As we push on through the recession, one thing that we haven’t seen enough of is solid original thinking about the causes of the crisis and what can be done to stop such a systemic disaster ever happening again. However Duncan Watts, writing in the Boston Globe, has a bold idea. Not only were banks to big to fail but the system as a whole is simply too complex to exist.

Rather than waiting until the next cascade is imminent, and then following the usual modus operandi of propping up the handful of firms that seem to pose the greatest threat, it may be time for a new approach: preventing the system from becoming overly complex in the first place.

It’s well known that few in the financial sector (let alone regulators) understood the instruments that were being used. Risk assessors refused to believe that a firm like Lehman Brothers could ever fall so easily and as a result, the consequences of such a collapse were not accounted for in risk models. In an ever more interlinked world, the danger of contagion effects means that everyone has an interest in the way the system works. If only a few people understand it, so much the worse for the rest of us.

An alternate approach is to deal with the problem before crises emerge. On a routine basis, regulators could review the largest and most connected firms in each industry, and ask themselves essentially the same question that crisis situations already force them to answer: “Would the sudden failure of this company generate intolerable knock-on effects for the wider economy?” If the answer is “yes,” the firm could be required to downsize, or shed business lines in an orderly manner until regulators are satisfied that it no longer poses a serious systemic risk. Correspondingly, proposed mergers and acquisitions could be reviewed for their potential to create an entity that could not then be permitted to fail… Perhaps what we need is an “anti-systemic risk” law that would aim to avert systemic risk before it is too late.

Watts concedes that this degree of intervention in the market is concerning, but one thing that everyone seems to agree on is that the era of market fundamentalism is over. If we’re willing to allow the state to intervene in bailing out failed banks, why not intervene to prevent them becoming unmanageable in the first place? Think of it as bonsai banking. As E.F. Schumacher said, ‘small is beautiful’.

David Cameron thinks an IMF bailout for the UK is on the cards:

If we continue on Labour’s path of fiscal irresponsibility, at some point – and it could be very soon – the money will run out. Then you will see the return of what happened under Labour in the 1970s, including emergency cuts to many of the public services on which a progressive society depends.

Ken Clarke, his new minister, thinks such talk is unrealistic and irresponsible:

ANDREW MARR: So let’s return to the main matter then: the economy. Is it possible that this country would go bankrupt, would actually be back in the 1970s position of having to go cap in hand to the IMF?

KENNETH CLARKE: I don’t think it’s a realistic possibility, though I mean I’m as gloomy as most people. I just think 2009 is going to be a dreadful year. And actually I don’t want it to be. I think it’s very important to realise the constraints of a responsible Opposition.

Personally, I think the chances that the IMF will have any money left to rescue the UK are vanishingly small. Jules has much much more on this…

I’ve been in Japan today, speaking at ‘Reforming International Institutions – Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century’,  a seminar organized by the United Nations University and the British Embassy in Japan.

You can download my talk here (with pictures, references etc) – or the text only is available below the jump. There’s a webcast too.

Headlines:

• It’s going to be a tough year. The financial meltdown has a long way to go, and the downturn is risking turning into a global depression.
• Trade is a bell wether. Protectionist pressures are already on the rise. If they gain traction, take that as a warning of a wider loss of confidence in global institutions.
• The unravelling of global economic imbalances could prove corrosive to the international order. If countries start to devalue to protect exports, expect a tit-for-tat dynamic to kick in.
• Scarcity issues (energy, water, land, food, atmospheric space for emissions) remain the key medium term driver of global change. Commodity prices will spike again as soon as there’s recovery.
• The downturn has stemmed the uncontrolled growth of emissions, but also lessened the chance of a robust global deal on climate.
• Economic bad times could well drive increased conflict. A major new security threat might be the fabled black swan – hitting just when the global immune system is already overloaded.
• If we experience a long crisis (or a chain of interlinked crises), we are likely to see either a significant loss of trust in the system (globalization retreats), or a significant increase in trust (interdependence increases). 
• You need to stretch time horizons to get the latter – shared awareness (joint analysis of risks and challenges), as a basis for shared platforms (loose coalitions of leaders), which can lobby for a shared operating system (a new international institutional architecture).
• 2009 sets a challenging agenda for the G20 (financial reform and economic recovery – but framed by a broader vision on climate, resources, security etc.)…
• …the G8 (caucus of rich countries able to tee up Copenhagen and kick start development assistance if developing countries begin to teeter)…
• …the UN (especially Ban Ki-Moon’s proposed high level ‘friend’s group’ on climate, but also as a fora for getting to grips with scarcity issues)…
• and the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO (first of all ensuring they keep their heads above water, then looking to ‘save globalization from itself’).
• Oh and be ready for the backlash – people are angry and rightfully so, but that may well lead us down some populist blind alleys.

