Enthusiasm for foreign intereventions from the sky seems to ebb and flow as the years go by. Back during the Kosovo intervention, Clinton and Blair were widely criticised for thinking that an intervention based on aerial bombing would allow them to get away without deploying boots on the ground. (In the event, Milosevic did blink first by accepting the terms of an international peace plan before NATO had to deploy ground troops – although the arrival of KFOR followed shortly afterwards.)

A few years later,  widespread calls from advocacy groups for the imposition of a no-fly zone over Darfur were met with scepticism in government, given the size of the country and the fact that halting Sudanese government air missions (especially “barrel bombing” from Antonov transport aircraft) clearly wasn’t going to halt the more fundamental problem of janjaweed attacks on the ground.

By the time of the Libyan civil war in 2011, no-fly zones seemed to be back in vogue, with France, Britain, the US, Canada and other countries undertaking numerous sorties over the country, as well as imposing a naval blockade, under UN SCR 1973.

Now, the world has been wringing its hands over the continually worsening humanitarian catastrophe in Syria for more than two years. Demands for action by the west are understandably mounting – yet it’s surprising that almost all the debate about possible interventions has focused on arming the rebels, with much less discussion of a no-fly zone.

I’m instinctively wary of non-specific demands that “something must be done” (see Max Hastings in the FT today for a good presentation of this view). But given that so much of the Syrian government’s advantage – and capacity to inflict atrocities – stems from its air superiority, a no-fly zone looks like a such an obvious option that it seems odd (at least to my inexpert eye) that it hasn’t been more widely discussed.

Still, this may finally be changing: Senate Armed Forces Committee Chair Carl Levin came out in favour of the idea last month, and rumours suggest that the Administration is thinking about it too – all the more so if it takes a decision to go in to the country to secure chemical weapons stockpiles.

The New Year brings news of a boom in facial hair implants in Istanbul. Follically-challenged men are coming from all corners of the Middle East to bolster their beards and multiply their moustaches. For a cool $2,300, those looking for wives or social advancement can buy themselves a head start at one of the city’s cosmetic surgeries – there are even special hair transplant tour packages, estimated to bring in 50 Arab tourists a day.

‘Thick hair is a status symbol,’ one cosmetic surgeon told the Guardian. Another, who is optimistically hoping to expand his operations to smooth-skinned Europe, reported: ‘Both in Turkey and in Arab countries facial hair is associated with masculinity, and its lack can cause social difficulties. Businessmen come to me to get beard and moustache implants, because they say that business partners do not take them seriously if they don’t sport facial hair.’

Global Dashboard readers planning business ventures in the Middle East – male ones anyway – take note.

I will be teaching a course this fall (780.718 Promoting Development in Fragile States) in the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University:

Hindered by weak institutions, social divisions, and difficult historical legacies, fragile states face fundamentally different challenges than other countries. This course focuses on understanding the drivers of state fragility and what steps might counteract these. It encourages participants to think deeply about the nature of development, political incentives, the role of geography in governance, social identities, the nature of public authority, and a variety of other issues relevant to state building in difficult circumstances. It will be of interest to students working on African and Middle Eastern issues, conflict management, comparative politics, and economic/political development.

The syllabus for the course provides a good reading list for anyone wanting to understand the problems facing fragile states and what policies might deal with their unique problems.

If you want more information, contact me at seth@sethkaplan.org.

The Security Council decided today to close down the UN observer mission in Syria, which I once predicted would be a “heroic failure”.  But this isn’t quite the end of the UN political presence on the ground, as the BBC reports:

Although the 101 remaining military observers will leave Damascus over the next eight days, a civilian liaison office is due to remain and a new special envoy is expected to be appointed.

What can such a political mission achieve?  Here’s a few historical analogies from a paper I wrote for USIP last year:

What happens if preventive diplomacy fails and decision makers choose to cross the Rubicon and unleash full-scale war? Counterintuitively, political missions may still have a role to play in this scenario, urging the parties to at least limit the level of violence and maintain some channels of communication during the fighting. As noted earlier in this report, UN missions currently play a role in trying to mitigate a number of ongoing conflicts, including those in Somalia and Afghanistan. The United Nations also has a long-standing presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which has continued to operate during crises such as Israel’s 2008–09 incursion into Gaza (“Operation Cast Lead”). During that crisis, the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) engaged in behind-the-scenes diplomacy with all sides—once Israel pulled back, UNSCO turned to facilitating the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza. It is a conduit for communications with Hamas that other actors cannot undertake directly.

