talking about the Lebanons, Somalias and Guinea-Bissaus of the world.  But as people who work in the counter-insurgency sphere have been pointing out for some time, the problem of erosion of state capacity is a whole lot more widespread than that. 

The credit crunch and subsequent slide into recession have already exposed some of the limits to state action in developed countries: look at the way central banks have appeared to be losing control of interest rates, or the nagging questions about whether the UK banking sector is just too big for the state to rescue. Then think of the atonishing list of countries that have had to accept IMF austerity programmes (and of those states that may still need to do so), and you’ve got another reason again to wonder whether states have the capacity to deliver on the demanding agendas that confront them.

Meanwhile, there’s a new spirit of disorder abroad in many countries as the downturn starts to bite: look at Greece last year, or the unrest in response to the financial crisis that’s taken place in Iceland, Latvia and Bulgaria.  Or look at cities like Naples or Tijuana which have been hollowed out by 4GW actors, with the states concerned apparently unable to get a hold on the situation (although note also the more upbeat case of Sao Paolo, where there’s been an apparent sea-change in prospects since the city’s nadir in 2006).

None of this amounts to a concrete prediction, but there is nonetheless a worrying set of drivers on the table that raises questions about whether, in (say) 5 years’ time, we’ll be starting to think that states just don’t have the legitmacy and capability they need to manage 21st century challenges. Whether that possibility figures in the next UK National Security Strategy, though?  Not if the perspectives I heard at these horizon scanning events were anything to go by.

David Cameron yesterday warned that the UK could be forced to go cap in hand to the IMF, as it did in 1976 under chancellor Denis Healey. (This, by the way, at the launch of a new programme at Demos about ‘progressive conservatism’. Et tu, Demos?)

The question is, would the IMF have the cash. Click on more to read a story I recently wrote for my mag, www.emeafinance.com, which looks at the risk of the IMF running out of money in the next 18 months, and asks what the chances are of it receiving more funds from cash-rich G20 governments (answer: slim).

Who’ll bail out the IMF?

In January 2008, the IMF’s managing director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, sent out a confidential document to the fund’s 2,400 full-time staff, telling them to get ready for the axe.

The memo said the staff should prepare for the “trauma” of sizeable downsizing, with around a sixth of the staff to be fired, and the staff budget of the fund to be reduced by US$100mn. “This is not a good time for staff”, the memo read. “Their expectation of a full career at the fund in exchange for their unflinching dedication and loyalty is in question.”

The fund had lost the great influence and power it had enjoyed during the 1990s, when it leant billions of dollars to crisis-hit Asian economies. Its power, then, was symbolised in the famous photo of then IMF director Michel Camdessus standing with his arms crossed like a strict schoolmaster, while the elderly Indonesian President Suharto bent over a desk to sign a humiliatingly-punitive IMF bail-out.

Emerging market governments learnt the lesson of that time. Many of them built up huge foreign exchange (FX) reserves, and bought back much of their existing public debt, so that they would never have to genuflect before the IMF. It gradually faded from the headlines and from the markets. “Some of my younger staff don’t even know what the words IMF stand for,” says Richard Luddington, vice-chairman of general capital markets at UBS.

Ousmene Mandeng, head of public sector investment advisory at Ashmore Investment Management, says: “I used to work at the IMF until October. When I left, I had the impression the fund would never play the role it once had in 1998. In hindsight, it seems absurd.”

Busiest month ever
A lot can change in a year.  November was the busiest ever month for the IMF. It lent US$41.8bn in bail-outs for Hungary, Ukraine, Iceland and Pakistan, and is in talks to provide further big loans to Turkey, Belarus, Latvia and Serbia, with other countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland also potential clients in the coming months.

At the end of October, the fund also launched a new US$200bn short-term facility, to help countries that have “a very strong track record but are nevertheless facing pressure on its balance of payments”, in the words of Strauss-Kahn. The facility would allow such countries to draw down 500% of their IMF quota (ie, the amount they contribute to the IMF annually) up to three times a year.

Having been criticised in the past for being too slow to respond to crises, and for imposing excessively harsh conditions on its loans, the IMF has drawn some praise for the speed and size of its November bail-outs.

At the beginning of the month, it provided €12.3bn to Hungary to help it cope with an FX crisis provoked by the government’s high levels of debt, high fiscal deficit and high current account deficit. The loan was part of a €24bn coordinated package with the World Bank and the EU. It was the first IMF bail-out of a stet country since the UK borrowed £2.3bn from the IMF in 1976.

Nigel Rendell, senior emerging markets analyst at RBC Capital Markets, says: “It was a huge amount of money, way above Hungary’s quota. Hungary probably didn’t need that much, but it was better too much than too little. I think both the Fund and the EU wanted to send a signal to speculators that they were ready to stand by other vulnerable markets in the region.”

The conditions were that the government further reduce its deficit, which it was trying to do anyway, via a wage freeze for public sector employees and an elimination of a bonus for pensioners. The bail-out also commits the government to recapitalising its banking sector.

This has already helped give some support to the forint, and has lowered the CDS spreads on Hungary’s sovereign debt by around 100 basis points to 380bp, from a high of over 600.

However, the cuts on public spending, and an expected steep drop in bank lending next year, mean the country is heading for a severe recession, with analysts predicting that GDP will contract by between 1 and 5% next year. Workers marched on the parliament in the last weekend of November protesting against the pay-cuts. And the banking system is likely to come under greater pressure if the forint devalues further.

The IMF’s US$16.4bn bail-out for Ukraine was, if anything, even more generous considering the size of Ukraine’s economy. The conditions were relatively relaxed, demanding that the National Bank has a more flexible currency strategy, which many analysts had been saying was necessary for some time.

This time, the IMF acted without the EU, which caused concern among some investors in Ukraine that the country would find itself on the wrong side of what Ukrainian prime minister, Yulia Timoshenko, called “a new financial Iron Curtain”.

Still, the IMF on its own acted very quickly to intervene and support Ukraine. And the government is, according to reports, relying heavily on the fund’s advice to guide its own rather slow responses to the crisis.