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It’s been another terrible day for the pound as markets punish the British government for stepping in to prop up… the markets:

Analysts said the [latest bailout]… shone a particularly unflattering light on the state of the British government’s finances as it was forced to take an ever-increasing role in the private sector.

James Hughes at CMC Markets said: “Any support seen through yesterday’s session for sterling is looking to be little more than wishful thinking as currency markets take on board the fact that the UK government is risking looking like a huge bank with some legislative functions attached, as RBS now seems to be teetering on the brink of full nationalisation.”

Credit ratings agencies are also enjoying the party, despite being utterly discredited. When they downgrade the UK’s credit rating, the current devaluation (which has upsides) may turn into a rout (which won’t):

The Commonwealth Bank of Australia lowered its forecast for the pound to $1.50 by the end of June from a previous estimate of $1.60, citing a high risk of a cut to the UK’s credit rating outlook. Richard Grace, CBA’s chief currency strategist, warned in a note on Tuesday that UK debt may now be greater than forecast due to the government’s additional bank bailout plans and cited the “high risk” of a downward revision to the ratings outlook for the UK.

Any downgrade wil force many investors to sell their UK government debt, raising the government’s cost of borrowing. The FT’s Lex thinks there’s one thing that will stop a run on the pound – all the world’s other major currencies are screwed too…

Optimism is in short supply at the moment, so I was psyched to read that Larry Kudlow – the National Review’s economics editor and (in his owns words) “a renowned free market, supply-side economist armed with knowledge, vision, and integrity acquired over a storied career spanning three decades” – has read the tea leaves and seen clear signs that the US economy is now bottoming out from a recession that hasn’t been “that big a deal”.

Phew. We can all stop worrying then. After all Kudlow’s stunning track record proves he really has his finger on the pulse of US economic performance. Let’s review some of the highlights from his analysis over the past couple of years:

Feb 2007: Praises Ben Bernanke for “laying the groundwork for what is virtually a runaway bull market” – one he assures us a few months’ later has guaranteed the US’s role at the epicentre of a “a global boom, marked by a spread of free-market capitalism like we’ve never seen before.”

Sept 2007: Warns us that “it’s very easy to be totally pessimistic and bearish right now, but that’s precisely why I will avoid falling into that trap. Optimists are winners. Pessimists are losers.”

Sticks to this creed throughout the quarter in which the recession got underway… October (“if things are so bad, why are they so good?”), when he says growth is accelerating…November (subprime is “just not that big a deal”)…and December (“the prophets of recessionary doom…have been proven wrong once again”)

In Feb and March 2008, admits that a mild recession is possible, but assures us that “Bernanke’s emergency machinations to fight the recession in housing and housing-related credit are starting to show very positive effects.” There is no “genuine, across-the-board credit crunch,” he tell us in April. As a result, any slump “could be over by late summer.”

In September (with summer a memory and the economic clouds darkening), swoons for Henry Paulson who has embraced the gales of creative destruction and promised “no more federal bailouts. Not for Lehman Brothers. Not for global insurer AIG.”