Political missions can thus play a useful functional role during active conflicts, although they are typically constrained by both security issues and a lack of political leverage.  . . .  A mission deployed during the early phase of a war can identify ways to mitigate the damage, but this ultimately depends on the combatants’ cooperation.

Syria’s combatants are unlikely to prove very cooperative.

There’s mounting confusion at the UN about who will replace Kofi Annan as the envoy to Syria.  Everyone knows that it’s meant to be veteran UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi.  But it’s widely rumored that Brahimi is holding up the announcement because he wants a clear vote of support from the Security Council, which is not so easy these days.

That’s all a bit sensitive.  Ban Ki-moon gave a press conference in Timor-Leste today, and some impertinent journalist brought the issue up (as well as raising concerns about Timor’s future).  Check out the subtle way that the UN transcript deals with the complex Brahimi issue:

Q: Are you confident the country will remain peaceful once the peacekeeepers [sic] leave? And the second question: Mr. [inaudible] …. is a strong candidate to replace Kofi Annan, are you going to announce officially here in East Timor?

SG: I didn’t clearly understand your first question, but for the second question: I am not in a position to inform on anything about the successor issue of Kofi Annan as Joint Special Envoy for Syria. I am in the process of actively searching for a successor and when I am ready I will certainly announce this as soon as possible.

Now we don’t know if the questioner said “Brahimi”.  But it’s not a bad guess, and it wouldn’t be too hard to check.  But maybe there’s another mediator in the frame: Mr. Inaudible, a master of quiet diplomacy?

A key challenge faced by those engaged in international human rights policy and practice is adopting an effective framework for protecting and promoting human rights around the world in a way that preserves and articulates their universal nature, while at the same time respecting local values and practices.

One way to approach this challenge is to examine values, norms, customs and practices in non-Western cultures which can act as ‘receptors’ for human rights principles and practice. A new Dutch collaborative research project adopts just such an approach (and is thus called the ‘Receptor Approach’). It brings together experts from around the world and from a variety of disciplines – law, anthropology, sociology, political science, international relations and philosophy among others. (more…)

Many fragile states suffer from incoherent legal systems. Whereas in developed countries, one single system exists and is effectively enforced, in fragile states multiple systems work side-by-side, each weakly enforced, and often operating in contradiction with each other. Creating a unified and robust system of law is one of the biggest challenges these countries face.

In most cases, this incoherence is a direct product of colonialism. One system, often with the greatest relevancy to local populations, has roots in the precolonial system of governance. It may have evolved a lot since then, but is still based on local circumstances and institutions. The state, itself a product of foreign rule, follows another system, based on Western legal tradition, imported from abroad. Neither is consistently or equitably implemented. Corruption distorts outcomes. Officials (whether those of the state or local leaders) lack training. Favoritism is common. (more…)

Kofi Annan’s efforts to pacify Syria face growing criticism. Violence continues and few hope that real peace talks can happen soon.  Diplomats are asking how long Annan can keep going.  In a new piece for Foreign Policy, I set out the dilemma he faces:

The former U.N. Secretary-General has made it clear that he knows his mission is close to failure. But it’s very difficult for him to call the whole thing off. While violence has continued in Syria at what Annan calls “unacceptable” levels, the death-rate has generally been lower than prior to the “ceasefire” he engineered in April. But whoever is attacking the U.N. observers probably wants to foment a full-scale war, and fighting appears not only to be on the rise again but also to be spreading into Lebanon.

If Annan were to quit now — precipitating the withdrawal of U.N. military personnel from Syria — he could risk a further escalation. This presents an ethical dilemma: Is it better for the United Nations to oversee, and arguably provide cover for, the current violence or retreat and open the way for something potentially worse?

Read my full attempt at an answer here.

The Syrian government defies belief:

In a letter to the 193-member U.N. General Assembly made public on Thursday, Syria’s U.N. ambassador, Bashar Ja’afari, said hotel occupancy had dropped from an average of 90 percent before the crisis began in March 2011 to less than 15 percent.

“In the cities and areas where there is tension, the impact of the crisis on the tourism sector has been totally disastrous: tourism activity has come to a complete halt and hotels have ceased to operate,” Ja’afari wrote in the letter dated May 7.

“All restaurants, roadside rest-stops, fairgrounds and other leisure facilities have also had to close,” he said.