Ousmene Mandeng of Ashmore says: “I was surprised by the size of the Ukraine package. Why didn’t the government use its own reserves? Maybe it hadn’t been able to formulate its own policy measures. It might give the IMF some credibility, to be called in like that, but it undermines the authority of the Ukraine government, which could have coped with the crisis on its own.”

The stigma of IMF help
In some ways, calling in the IMF can be a political as well as an economic life-saver for struggling governments. Peter Elam Hakansson, the founder of East Capital, which is one of the biggest portfolio investors in the CEE region, says: “It allows governments to blame the fund for difficult policy measures like freezing wages and cutting government spending. And indeed, governments in Hungary, Ukraine, Latvia and elsewhere have been doing just that.”

But blaming the IMF for policy measures ultimately weakens a government’s own authority. It is, in effect, admitting that a country does not have the strength to be responsible for itself, that it is a colony rather than an autonomous sovereignty. This is a great blow to the prestige of some emerging markets, who a year ago were boasting about how much they had matured since the 1998 crisis.

Some emerging market governments can legitimately boast about no longer needing the IMF’s help. Several CEE countries are in good shape, such as Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Russia is also is excellent fiscal shape, thanks to its prudent build-up of petro-dollars during the boom years. Kazakhstan is also sufficiently wealthy to be able to clear up its financial system on its own.

What this means is a two-tier system is growing up within emerging markets – those countries which are capable of governing themselves, and those which need external assistance. And there is a definite stigma to being in the second group.
Mohammad El-Erian, co-CEO of Pimco and a former director at the IMF, says: “Some countries have self-insurance, and others have none. So emerging markets have gone from a homogenous bloc to one which has become very country-specific. It might not even make sense to talk about ‘emerging markets’ as an asset class that includes both China and Seychelles”

The two-tier system within emerging markets will be exacerbated by the fact that some governments, such as China, the US, UK, Russia and UAE, can afford multi-billion-dollar fiscal stimulus plans, while those countries that seek IMF assistance will be forced to cut public spending just as their countries head into recession.

Dennis Leech, an economics professor at the UK’s Warwick University who covers the IMF, says: “The IMF has told Hungary, Ukraine, Pakistan and Iceland to balance their budgets and cut expenditure. Meanwhile the US, the country with the most voting power in the IMF, is desperately trying to spend its way out of recession. There’s a clear double standard.”

The stigma of seeking help from the IMF is perhaps what has prevented any country so far from drawing some funds from the short-term lending facility. Mandeng says: “There’s a first mover issue there – who wants to be first to take advantage of the facility, and what kind of group will you be in if you participate? What kind of signal does that send to investors?”

IMF funds ‘inadequate’, but G20 governments unwilling to help
There is also the issue of how much help the IMF can give in 2009. The fund has reserves of US$200bn, but if the fund keeps spending like it did in November, this won’t last six months.

In November, Strauss-Kahn sent a letter to the members of the G20 saying that the IMF’s resources were “inadequate” to cope with the crisis, and calling for more funds to be made available. He wrote: “there may be concerns in markets that the official resources needed to stabilize the situation are inadequate, which could exacerbates the problem as investors head for the exits.”

Strauss-Kahn later said the IMF needed at least another US$100bn to help countries through the next six months. Where would this money come from?

Western governments have been hoping that oil-rich Gulf countries would foot the bill. In November, UK prime minister, Gordon Brown, went on a tour of the Middle East, trying to convince Middle Eastern governments to bail out the world economy, via a huge capital injection into the IMF. He said: “The oil producing countries, who have generated over US$1tn from higher oil prices in recent years, are in a position to contribute” to an expanded fund.

Brown then organised a G20 meeting in Washington on November 15, which was heralded as a ‘new Bretton Woods’, comparable in significance to the first Bretton Woods conference in 1944 that created the IMF and World Bank. The meeting, Brown briefed journalists, would lead to a new, improved IMF, with a greater global role and increased capital. 

However, both the Middle East roadshow and the G20 meetings were complete flops. No emerging market country showed itself willing to commit any more capital to the IMF, and the ‘new Bretton Woods’ conference turned out to be a damp squib without the participation of the president-elect of the US, Barack Obama.

Ariel Buira, former executive director of the IMF, says: “The G20 meeting in November was not a big success. The Saudis said ‘thanks, but no thanks’. China asked what was in it for them. The Brazilians said they didn’t want merely to be invited to G7 meetings for coffee.”

Japan’s government did come forward and say it could commit a further US$100bn to the fund by issuing long-term bonds. But the announcement immediately led to a rise in Japan’s government bond spreads, and with the country heading into recession, the government might think twice about its generosity. 

Reforming the IMF
There is a feeling among the more powerful and wealthy emerging market governments that if western governments really want them to bail out the IMF, then the IMF has to be radically overhauled.

In early November, the Bric countries – Brazil, Russia, India and China – held their own summit of finance ministers before the G20, at which Brazil’s finance minister, Guido Mantega, declared: “The Brics and the G4 (South Africa, Brazil, China and India) …have been managed by institutions from the 1940s and 1950s, when the US and the European countries represented the bulk of the global economy. Today the emerging nations represent 75% of global growth, but we have minority representation” in the G7 and the IMF.

Mantega said Bric countries were ready to add money to the fund, but only in return for a greater say in its governance: “None of the Brics said they are not prepared to put funds in, they have money, they have reserves. They only want greater participation. It is currently the fund that does not want to give us a greater share.”

Most analysts agree that the IMF has what El-Erian of Pimco calls “a massive legitimacy problem”. He says: “The voter representation is a reflection of the world 40 years ago. Why does Belgium have the same voter power as China?”
At the moment, the US has 16.8% of the vote on IMF governance, which is far more than any other country, followed by 2-5% votes for Japan, Germany, France, UK, China, Italy, Canada, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Belgium, India and Switzerland. The head of the IMF has traditionally been from western Europe.

Mandeng says: “The idea has been that the managing director has to come from estern Europe in order to have the ear of the G7. Still, all these European heads of the IMF, enough is enough.”