Three days later, however, swoons for Paulson again, this time for preventing what would have been an “unfathomable” – an AIG collapse. Bailouts, it turns out, are a simply wonderful idea – not only will they save capitalism from doom; for taxpayers they’re a “win-win-win-win.” The government is sure to get its money back – even better it’s highly likely to make “a handsome profit” – enough to “pay down the national debt.”

October 2008: Is appalled by the “fear and panic” that have gripped the economy. “It is one of those moments in history when people feel helpless, frustrated, and bewildered about what’s going on and why it’s happening.” But still assures us that “much good may ultimately come of this terrifying correction.”

November 2008: Is cock-a-hoop at the “economic-primer” George Bush has left for his successor-elect Barack Obama, who apparently now has “an outsized responsibility [eh?] to mend and revive the economy.” Obama needs to access Bush’s wisdom and follow his economic-growth model, one “that has worked so well and so long for this country.”

Yes – that’s right. Bush (“the top economic forecaster in the country”) and his administration have left the US poised for recovery. If it all goes wrong, we’ll all know who to blame – that “extremely liberal-left” guy who is just about to take over. But as long as the new President tries to do what Bush would have done, then everything – my friends – will be alright.

Here in Britain, one Christmas present arrives a few days late each year: the declassification of Cabinet papers that are then made available to the National Archive under the ‘Thirty Year Rule‘.  This year, the newly released documents are from 1978: the twilight period of Labour’s ill-fated Callaghan administration, famous for the ‘winter of discontent‘, when a torrent of industrial action meant that the rubbish went uncollected and the dead unburied.

You might suppose that it’s not the sort of anniversary that Gordon Brown will really want to be reminded of, not least given the obvious link back to Margaret Thatcher’s hugely successful election slogan of the time – ‘Labour isn’t working’ – and the fact that Callaghan’s administration had to go cap in hand to the IMF for a bailout.

But superficial similarities aside, the crucial difference between late 70s Britain and late 00s Britain is that during the former, the pendulum had swung all the way to the ‘state’ or ‘public’ end of the spectrum – whereas today, we find it right over at the ‘market’ or ‘private’ end.  Robert Skidelsky, writing in Prospect this month, refers to Arthur Schlesinger Jr’s The Cycles of American History, which describes this cyclical dynamic in detail:

[Schlesinger] defined a political economy cycle as “a continuing shift in national involvement between public purpose and private interest.” The swing he identified was between “liberal” (what we would call social democratic) and “conservative” epochs. The idea of the “crisis” is central. Liberal periods succumb to the corruption of power, as idealists yield to time-servers, and conservative arguments against rent-seeking excesses win the day. But the conservative era then succumbs to a corruption of money, as financiers and businessmen use the freedom of de-regulation to rip off the public. A crisis of under-regulated markets presages the return to a liberal era.

As Skidelsky summarises, the 1870s saw the pendulum start to swing towards collectivism on the back of a global depression triggered by a collapse in food prices. Most industrialised countries began to raise tariffs; social protection systems were rapidly rolled out (although not in the US).  The great depression of 1929-32 accelerated the process as Keynesian economics became orthodox.  But by the 1970s, the pendulum was about to swing the other way, as governments pursued “free trade abroad and social democracy at home”:

The crisis of liberalism, or social democracy, unfolded with stagflation and ungovernability in the 1970s. It broadly fits Schlesinger’s notion of the “corruption of power.” The Keynesian/social democratic policymakers succumbed to hubris, an intellectual corruption which convinced them that they possessed the knowledge and the tools to manage and control the economy and society from the top. This was the malady against which Hayek inveighed in his classic The Road to Serfdom (1944). The attempt in the 1970s to control inflation by wage and price controls led directly to a “crisis of governability,” as trade unions, particularly in Britain, refused to accept them.

Large state subsidies to producer groups, both public and private, fed the typical corruptions of behaviour identified by the new right: rent-seeking, moral hazard, free-riding. Palpable evidence of government failure obliterated memories of market failure. The new generation of economists abandoned Keynes and, with the help of sophisticated mathematics, reinvented the classical economics of the self-correcting market. Battered by the crises of the 1970s, governments caved in to the “inevitability” of free market forces. The swing-back became worldwide with the collapse of communism.