Last Friday, my attention was caught by the title of a piece on the Mideastwire blog:

Richard Gowan misses the key aspect of conflict mitigation: positive incentives and weak actor/strong actors dialectic

Mideastwire’s editor Nicholas Noe took issue with this paragraph from something I wrote for Foreign Policy at the end of March (and also blogged about on GD):

Conflict resolution experts argue that combatants negotiate seriously when facing a “mutually hurting stalemate”: a situation in which both sides grasp that victory is unachievable. In February, it seemed possible that Syria was headed for just such a stalemate, with anti-government forces holding significant urban areas and the army losing confidence. If this situation had continued, Annan’s basic concept — a U.N.-supervised cessation of hostilities to create space for political dialogue — could have been workable.

Here is Mr Noe’s critique of what I had to say:

This is the old, one dimensional way to view attempts at conflict mitigation. But one critical side it misses is the effect of outside, preponderant powers and how this part of the equation can radically alter the playing field. For example, in Syria, the conflict is NOT between syria and an opposition – it is FAR beyond that. As such, the conditions of negotiation and conflict are radically different AND, because Syria is actually a fairly weak actor vis a vis its opponents, the opportunities can and should be far more open for its opponents to offer, perhaps, POSITIVE INCENTIVES which can 1) help fracture the regime if reasonable offers are rejected or 2) ease the regime actor into the guts of an international process that steadily drains the regimes ability and desire to exercise violence and project instability… either way flexibility is the possibility which must be seen and emphasized for the vastly preponderant actors!

Gowan’s standard, simplistic view does not allow for this aspect of dynamism which is critical in the current situation – reducing matters to “when both sides grasp that victory is unachievable”… But Mr, Gowan – what about when the weak regime actor sees benefits as well to mitigating conflict and moving into an internationalized process?

I felt a little put out, as what I said was taken out of context here.  You might assume that I was opposed to the Annan plan: but the FP piece was a qualified endorsement of the plan.  I concluded that “Annan is not a miracle-worker, but he is a professional: he should be given the chance grind out a peace deal.”   However, the last 2-3 days have brought a lot of evidence that the Syrian regime also has an ”old, one dimensional way” of looking at conflict.  Rather than entering into an internationalized peace process (perhaps out of fear of losing leverage), Syria has (i) ratcheted up the violence and (ii) effectively called on the Syrian opposition to admit defeat; and (iii) ignored intensified international condemnation of its behavior.

I can only read this series of events as follows: Assad grasps that if he can crush the opposition, he can either avoid political talks altogether or (more likely) sit down to talk with some set of cowed and broken foes from a position of strength.  In such circumstances, the fact that Assad is potentially vulnerable to pressure from outside powers may not matter.  After a convincing military victory, he could offer some vague package of insubstantial reforms and (as I argued in FP) find a few opposition leaders who would be prepared to go along with him out of desperation or opportunism.

This is clearly a scenario that many in the Syrian opposition fear, and why leading rebels have refused to accept his terms.  Assad’s militant opponents may be in bad shape, but they would rather hang on for increased military supplies from their Arab backers than put faith in flexibility and concessions in talks with Assad.

So I’m afraid that my pessimistic analysis looks more convincing now than it did last week.  Events may change again: Russia may yet finally get its act in gear and force Assad to back down and talk.  In that case, Mr Noe’s optimism may be justified.  A chastened Assad, fearing that Moscow could desert him, might start to behave very differently.  My initial support for the Annan plan was based on the assumptions that (i) Assad’s military push would lose steam and (ii) Russia would make a successful effort to call him to order.  As of now, the military situation is awful and Russia has either failed to apply sufficient pressure or (as the Washington Post quotes me today) Assad holds Moscow in contempt.  Simplistic, perhaps, but that’s the brutal reality.

Briefing the General Assembly today, Kofi Annan noted that UN officials are now in Syria to plan a new ceasefire monitoring mission – one element of Annan’s peace plan.  Here is what he had to say about the mission:

As we prepare for such a mission, we need to keep the unique character of the Syrian crisis in mind. The violence in Syria cannot be addressed through the means of a traditional observer mission interposed between two armies. The situation is fluid. There is no established frontline. Peace will not be consolidated without a credible political process.  What we would need on the ground is a small and nimble United Nations presence. It would need to be deployed quickly with a broad and flexible mandate. Its freedom of movement throughout the country and security must be assured. It should engage all relevant parties. It should constantly and rapidly observe, establish and assess facts and conditions on the ground in an objective manner.