In April 2008, the IMF did announce, with much fanfare, a new quota formula to give emerging market countries a greater vote in the IMF’s governance. However, Leech of Warwick University says: “It was just hype. The changes make almost no difference to the distribution of voting power. It reduces the US vote from 16.8% to 16.7%.”

Ariel Buira, Director of the G24 Secretariat in Washington DC, says: “The results of quota reform were very disappointing. The inclination of the EU and US is to maintain the status quo as much as they can. But the system is broken, and the G8 alone is not able to fix it.

The US’s domination of the IMF’s governing structure may have caused what many experts believe to be the fund’s great failure of the last decade – the failure of its surveillance function over the US and Chinese economies.

Buira says: “The IMF is charged by Article IV of its constitution to exercise surveillance over the economies of both China and the US. But there was no effective surveillance. There was instead a major failure of the IMF to perform its duty. The overwhelming power of the US over the IMF prevented the fund from making proper criticisms of US policy.”

Many analysts agree that the IMF has an important role to play in its surveillance and advisory functions. But some question if the IMF’s expertise at the moment is in the right area. El-Erian says: “The expertise of the IMF has to change. It’s a macro shop at the moment, full of macroeconomists. But they don’t know much about finance. There’s now a recognition that the IMF needs expertise in finance as well as economics. The fund has homework to do.”

These issues are likely to make reform of the IMF a slow and acrimonious process. In the meantime, investors will have to keep their fingers crossed that the fund doesn’t run out of money in the next 12 months.

You can download my talk here (with pictures, references etc) – or the text only is available below the jump. There’s a webcast too.

Headlines:

• It’s going to be a tough year. The financial meltdown has a long way to go, and the downturn is risking turning into a global depression.
• Trade is a bell wether. Protectionist pressures are already on the rise. If they gain traction, take that as a warning of a wider loss of confidence in global institutions.
• The unravelling of global economic imbalances could prove corrosive to the international order. If countries start to devalue to protect exports, expect a tit-for-tat dynamic to kick in.
• Scarcity issues (energy, water, land, food, atmospheric space for emissions) remain the key medium term driver of global change. Commodity prices will spike again as soon as there’s recovery.
• The downturn has stemmed the uncontrolled growth of emissions, but also lessened the chance of a robust global deal on climate.
• Economic bad times could well drive increased conflict. A major new security threat might be the fabled black swan – hitting just when the global immune system is already overloaded.
• If we experience a long crisis (or a chain of interlinked crises), we are likely to see either a significant loss of trust in the system (globalization retreats), or a significant increase in trust (interdependence increases). 
• You need to stretch time horizons to get the latter – shared awareness (joint analysis of risks and challenges), as a basis for shared platforms (loose coalitions of leaders), which can lobby for a shared operating system (a new international institutional architecture).
• 2009 sets a challenging agenda for the G20 (financial reform and economic recovery – but framed by a broader vision on climate, resources, security etc.)…
• …the G8 (caucus of rich countries able to tee up Copenhagen and kick start development assistance if developing countries begin to teeter)…
• …the UN (especially Ban Ki-Moon’s proposed high level ‘friend’s group’ on climate, but also as a fora for getting to grips with scarcity issues)…
• and the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO (first of all ensuring they keep their heads above water, then looking to ‘save globalization from itself’).
• Oh and be ready for the backlash – people are angry and rightfully so, but that may well lead us down some populist blind alleys.

2009 – A Year for International Reform
Talk to the Reforming International Institutions – Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century conference
David Steven, 21 January 2009 

Introduction

In the run up to November’s G20, I published A Bretton Woods II worthy of the name, a paper co-authored with my colleague, New York University’s Alex Evans.

In a nutshell, our argument was that leaders needed to respond to extreme global stress by:

• Becoming more ambitious in their attempts to reform the international system, despite temptations to focus narrowly on fire fighting a growing number of immediate problems.
• Focusing on the long-term in order to increase the basis for co-operation, thinking in decades where national interests tend to converge, rather than in years where often they will not.
• Working towards integrated solutions, and not imagining that a ‘global deal’ on finance could be divorced from the other big deals that must be struck on trade, security, climate and other resource issues.

This paper, prepared for presentation to the United Nation’s University and UK Foreign Office conference on International Institutions Reform in Tokyo, expands these points.

It has been written at the beginning of a critical year for the international system – a year of great peril, but also of some promise. Threats are building up globally, many of which are poorly understood and will strain our capacity for collective action. International institutions, as currently constituted, risk being overwhelmed. We could end the year confronted by a ‘new isolationism’.

But there are also opportunities to carve out an effective response. After all, a crisis always provides the conditions in which desperately needed reforms can best be achieved.

But policy-makers will find it much easier to work together if they focus on the big picture, or what Wittgenstein called ‘the single great problem’. Without ambition, long-term goals, and integration across issues, 2009 will go down in history as a year of lost opportunities – and possibly mark the point that a short-term international crisis turned into a much more deep-seated decline.

The financial crisis

So how can we expect 2009 to unfold?

First, it is a given that the financial crisis will continue to unravel, revealing some devastating economic consequences.

Japan knows better than most how pernicious a banking shock can be – and how long lasting. Her experience, however, is far from unique. On average, banking crises take around four to five years to unravel in a developed country, and cost around 12% of GDP to resolve – emerging economies tend to feel more pain, but get through the crisis slightly faster.

Their economic impact is also considerable. In a review of the fallout from past crises, Carmen Rheinhart and Kenneth Rogoff find that on average:

• 35% is lost from house prices and 55% from equities.
• Unemployment rises by 7% and output falls by 9%.
• Government debt increases by 86%.

The past does not predict the future, of course, but it should make us wary. The pattern, as Japan found, is for policy-makers to underestimate the seriousness of the problem and for financial institutions to spend years refusing to confront their predicament head on. The required psychological shift is a profound one.

Throwing money at the problem is, in many ways, the easy bit. Much more demanding is the process of unpicking and revaluing the poorly-understood risks that are at the heart of the financial sector’s difficulties. This is a process that has barely begun.

Back in April last year, I presented on multilateral reform to heads of state at the Progressive Governance summit. Then, bold action was promised to sort out the ‘bad’ from the ‘good’ banks, but nine months’ later that is only beginning to happen.