But today, Skidelsky notes, the crisis is that of conservatism:

The financial crisis has brought to a head a growing dissatisfaction with the corruption of money. Neo-conservatism has sought to justify fabulous rewards to a financial plutocracy while median incomes stagnate or even fall; in the name of efficiency it has promoted the off-shoring of millions of jobs, the undermining of national communities, and the rape of nature. Such a system needs to be fabulously successful to command allegiance. Spectacular failure is bound to discredit it.

The situation we are in now thus puts into question the speed and direction of progress. Will there be a pause for thought, or will we continue much as before after a cascade of minor adjustments? The answer lies in the intellectual and moral sphere. Is economics capable of rethinking its core principles? What institutions, policies and rules are needed to make markets “well behaved”? Do we have the moral resources to challenge the dominance of money without reverting to the selfish nationalisms of the 1930s?

There’s no doubt that these are the right questions to be asking (David and I sketched out a first attempt to marshal some thoughts on this area in a paper we published just before the G20 summit in November). As Skidelsky notes, we could do worse than to aim for Keynes’s basic stance:

In terms of our pendulum analogy, he was someone who instinctively sought an equipoise: not in the timeless equilibrium of classical economics, but in a balance in political economy between freedom and control, national and international wellbeing, efficiency and morality. He was an Aristotelian, who believed that vices are virtues carried to excess. This is a good philosophy for today.

Poor old Karachi. Pakistan’s economy is yet again on the slide – with an IMF bailout threatening more hard times ahead (3 million job losses predicted). Mumbai’s attackers are said to have come from Pakistan’s business and media capital. And now… more riots.

For the latest, follow #Karachi on Twitter, where the topic is trending heavily. Media reports are scanty – but four people are reported dead, many more injured… This is not likely to be associated to the Mumbai attacks (see background), but it sure won’t help!

Update - Grim, grim reports of much worse riots in Nigeria too…

Not a lot of comment needed on this one, really:

Via Duncan Green.

Bloomberg has a major exclusive:

Nov. 25 (Bloomberg) — The deal to rescue the world’s best- known bank was pieced together by regulators over Domino’s pizza in near-empty offices one block from the White House …

In the middle of the meeting, Paulson called Bernanke, telling him that he and FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair, whose agency guarantees bank deposits and some debt, were still negotiating details, according to the person. Meanwhile, about 20 staffers were working at FDIC offices a block from the White House, subsisting on Domino’s pizza for dinner at around 8 p.m. and working on the deal until about 11:30 p.m., according to a person familiar with the matter.

Eh?  The biggest bank failure yet, and we’re focusing on the food they orderered?  

But wait – isn’t this all slightly familiar?  Rewind back to the start of October, when UK officials were putting together the rescue package for Britain’s high street banks.  Here’s the Guardian at the time on the key points of the deal:

In the Treasury war room overlooking St James’s Park, central London, his chancellor, Alistair Darling, was thrashing out the details of the bail-out with ministers, lawyers and executives from the eight leading banks … 

Anticipating the long and tense night ahead for him and his team, Darling had taken matters in hand at 8.30pm, personally ringing one of his favourite restaurants, Gandhi’s in Kennington, south London, to order £245 worth of rice, karahi lamb, tandoori chicken, vegetable curry and aloo gobi.

What is it with this obsession over what officials or liquidators were munching (and what time they placed the order) as they put together bailout packages late at night?  Well, Lucy Kellaway is on hand to explain:

Newspaper articles in these tumultuous, fatal, not-seen-since-the-Great-Depression times are so tightly packed with cliché it is hard to do anything other than join in.

To get the tone right, one needs to use clichés of four different sorts. First is the geological seam of seismic shifts, landscapes, earthquakes and meltdowns. Second is the newer, more vicious, medical imagery of injected, sharp, toxic, pumped, fatal and reeling. Third is the cliché of banal detail: what time it is, what people are eating, what their complexions look like (but only if pale) followed by another look at the clock. The only mundane cliché not to have been seen once in the last six weeks is “smoke-filled rooms” as that is now illegal. The fourth sort of cliché is to declare everything the worst since 1929 or the worst in living memory.