This assessment strikes me as sound.  Last week, I jotted down six criteria for a successful monitoring mission in Syria – Colum Lynch was kind enough to publish them on his blog over at FP:

1. Freedom of movement: The Arab League observer mission was under constant supervision by Syrian security personnel, and could not travel to trouble-spots without their minders. To have even minimal credibility, the U.N. mission would need to be able to make monitoring visits on their own initiative. The team would need their own vehicles (probably armored 4x4s) and independent close-protection officers. The Syrian authorities will argue that the observers should notify them in advance of trips for safety’s sake. Nonetheless, the U.N, should insist on the right on to make spot-checks with 2-3 hours notice at most.

2. A secure HQ and communications: The Arab observers were headquartered in a hotel, and had use Syrian communications systems to contact the Arab League in Cairo, inevitably compromising their reporting. A credible U.N. mission would need an independent base — off-limits to Syrian authorities — and the ability to send encrypted communications to New York. A neutral government such as Switzerland could provide military communications experts to support the mission. It might not take long for the Syrians (with Russian and Iranian help) to crack the codes, but this would at least signal the observers’ autonomy.

3. Access to Syrian artillery and armor: The use of big guns and tanks against civilians has been a defining dimension of the conflict. While the Arab observers were meant to oversee the removal of heavy weapons from urban areas, the Syrian Army only made cosmetic withdrawals. Annan and the Security Council have now called for the “end the use of heavy weapons in population centers, and [to] begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centers.” U.N. monitors would need to prioritize tracking artillery and armored units, possibly even embedding personnel in their bases away from cities.

4. Satellites and drones: Heavy weapons can also be tracked by drones and satellites — which the United States has done already — and the observer mission should make use of these sources. Damascus will object to the U.N. turning to the United States for aerial or satellite intelligence, but the U.N. can get imagery from other sources and has its own satellite imagery analysts. The EU also has a satellite center that could be put at the U.N.’s disposal, and Belgium has a small fleet of drones that it has previously deployed in European peace operations.

5. Special investigators: While “observing” and “monitoring” sound like passive activities, the U.N. could also deploy investigative teams to gain more detailed information on specific incidents — including bombings and raids by rebel forces. While it’s very hard to gather reliable evidence in war zones, small teams of forensic and ballistics specialists may be able to piece together basic facts on new massacres. Although not much of a deterrent in the short term, the presence of these teams may make it possible to hold killers from both sides accountable later, as drawn-out prosecutions in the Balkans have shown.

6. An emergency exit strategy: However effectively the U.N. monitors might perform, there will still be a risk that the situation in Syria will deteriorate again — and either the government or opposition could try to seize some observers as hostages. There will need to be a military plan to get the monitors out at short notice. Russia, with its base at Tartus, is best-placed to arrange such a plan and could offer to do so as a sign of goodwill towards Kofi Annan. The U.N. peacekeeping force in Lebanon and the Turkish armed forces — and possibly Britain, which has forces stationed nearby in Cyprus — could lend a helping hand.

Will the forthcoming UN mission meet these criteria?  My suspicion is that it will have limited freedom of movement (getting around Syrian obstacles and objections will be a daily nightmare) and get some access to Syrian armored units and probably have the necessary communications kit.  Drones and satellites are unlikely.  Adding special investigators – or even a just a simple human rights component to track abuses – to military monitor should be a priority, as these experts can dig into cases of torture and targeted killings.  But, frankly, a heavily-armed extraction mission is a bit fantastical…

Religion has played an important part in the Arab Spring, either as a ideological influence behind calls for change or, more recently, as a major force in elections. Islamic parties already dominate the political scene in Tunisia and Egypt, and will likely do so anywhere else democracy allows a free vote.

Most Westerners assume that that these trends can only end up hurting the region.  For them, religion is a major cause of the problems that plague the Middle East, and greater secularism is essential for democracy and progress. But such notions show just how little outsiders understand the region, its dominant faith, and the political dynamics driving change from Morocco to Iran. (more…)

Kofi Annan is briefing the Security Council on his efforts to resolve the Syrian crisis today.  As I wrote in a piece for Foreign Policy on Friday Annan – originally welcomed as a potential savior – has been coming under increasing criticism for his peace plan:

At first sight, Annan’s proposals don’t seem so contentious. The main pillars are an “inclusive Syrian-led political process,” an “effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence,” and “timely provision of humanitarian assistance.” Other points include the release of political prisoners, letting journalists move freely, and permitting peaceful demonstrations. While these are unquestionably urgent priorities, however, the plan will ultimately be judged on the implementation of its political and military aspects.