Instead, many countries have pumped money into their financial institutions, without having the tools to force these institutions to identify, value and dispose of toxic liabilities.

This mistake is likely to prove costly. As Ben Bernanke admitted last week, large quantities of “troubled, hard-to-value assets” have now become the primary obstacle to the financial system’s recovery. The UK and US are both now working on new mechanisms to tackle these toxic assets.

Meanwhile, the US Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) has been subjected to some fierce criticism. The Congressional Oversight Panel, for example, identified:

• ‘Significant gaps in Treasury’s monitoring of the use of taxpayer’s money’
•  A lack of clarity in asset evaluation, making it unclear whether the Treasury is able to distinguish between ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’ banks, and
• ‘Shifting explanations’ of the fund’s purposes, leading the Panel to the conclusion that the Treasury does not have a clear strategy for spending the funds.

The situation in the US is not atypical; its system is simply unusually willing to wash dirty linen in public. Stimulus packages also pose risks, as they must be assembled and dispersed at high speed. Finding productive investment opportunities is a significant challenge.

We have already seen a massive market failure. The danger is that a similarly sized policy failure will now be layered on top.

The trade challenge

The trade system is also well worth keeping a close focus on.

It offers the best early warning system we have for any widespread loss of confidence in global integration. Protectionist pressures are already on the rise, as happens in every serious downturn. In 2009, will they overwhelm the will of governments to contain them?

If they do so, we may rue the opportunities that were missed on trade in 2008. In April, at the Progressive Governance Summit, there was genuine enthusiasm for returning to, and completing, the Doha Development Agenda. But the talks still collapsed in July, in a row between India, China and the US.

China thought the rich countries had been ‘selfish and short-sighted’, while Japan attacked the emerging economies for failing to recognise their new responsibilities. They had failed to think about the world economy as a whole, while pursuing narrow national self-interest.

At the G20 in November, Doha was back on the agenda, with heads of state promising a framework agreement by the end of the year. By mid December, however, Pascal Lamy had decided it would be dangerous even for ministers to meet, believing that an acrimonious failure could threaten not just the round, but the WTO system itself.

And the bad news spread beyond Doha. Russia, India, Indonesia, Brazil and Argentina – all G20 members, and key swing voters in the multilateral system – had announced restrictive trade measures within weeks of the G20, despite a promise to “refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services.”

Doha, then, has become the ‘zombie’ trade round, staggering on, but never quite dying. Few expect that it can now be revived. But who knows? Given its resemblance to a B-movie, perhaps it will lurch back into life at the very moment when all hope appears to have been lost.

An alternative view is that the content of Doha doesn’t matter that much. As Paul Krugman has argued, “World trade is already so free, we’re really talking about stuff at the margins.”

But Doha has, at the very least, great symbolic importance. It is a yardstick for our ability to strike complex global deals; shows the extent of the world’s commitment (or otherwise) to developing countries; and – above all – acts as a bellwether for global confidence in free trade itself.

Global imbalances

If the global trade system is to come under a sustained attack in 2009, this will happen as global imbalances – built up over the past decade – unravel, revealing divergent interests between producer and consumer countries, and particularly between China and the United States.

Currency may well be the main battleground, with countries tempted by competitive devaluations as export markets shrink and domestic producers beg for protection.

Since the mid-1990s, we have seen:

• A ‘savings glut’ in Japan and old Europe, and more recently in China and the oil producing countries.
• A ‘money glut’ in the United States and a few other countries.

Effectively, US consumption was fuelled by a potent combination of cheap imports and cheap money, leading to a surge in consumption and debt. The causes for this were to be found both in the US and globally.

Within the US, monetary policy was lax (in part, as a response to previous economic shocks). From overseas came an avalanche of dollars, as China and other countries recycled their surpluses back into the US economy in order to stop their currencies from appreciating.

The debate as to who should be blamed for the imbalances – savers or borrowers – is a fruitless one. The arrangement was symbiotic, or to borrow language from those who treat addiction, an example of co-dependence.

More pertinent were two questions. Were the imbalances sustainable? And if not, could they be unwound in an orderly fashion? The answer to the first was ‘clearly not’. Much now depends on whether a gradual and controlled rebalancing is possible.

China is entering a critical period. The country has massive surplus capacity now the American consumer has stopped spending. Its exports have fallen fast and have much further to go. It is vulnerable to falls in the dollar, which will worsen its terms of trade while devaluing its massive dollar holdings ($1.94 trillion at the end of 2008).

Finally, there are signs that so-called ‘hot money’ may be beginning to flow out of the country, with analysts estimating that $120-140bn of capital left the country in the last quarter of 2008. China’s own banking system has significant weaknesses, despite recent efforts to address non-performing loans.

Some of the tensions can be seen in a fascinating interview in last month’s Atlantic magazine with Gao Xiqing, Chief Investment Officer at the China Investment Corporation, the sovereign wealth fund that manages the riskier part of China’s foreign exchange reserves.

Gao had harsh words for the Americans (“the simple truth today is that your economy is built on…the gratuitous support of a lot of countries”). He also provided an insight into how unpopular Chinese investment in the US can be at home. China’s citizens ‘hate’ its support of rich Americans (“people eating shark fins” at the expense of “poor [Chinese] people eating porridge,” he claims).

It seems unlikely that the Chinese can boost domestic consumption rapidly enough to soak up declining exports – though they must do what they can. A worrying prospect is that the Chinese government will devalue to prop these exports up. That would mean that Western stimulus dollars, euros and pounds were flowing to Chinese producers. It is hard to imagine anything more politically explosive in the current climate.

The US would almost certainly react to protect its producers, with Europe tempted to follow suit. The worst case would be the emergence of a nasty zero sum dynamic in the international arena – a series of tit-for-tat measures that are politically compelling in the short term, but lead to a marked, and even disastrous, loss of collective welfare over longer time scales.

The politics of scarcity

2009 will also see the world continue to grapple with the impact of a set of scarcity issues that are perhaps the most important long-term drivers of global change.