So there you are.  Sounds like an excellent excuse for a new version of Meeting Bingo…

$7.4 trillion… $7.4 TRILLLION - that’s what Bloomberg calculates the US government has now pledged to the bailout.

The Citibank rescue is being described as a ‘good bank/bad bank‘ deal. Not so, says Paul Kedrosky:

Here is the gist:

• Citi will carve out $300-billion in troubled assets, which will remain on its balance sheet:
  • The first $37-$40-billion in losses on those assets will go to Citi
  • The next $5-billion in losses will hit Treasury
  • The next $10-billion in losses will go to the FDIC
  • Any more losses will go to the Fed
• There will be no management changes at Citi, because, you know, they are all fine and upstanding people who have done nothing wrong.
• There will be some compensation limitations, but those have not yet been made clear.

To be clear, this is not a “bad bank” model. Assets are not, apparently, being taken off the Citi balance sheet and put into another entity walled off from the Citi biological host. Instead, they are being left on the Citi balance sheet, but tagged and bagged for eventual disposal via taxpayers.

He dubs it the ‘fucked bank’ model.

Update: John Carney likes the deal (not):

Citi shovels a steaming pile of $306 billion of crap assets into a corner of its balance sheet. It gradually writes down their value. Citi takes the first $29 billion of losses, and taxpayers take the next 90% (about $250 billion). In exchange, taxpayers get $27 billion of Citi preferred stock.

Would Warren Buffett have made that deal? No way.

At the very least, there should be a sliding scale for taxpayer ownership: The more the value of the crap assets deteriorates, the more of the company the taxpayers own (and the government should be assessing the value of these assets, not Citigroup). Because as it is, Citi has an incentive to write the whole pile off tomorrow for a song. (This would actually be good for the economy, but not for the taxpayer’s “investment”).

By the way, there is no guarantee that this taxpayer largesse will save Citigroup. $306 billion of assets sounds like a lot, but it’s only about 15% of Citi’s massive asset pile (10% if you count the stuff that was so hideous that Citi shoveled it off the balance sheet long ago). Presumably Citi could keep having to take writedowns on assets outside of the bailout’s $306 billion, weakening the company’s capital and eventually possibly forcing yet another bailout.

So taxpayers may get yet another chance to get hosed.

Update II: This from the WSJ is ominous:

In addition to $2 trillion in assets Citigroup has on its balance sheet, it has another $1.23 trillion in entities that aren’t reflected there… Among the off-balance-sheet assets are $667 billion in mortgage-related securities.

So there’s many more toxic assets still to be owned up to (read Felix Salmon’s take). Meanwhile, the Economist points out the obvious:

One thing that we know will be fun is watching Mr Paulson defend the purchase of $100 billion of Citi’s junk, while simultaneously arguing that Detroit shouldn’t get a dime from TARP.

Update III: Shareholders like the deal – initially at least. Commentators from left and right think the US government got ripped off: Krugman:

A bailout was necessary — but this bailout is an outrage: a lousy deal for the taxpayers, no accountability for management, and just to make things perfect, quite possibly inadequate, so that Citi will be back for more. Amazing how much damage the lame ducks can do in the time remaining.

Arnold Kling:

The one sector that definitely needs to contract is the financial sector. Maintaining Citi as a zombie bank is not really constructive. I would feel better if it were carved up, with the viable pieces sold to other firms and the remainder wound down by government. In my view, getting the financial sector down to the right size ought to be done sooner, rather than later.

My questions: (i) How long before another bank wants the same kind of deal? (ii) Is there anything Paulson can now do to rescue his credibility? (iii) How long before the scale of Citi’s problems are fully understood?

Some answers/guesses: (i) Two weeks. (ii) No – he’s changed direction too many times. (iii) Between 2 and 5 years.