These issues have enormous geopolitical relevance (oil), are growing causes of poverty and conflict (food, water, land), and/or demand unprecedented levels of international collective action (climate change).

Neither can they be seen in isolation, as was shown by last year’s short, but pronounced, commodity boom. In the spring of 2008, oil prices spiked, reaching $147 dollars per barrel in July. Food prices also increased alarmingly, sparked to a large degree by the price of oil. Inputs such as fertilisers had risen in price, while biofuels were an increasingly strong competitor for productive land.

In rich countries, recent analysis suggests that higher energy prices were a significant factor in turning an incipient slowdown into a deep and painful recession. In poorer countries, rising commodity prices had seriously destabilising effects, with food riots across Africa and Asia.

The response: a wave of resource nationalism, with over thirty countries introducing export restrictions. Even with lower prices, countries have continued to try and protect their security of supply. Middle income food importers have signed long-term land deal with other – usually poorer – countries, while producers are re-examining the merits of self-sufficiency.

In the medium term, the drivers for commodities remain upwards. Population growth, economic development, underinvestment in supply, a lack of water, competition for land, and climate change are all likely to increase prices and volatility.

We therefore find ourselves in a damaging triple-bind:

• On the one hand, resource price shocks are likely when times are good, acting as a repeated challenge to economic recovery.
• On the other, political progress may prove hard in both good and bad times. When prices are high, national responses will be favoured. When prices are low, economies will probably be suffering too. Other priorities will thus seem more important.

Recent experience with climate change illustrates the problem. In the boom years, global emissions shot up, rising 2.9% a year between 2000 and 2006, compared to a figure of less than 1% that was assumed in the models that formed the basis of the Stern Review. Surveying this trend, analysts from the Tyndall Centre argued that “it is difficult to envisage anything other than a planned economic recession being compatible with stabilization at or below 650ppm.”

Now, of course, we have that recession – though it wasn’t planned. The IEA expects demand for oil to fall by around 0.6% next year, though the drop could be much more dramatic than that. Emissions will decline roughly in line with energy demand (though probably not as rapidly given substitution by dirtier forms of fuel). In theory, this should make emissions restrictions easier to swallow.

But yet, as we saw in Poznan, the reverse is true, with many governments arguing that a tough climate deal should be delayed until the economy recovers. At the same, investment in low carbon technologies (at least from the private sector) is also suffering.

The logic is insidious and, if unchecked, will have catastrophic long-term consequences, as countries persuade each other that it’s never a good time for a robust climate deal.

The security threat

Finally, with the economy on all our front pages, it is easy to disregard the potential impact of security threats on the world in 2009, and on prospects for international co-operation.

That would be a mistake. The situation in the Middle East again seems unsustainable, at a time when oil producer countries are coping with what was, for them, a very unwelcome decline in the oil price. Iran’s nuclear ambitions are a threat not just to Israel, but to many of its competitors in the Arab world, and indicate the ongoing threat from proliferation.

Key middle income countries, meanwhile, are experiencing extreme distress. Pakistan, for example, has been battered by fall-out from its highly ambiguous role in the Bush administrations ‘war on terror’; by the commodity price crunch which pushed large numbers of Pakistanis back into poverty; and by the credit crunch, which left it needing an IMF bailout.

Many other countries are feeling similar impacts. Higher food prices in 2008 are estimated to have pushed an additional 130-155 million people into poverty. That shock had barely worked its way through the system, before the financial crisis hit. The World Bank estimates that developing country growth will slow to 4.5% in 2009, well below recent levels. Many analysts are significantly more bearish.

2009 could see a wave of countries get into serious trouble. If so, the IMF may well struggle to cope, given that its reserves are only around $200bn. It can probably respond to a handful more crises in smaller, poorer countries. If a larger emerging market were to get in trouble, it would need new money and fast. Trouble for a major developed country would quickly take us into unknown territory.

Weak growth in the developing world is likely to fuel conflict and state failure, with poor countries facing a ‘demographic disaster’ if they fail to provide economic opportunities for growing numbers of young adults. There is a compelling link between income and civil war, while sudden income losses weaken the legitimacy of the state and exacerbate competition between groups for scarce resources.

The results are countries that are a threat to themselves, to their neighbours, and – as havens for terrorists – to the rest of the world.

Now is a good time to remember that Nassim Nicholas Taleb has said that the financial crisis is not a black swan, because it was too predictable that it would happen.

An unexpected security deterioration in one or more regions is precisely the kind of additional stress that could derail international efforts to tackle other problems. Terrorism is another potential threat that can be corrosive to international alliances, of course, while avian flu would see countries rush to close their borders, in a futile attempt to isolate themselves from the threat.

This, then, is not a time to lose focus on these risks. Instead, the question to ask is: how will global systems cope at a time when they are already compromised by a number of other serious stresses?

Lessons from Bretton Woods

Given the dramatic prospects we face in 2009, it’s tempting to look at past crises to see what historical precedents tell us about what is happening today.

In the run up to the G20 last year, a number of European governments became excited by the prospect of a grand redesign of the multilateral system. Gordon Brown and Nicolas Sarkozy were particularly enthusiastic about the prospects for Bretton Woods II – and have taken this energy into the G20 process.

The first Bretton Woods conference aimed, in the words of John Maynard Keynes, to find “a common measure, a common standard, a common rule” that would govern all parts of the economic system.

The impetus for agreement sprang from the exhaustion of the second world war; a decade of thinking and preparatory work by Keynes and others; and the ability of the United States – in its pre-Cold War period of undisputed hegemony – to impose agreement where necessary.

Today’s conditions are very different. Many policymakers are still in denial about the depth of the problems we face. There are few, if any, well-developed packages of solutions. And the United States is in no position to insist on a programme of global reform.

Perhaps then, a better example is the crisis that ended the Bretton Woods system – the so-called ‘Nixon Shock’ of 1971 when the US President broke the link between dollar and gold.

Although Nixon blamed speculators for his decision, in fact the problems were structural – global imbalances that are strikingly similar to today’s. Post-war European recovery had led to large US deficits and, with fixed exchange rates, the Europeans had little choice but to recycle dollars into US government debt, of which there was plenty, given America’s need to fund an expensive war in Vietnam.

The result was a series of runs on US gold reserves and growing pressure to devalue the dollar. Policy was made up on the hoof. Nixon’s shock decision to break the link with gold was taken with little preparation or forethought. The President spent less time on the policy itself, than he did on worrying whether he should interrupt a popular television programme to announce it to the American people, and the world.

So what happened? Predictably, the dollar went into a steep decline, losing around a quarter of its value against a basket of European currencies. And inflation was let loose, despite US attempts to control prices and wages. The resulting inflationary spiral was not tamed until the 1980s and only then through the ‘Volcker recession’.

Natural resources were also involved. The oil shock of 1973 can be seen, in part, as a response to the depreciation of the dollar, as Arab countries protected an oil price that, when denominated in gold, had seen a three-fold decline.

The Nixon shock illustrates the dangers of unilateral and reactive policy-making; and also the power of unintended consequences. In our response to a crisis, we often sew the seeds for the next breakdown, and can easily exacerbate not dampen volatility.

Stagnation in the thirties

For pessimists, however, comparison with the 1970s is not sufficiently dramatic. They prefer to reach for the stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent ‘great depression.’

A few months’ ago, these were comparisons were regarded as distasteful, maybe even a little hysterical. In April last year, the IMF was predicting only a minor slowdown for Europe and a recovery in the US starting in 2009.

No longer. Now, rich countries are clearly all in a deep recession. The question is whether it will be U-shaped (deep but with a gradual recovery) or L-shaped (ongoing stagnation). As one economist quipped recently, it’s now too late to avoid 1929. Instead, we must focus on avoiding the mistakes of 1930, 1931 and 1932.

What were those mistakes? Deflation exacerbated by policy, of course. But also a tit-for-tit recourse to protectionism, as global trade came to a halt, and a series of sovereign debt defaults, leading to the collapse of the international financial system.

It is tempting to imagine that the period was a time of international policy paralysis, with policymakers simply unaware of the risks they were running. Far from it. There were plenty of attempts to tackle problems on an international level, culminating in a World Economic Conference in 1933 that brought 66 nations together.

The summit was supposed to launch a global ‘new deal’ – or, at least, that was what the Europeans were hoping for. But there was no shared platform to bind Europe, the UK and the US together. Franklin Roosevelt – just elected in a landslide – was focused on problems at home.

To European fury (and the discomfit of his own delegation), the new President derailed the summit with the so-called ‘bombshell message’, sent from a yacht where he was enjoying a vacation. It was to be the last attempt to forge a global approach to reform before Bretton Woods.

Surveying the conference’s wreckage, Keynes’s conclusion was a sobering one. 66 countries could never be expected to agree, he thought. Only a ‘single power or a like-minded group of powers’ could prevail – and only then if they were equipped with a new understanding of the world’s systemic problems, and a new toolbox with which to tackle them.

The first globalization

The 1930s offers salutary lessons to policy makers. However, it does encourage them to believe that our current troubles are purely economic in their nature – and can be solved through some deft re-regulation and a generous dose of stimulus.

This creates a real danger that other pressing issues will be kicked into the long grass for how ever long a recovery takes. This would be a mistake, especially given the strong links between economic and other global challenges.

To underline this point, it is worth looking back beyond the thirties, to the period before the First World War, when the world had its first experience with globalization and enjoyed unprecedented mobility of capital, goods and people.

It was then that Norman Angell argued in The Great Illusion that major wars were now almost inconceivably because of “the delicate interdependence of our credit-built finance.”

For Keynes, looking back, globalization then appeared “normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement.” But yet the forces that were to lead to war were already building:

The projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions, and exclusion, which were to play the serpent to this paradise, were little more than the amusements of his daily newspaper, and appeared to exercise almost no influence at all on the ordinary course of social and economic life, the internationalization of which was nearly complete in practice.

Rapid social, technological and economic development had brought about a new paradigm of ‘industrial war’. Countries were enmeshed in a system of diplomacy that was intricate in its operation, but in which levels of mistrust had steadily grown.

The result, in 1914, was the destruction of the European world order and a period of chaos that took two world wars and the intervening depression to resolve.

Today, the second period of globalization faces similar challenges and contradictions.

Modern economies are dynamic but unstable, as we have found out. Technological diffusion is putting unconventional weaponry in the hands of a growing number of states. Inevitably, non-state actors will also find some way of getting in on the act.

Power, meanwhile, is shifting to countries where most people are still poor, at a time when resource constraints are beginning to bite. Economies must decarbonise at a speed that will make the industrial revolution look pedestrian. Even so, the chances of disruptive climate change are now worryingly high.

The challenge then is to use the current systemic shock as an impetus for fundamental reform. The danger is that, as in 1914, the basis for international co-operation will disappear, just when globalization most needs to be ‘saved from itself’.

Signals from the future

Last year, in a paper for the United Nations University, I argued that international co-operation on climate depends on ‘signals from the future’.

Alex Evans and I have developed this work further, in a project for the UK’s Department for International Development that explores the radically different institutional architecture that will be needed to deliver a low carbon future.

One of our central arguments is that action taken on climate today is fundamentally influenced by expectations of what will happen in the future:

• If countries, companies and citizens expect a slow transition to a low carbon economy, then they have a strong incentive to block any climate deal, and to free-ride on carbon reduction measures implemented by others.
• On the other hand, if they expect the transition to happen rapidly, their incentive is to lead the change (in order to avoid misallocated investment, and to lead emergent industries), while supporting strong action against free-riders.

An effective climate deal, then, is something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. With strong signals from the future, policy-makers are likely to behave in a way that makes a deal easier to achieve. In contrast, weak signals will lead to a vicious cycle and intense zero sum competition.

This argument can, I believe, be applied more generally to today’s international challenges. Let us characterise current international co-operation as medium trust, with considerable commitment to globalization, but relatively weak institutional arrangements for controlling the global system.

If we experience a long crisis (or a chain of interlinked crises), we are likely to see either a significant loss of trust in the system (globalization retreats), or a significant increase in trust (interdependence increases). The status quo is not likely to be stable over the medium-term.