In our paper on Bretton Woods II (pdf), Alex and I provide rather a gloomy assessment of financial crisis – which we suggest is going to last longer than many think…

Given that we now face what Gordon Brown has described as “the first truly global financial crisis of the modern world”, our bet would be that it takes as long as a decade to bring it fully under control.

Let’s unpack the assumptions behind our pessimism. We start from the premise that, six months back, experts were overly optimistic about how far-reaching the meltdown would be. This is based, in part, on April’s Progressive Governance summit, where heads of state were (a) clearly freaked out; (b) fairly sure they grasped the problem, if not the solutions; (c) not acting as if they expected any further big surprises.

Consider, too, what the IMF’s Dominique Strauss Kahn was saying at the time. He was as worried by inflation, as he was by economic slowdown. Although he was forecasting a “rather important, serious slowdown in economic growth” – the expected pain wasn’t really that bad:

Something around 0.5 percent as a rate of growth for the United States in 2008 and a slight recovery during 2009-an average of 0.6 percent for 2009, which is both linked to the financial turmoil, of course, but also the business cycle. 

Next, we look at the lessons of earlier banking crises that, in developed countries, have tended to take four or five years to unravel, cost around 12% of GDP to resolve, and lead to a cumulative loss in output equal to almost a quarter of GDP. The figures are drawn from this useful chart prepared by PIMCO’s Michael Gomez:

Then add in what we know about the banking crisis that gripped Japan in the 1990s, which the IMF ascribes to “accelerated deregulation and deepening of capital markets without an appropriate adjustment in the regulatory framework”. Hiroshi Nakaso’s account is worth reading in full – seven years of crisis management and fire fighting as a senior manager at the Bank of Japan.

“When the bubble burst in the early 1990s, no one expected it was going to usher in such a prolonged period of weak growth in Japan,” he writes. Policy makers underestimated the seriousness of the problem, while banks lacked the ‘foresight and courage’ to confront their predicament head on.

At the time there was considerable schadenfreude in the West about Japan’s failure to get to grips with its crisis. It was eight years or so before its policy makers even found the levers that would begin to inch the crisis towards a solution. Are we right to assume that we’ll now do better? (more…)

Ahead of this weekend’s G20 summit, David and I have published a short paper entitled A Bretton Woods II worthy of the name.  Key points:

- The summit is unlikely to be able to live up to its billing.  Leaders do not yet understand the nature of the problem well enough to be able to implement viable solutions.  However, the problem is more fundamental than a simple lack of shared awareness. 

 - History suggests that leaders will only think the unthinkable on institutional reform once the challenge they face has really hit rock bottom. But history also suggests that we are wrong to think that the worst of the crisis is now past, given that many past banking crises have taken five years or more to unravel.

 - Bretton Woods 1 looked across the whole international economic waterfront in 1944, while this weekend’s summit will be much more narrowly focused.  Leaders will make a big mistake if they try and tackle finance in isolation, given the growing impact of resource scarcity, and that 2009 is supposed to see another ambitious global deal – on climate.

 - We need to recalibrate what we expect from globalization through a serious debate about subsidiarity. Where has globalization gone too far, too fast? Where do we need more integration at a global level? These were exactly the questions that preoccupied Keynes in 1933, when he weighed the relative benefits of global versus local across a range of variables.  We need a similar debate today as a precursor to serious international economic reform.

 - Leaders need to extend their horizons in (at least) five directions: onto longer time scales; beyond financial regulation into wider resource scarcity challenges; into other international processes, especially climate; towards grand bargains with emerging powers; and beyond government, to non-governmental networks.

Full version after the jump, or better yet here’s the pdf.

(more…)

Just after the Bank of England’s stunning 150 basis point cut yesterday, BBC business editor Robert Peston noticed an alarming signal of problems ahead.  He wrote:

I’ve just had a call from an astonished individual who has several hundred million pounds that he puts on deposit in various banks. As of 10 minutes ago, a leading British bank was offering to pay him almost 7% interest for his cash. That was after the Bank of England’s policy rate had been slashed by 1.5 percentage points to 3% – an unprecedented reduction in the history of the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee.