Which way we move depends, above all, on our time horizons. Do they shorten, as countries focus on immediate domestic political concerns? Or do they lengthen, as institutions are built that can last a generation or longer?

The three ‘shareds’

Lengthening time horizons requires countries to work from a comprehensive view of the risks and challenges the world faces, and its opportunities for solving them.

This is why we need a new diplomacy – one that focuses its resources not on bilateral relationships, but on multipolar responses to global threats and challenges.

This is a diplomacy of ideas, not one of narrow self-interest, and it should take us a long way from the old geopolitics. In the new paradigm, countries need to co-operate to build a vision for the international institutions that we need, not just today, but over the next generation. They need to identify and further shared interests.

The goals of this diplomacy, then, are to build:

• Shared awareness – a joint analysis of future challenges, one that is sufficiently broad to bring together economic, security and scarcity issues, and that has buy-in not just from governments, but from non-state actors too.
•  Shared platforms – coalitions of countries that begin to harmonise their domestic policies and commitments (whether on banking reform, or climate change, or investment in agriculture), and use this as the basis for lobbying for more fundamental international reforms.
•  A shared operating system – new global frameworks and institutions, with a mandate to deliver security and sustainable growth over the long-term.

As Alex and I argued in our paper for the Progressive Governance summit, we need to drive through a programme a multilateral reform that focuses on delivering results, not restructuring organisations.

 This means building an international system that:

• Aims, over the long term, to manage risk and increase resilience.
• Embeds national sovereignty in a deeper context, in which the need for cooperative action between states is recognised and acted upon.
• Overcomes fragmentation between silos and distributes, as widely as possible, the responsibility for creating global public goods.
• Rebuilds international organizations, making them much more flexible, responsive, and able to interface with non-state global networks.

Building the platform

So what might this look like in practice?

The first priority is for the US, Japan and Europe to start acting as if they have a shared interest in a more stable, equitable and sustainable future. We have been through a period of US overreach and unilateralism, coupled with muddle and passivity from its key allies. That has to end.

The Obama administration will clearly be a breath of fresh air. It can be expected to:

• Develop the US’s piecemeal and reactive bailout into something that has greater coherence and strategy.
• Signal a more co-operative and less confrontational security stance.
• Begin the process of legislating on climate change, with the US potentially matching European commitment on the issue.

This will create considerable diplomatic space – across the UN system; at the G20, of course; but also at the G8, which will have a reduced, but important, role as a caucus for richer countries.

For the rich countries, the priority is to use domestic delivery to build a basis for international agreement. This is true for financial reform, trade, and action on climate and other resource issues.

But, assuming positive moves from the US, will Europe and Japan respond in kind? Or will they take a ‘wait and see’ approach to Obama’s overtures? The question is critical to the ongoing relevance of the post-1945 alliance.

Even united, the world’s traditional powerbrokers cannot act alone. They will need China, India and the other emerging powers not as reluctant negotiating partners, but as substantive contributors to a new global order.

Broader involvement becomes more, not less, important should the BRICs find themselves in serious economic trouble as the financial meltdown proceeds.

This will require more established powers to show considerable (and uncharacteristic) humility. In East Asia, memories of the financial crisis of the late 1990s are fresh. Bailout packages then came with stringent conditions and much lecturing from the international community. Countries were told there was no gain without much pain.

Things are very different today, now that rich countries are in trouble. Stimulus is all the rage, not austerity. The doctrine of deregulation has also been shattered, but it is as yet unclear what will take its place.

2009 will be a year that heads of state spend more time together than ever before. This time will be wasted unless the intellectual spadework is done to prepare for their discussions.

That means creating a vision for where globalization goes from here. Built into this vision, we need a renewed emphasis on the resilience and coherence of global systems. We cannot simply ‘redraw the organogram’ – the need for reform is much more fundamental than that.

Good signs

I want to end by sketching out some sense of what would constitute progress in 2009. This is not a comprehensive agenda for the year, just some positive signals that countries are choosing a long term, high trust and co-operative approach, not slipping into tit-for-tat, reactive and protectionist responses.

We should expect the G20 to:

• Embed its work on finance and economy within a broader vision of global reform and not simply focus on technical issues.
• Make clear its expectations for a deal on climate at Copenhagen and set out some parameters for the ambition of that deal.
• Make a shared commitment to a green stimulus, with arrangements to quantify the impact of stimulus packages on carbon productivity.
• Mandate the IMF to monitor the re-pricing and allocation of toxic assets, improving cross-border visibility of the pace of financial restructuring.
• Agree that members should report, on a quarterly basis, steps they have taken to control the financial crisis.
• Begin to develop a ‘super sherpa’ system to improve the capacity of Heads of State to cope with their growing responsibility for global issues.

From the G8, meanwhile, we should expect:

• A clear signal from each member state as to what it is prepared to offer to ensure an effective climate deal.
• Equally clear signals from the ‘+5′ countries (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa) on how they plan to reduce emissions over the long term.
• A renewed pledge to meet development commitments, especially as poor countries suffer growing impacts from the financial crisis.
• Reporting on national delivery of key G8 commitments in area such as climate and trade.

From the United Nations, we require:

• Renewed leadership from the Secretary General on climate, especially through the SG’s high-level ‘Friends Group’.
• A concerted effort to explore the shape and content of a climate deal, using previous High Level Panels as a precedent.
• A process that explores the global institutions needed to deliver a post-2012 climate deal (this could build on the model provided by the Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis).
• An exploration of how global stocks of food and other commodities can be increased, using the International Energy Agency’s co-ordination of strategic oil reserves as a model.
• An initiative by the Security Council to explore the security implications of financial instability and growing resource scarcity, as part of a renewed commitment to forging a new global security consensus.

This year could be an exceptionally tough one for the Bretton Woods’ institutions and the WTO. As a minimum, we should therefore look to:

• Strengthen the IMF and World Bank to ensure they can cope with the risk of a cascading series of national liquidity crises.
• Defend the current free trade system and maintain confidence in the WTO.

Looking forward, the Bretton Woods’ institutions must address their lack of legitimacy in large parts of the world, while developing:

• An enhanced global surveillance function (though this must incorporate a new openness about the limits of economic forecasting).
• Tough international norms for the regulation of financial institutions.
• A framework that allows debtor countries to restructure their debts in a controlled fashion.
• Enhanced arrangements for working with the rest of international system to improve resilience in the face of short and medium term challenges.

Finally from the WTO, we should look for:

• A renewed attempt to breathe life into Doha, perhaps as part of a broader ‘grand bargain’ on finance and climate.
• An analysis of the relationship between trade and scarcity issues, exploring action to discourage export barriers and related restraints to trade.
• An analysis of how the world trade system can best be integrated with a comprehensive framework for emissions control.

Human drivers

Finally, I want to close with a warning.

We will make a grave mistake in 2009 if we persist in treating the world’s challenges as primarily technical ones, and we neglect the underlying human drivers.

The world’s economic and financial problems have deep-seated psychological and behavioural dimensions. As Paul Krugman has argued, “the expectations, even the prejudices of investors, [have] become economic fundamentals – because believing makes it so.”

Our security challenges result from the fact that conflicts are now fought ‘among the people’ rather than just between nation states.

Scarcity issues, meanwhile, trigger powerful popular responses – and could easily lead to debilitating conflicts within and between countries over how limited resources can be fairly distributed.

But we live at a time when public trust in governments is being shattered.

In a recent international poll, only half of respondents believe their leaders are up to the task of designing a suitable response to the financial crisis. Confidence was lowest here in Japan, the country that has the longest experience of financial turmoil.

In this atmosphere, populist movements are certain to thrive. We ignore them at our peril, as they will rarely support international action and, even if they don’t attain power, they may exert a blocking vote.

That makes it vitally important that reforms are designed in the open, not cooked up behind closed doors. Whatever solutions we come up with, they must emerge from a new engagement with citizens and efforts to develop domestic political conditions that allow international commitments to be made.

That means a concerted attempt to:

• Reach out to influencers and opinion formers at a national level, to debate and make the case for a new multilateralism.
• Build a narrative and vision that will communicate to a wider public the need for international approaches to global problems.
• Develop social protection systems that will insulate citizens from international volatility and instability.

Ultimately, any international reform agenda must be about the needs of global citizens. Lose sight of this fact and, however attractive new policies appear in prospect, in practice, they will fail.

For references, see PDF version.

The financial and economic crash of 2008, the worst in over 75 years, is a major geopolitical setback for the United States and Europe. Over the medium term, Washington and European governments will have neither the resources nor the economic credibility to play the role in global affairs that they otherwise would have played. These weaknesses will eventually be repaired, but in the interim, they will accelerate trends that are shifting the world’s center of gravity away from the United States.

On the other hand, he argues that China will be a net beneficiary.  True, it’s taking an economic hit, its exports are falling fast, urban real estate is falling, and growth is slowing rapidly. But its financial system is relatively unaffected by toxic assets, and in any case doesn’t play that big a role in its economy. Plus, it has a huge budget surplus and current account surplus, little government debt, and moumental foreign exchange reserves.  So,

China’s global influence will thus increase, and Beijing will be able to undertake political and economic initiatives to increase it further. China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are just concluding an agreement that would create the world’s largest free-trade area, and Beijing could take additional steps toward Asian interdependence and play a stronger leadership role within the region.

China could also expand its diplomatic presence in the developing world, in order to further its model of capitalism and, in places such as Angola, Kazakhstan, and Sudan, satisfy its thirst for natural resources. In the midst of this crisis, it might also help finance emergency loans, either directly, through bilateral financing arrangements, or indirectly, by creating an additional facility at the IMF that could expand the organization’s available credit beyond what current quotas allow.

India, on the other hand, may also emerge relatively unscathed, but Altman thinks it lacks “the wealth or the internal cohesion of China”, noting that Manmohan Singh’s government only just avoided losing a confidence vote over its nuclear deal with the US. [I take Altman's point about the wealth,but I'm not sure that India has lower internal cohesion than China - I suspect India would prove a good deal more socially resilient than China in the case of a worse downturn than he's predicting in both countries.]

Overall conclusion:

This historic crisis raises the question of whether a new global approach to controlling currencies and banking and financial systems is needed. Many economists and leaders are advocating such a reordering and calling for a Bretton Woods II. But creating a wholly new global financial order would be unworkable. Financial and currency markets are too large and too powerful to be contained; the days of managed exchange rates are over. Global financial regulation would probably cause more problems than it would solve, if only because the reforms needed in the West differ too much from those required elsewhere. A better approach is to focus on a few key measures.

Specifically, strengthening the IMF (enlarge the capital base, suspending conditionality, make China and other cash-rich states bigger shareholders); replace the “obsolete” G8 with the G20; and revise the Basel II guidelines on bank capitalisation.

According to the Telegraph:

The bad bank plan has climbed the political agenda in the past couple of weeks as the Government has become aware of the extent of the lenders’ bad debts.

Sources said that a bad bank would have to take on about £200 billion of toxic assets. That would take the Government’s total commitment to solving the banking crisis to almost £1 trillion in taxpayers’ money that has either been spent or pledged.

Valuation remains controversial, with banks scrabbling to extract as much as they possibly can from the taxpayer. One option (following the Swedes again) is to use an independent board to have a go at guessing what all the crap is worth.

Willem Buiter has a simpler suggestion – privatise the whole sector, with the government then making whatever valuation it likes as it transfers toxic assets into a new vehicle. Buiter, who thinks that even HSBC is now toast, points out that the current half-way house (partial state ownership) may be the worst of all worlds:

Ironically, by partially nationalising some of the banks, by making this injection of public capital expensive financially and as regards other conditionality, and by holding the threat of possible future (partial) nationalisation over the remaining banks, the authorities created an incentive structure that is biased strongly against bank lending, and against bank risk taking generally.  The best escape from this unfortunate halfway house is to go to temporary full public ownership of all the banks.  It would be cheap.  It should not cost more than £50bn for the state to buy the rest of the UK high street banks.  It could wait a while and get them even cheaper – possibly for nothing. But time is more precious than money in this case.