Why does it matter that this holder of squillions is still being offered almost 7%? Well, if he’s being paid almost 7%, what chance is there that small businesses will be able to borrow at less than 10, 12, 14% or more (with the actual rate depending on an assessment of their credit-worthiness)?

Peston’s conclusion: “the transmission mechanism from the Bank of England’s policy rate to the interest rates we pay has broken down“.  This morning, the front of the FT confirms the problem:

All but two UK banks snubbed government calls to pass on Thursday’s dramatic interest rate cuts to new customers and more than 20 lenders withdrew deals that would have slashed borrowers’ monthly mortgage repayments … Lloyds TSB and Abbey were the only two lenders to say they would pass on the full rate cut in their standard variable rates.

What’s at stake here is potentially rather larger than simply the question of providing some much-needed relief for mortgage holders and small businesses, or the political issue of whether banks in receipt of taxpayer bailouts have a duty to pass on the rate cut. 

No, the bigger question is about the degree and efficacy of state control over monetary policy – full stop.  Here’s how it’s supposed to work in the words of the Bank of England:

When the Bank of England changes the official interest rate it is attempting to influence the overall level of expenditure in the economy. When the amount of money spent grows more quickly than the volume of output produced, inflation is the result. In this way, changes in interest rates are used to control inflation.

The Bank of England sets an interest rate at which it lends to financial institutions. This interest rate then affects the whole range of interest rates set by commercial banks, building societies and other institutions for their own savers and borrowers.

Well, that’s the theory, anyway.  But what happens if it no longer works?

Marcello Simonetta in Forbes agrees that current events have a certain familiarity to them – but he’s looking a lot further back than everyone else.  Specifically, he’s been immersed in Raymond de Roover’s 1963 tome The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank (1397-1494)…

Now, as then, the coordination between different branches or departments continues to be a major issue confronting administrators in business as well as in governments. Choosing the right person as a manager is no less difficult than finding the right heir to the business or the reign.

After Cosimo’s death, his son, Piero, and his grandson, Lorenzo, had a much less steady hand on the branch managers and gradually lost their grip on the banking empire. Diminished economic power brought about troubles at home, where in 1478 the so-called Pazzi Conspiracy–an attempted coup organized by a rival banking family secretly helped by the Roman Catholic Church–brought Lorenzo to his knees.

By the time Cosimo’s grandson tried to recover control over Florence, the Medici Bank was near collapse, which led to many irregularities. One disgruntled citizen commented after a two-year bout of warfare: “Cosimo and Piero (grandfather and father), with half of the money you have spent on this war, would have gained much more than you have lost.”

This might remind us of other recent disastrous military and monetary enterprises. Then, as now, too much money badly accounted often damages the purpose for which it is spent. Lorenzo, desperately in need for monies, turned business into a matter of state and took money from his own relatives to defend himself and the city, and also diverted public funds for his own use.

The fear of being annihilated by foreign powers, combined with the lack of transparency, allowed the ruler of the Republic to turn it into an effective tyranny. With the declared purpose of defending Florentine freedom and its way of life, Lorenzo raised taxes for the war and embezzled banking funds with the result (does this sound familiar, anyone?) of creating a huge credit crunch.

The Medici Bank–as De Roover argued–had tenuous cash reserves that were usually well below 10% of total assets. Lack of liquidity was an issue for banking since its origins. Of course, in the Renaissance they dealt with thousands or millions of florins–billions were yet unthinkable. But would a bailout have been thinkable at the time? Lorenzo certainly bailed himself and his family out of a political and financial mess with public funds. He eventually gained for himself the superlative epithet of “The Magnificent” by obtaining foreign military support and by compromising his city’s liberty.

However, shortly after his death in 1492, his weak son Piero was thrown out of Florence. Perhaps that was an early instance of what we would now call kicking the debt problem onto the next generation.