The standard line of attack on this blueprint is that it appeals to all the wrong people. Unlike the previous Arab League peace plan, it does not call for President Bashar al-Assad to stand down. Russia and China, having stopped the Security Council from backing the League’s proposals, welcome this softer approach. When Annan announced this week that President Assad had accepted the plan, skeptics accused Damascus of using the diplomatic opening to buy time. Assad, they allege with reason, is a congenital breaker of promises and probably views this war in existential terms: nothing short of total victory can guarantee his continuation in power. So his support for Annan’s plan is proof that it must be flawed.

Still, it’s unfair to criticize Annan for engineering a diplomatic consensus. He was chosen precisely because he could help soothe fraying tempers at the United Nations and avert calls for an ill-conceived military intervention in Syria, as I noted in a recent piece for World Politics Review. He has done a far better job in these terms than initially seemed possible. But he faces a far worse context for peacemaking inside Syria than when he took the job.

Conflict resolution experts argue that combatants negotiate seriously when facing a “mutually hurting stalemate”: a situation in which both sides grasp that victory is unachievable. In February, it seemed possible that Syria was headed for just such a stalemate, with anti-government forces holding significant urban areas and the army losing confidence. If this situation had continued, Annan’s basic concept — a U.N.-supervised cessation of hostilities to create space for political dialogue — could have been workable.

But the security situation has changed significantly. The army got the better of the opposition in Homs and Idlib. Rather than break under the strain of fighting in built-up areas, the military has kept up its offensives while rebels say they are running out of ammunition. In this context, even as intense fighting continues, Assad has less incentive to talk in good faith. Yet the Security Council and Arab League can hardly reverse themselves and say that they no longer believe negotiations are worthwhile.

Over the weekend, however, quite a few Western leaders began talking about the potential failure of the Annan plan.  At the meeting for the Friends of Syria in Turkey, Hillary Clinton cast doubt on Assad’s sincerity and William Hague argued that “there isn’t an unlimited period of time for this, for the Kofi Annan process to work before many of the nations here want us to go back to the UN Security Council.”  There is an argument going around that if Annan’s plan demonstrably fails, China and Russia may find it hard to veto any future UN resolution on Syria.  Frankly, I think that’s optimistic.  But Annan should be careful: he may find that Western and Arab hawks are now looking for his plan to fail, while the Assad regime continues to play for time…

Almost ten years ago, I had my first adventure with blogging at the World Summit on Sustainable Development – where I ran what was probably the world’s first ‘live blog’ from a fast-moving global event.

Daily Summit was a blast, but I was left with one frustration – how tough it was to get people working for the governments at the summit to talk openly, and on-the-record, about what they were trying to achieve.

There were statements galore and gazillions of press conferences – but little that bridged the gap between ‘official positions’ and the gossip in the corridors that only insiders get to hear.

So I wrote the Human Voice, an article about what I hoped blogging would do to the way organisations communicated with the outside world:

How long ’til a Chief Executive of a major multi-national has a blog? Which government minister will boldly blog where no minister has blogged before? When will blogging become a way of communicating for senior civil servants?

And when are we going to hear from the organisational infantry – slogging away in the trenches, but fighting interesting battles and helping win the occasional war?

Ten years’ later, of course, all this is commonplace (thanks largely to Twitter). But many organisational bloggers/tweeters remain unbearably stiff and formal or – worse – pepper the world with exhortatory missives about the greatness of their product, the importance of their issue, or the awesomeness of their boss. It can be hard to take.

So hats off to Tom Fletcher, the British Ambassador to Lebanon, for this tweet:

Interesting piece on paintballing with Hizballah. (RT not endorsement, &breaks our travel advice on so many levels). vice.com/read/paintball…

— Tom Fletcher (@HMATomFletcher) March 24, 2012

Not only did it make me laugh – it  alerted me to what is a great article.

We figured they’d cheat; they were Hezbollah, after all. But none of us—a team of four Western journalists—thought we’d be dodging military-grade flash bangs when we initiated this “friendly” paintball match.

The battle takes place underground in a grungy, bunker-like basement underneath a Beirut strip mall. When the grenades go off it’s like being caught out in a ferocious thunderstorm: blinding flashes of hot white light, blasts of sound that reverberate deep inside my ears.

As my eyesight returns and readjusts to the dim arena light, I poke out from my position behind a low cinder-block wall. Two large men in green jumpsuits are bearing down on me. I have them right in my sights, but they seem unfazed—even as I open fire from close range, peppering each with several clear, obvious hits. I expect them to freeze, maybe even acknowledge that this softie American journalist handily overcame their flash-bang trickery and knocked them out of the game. Perhaps they’ll even smile and pat me on the back as they walk off the playing field in a display of good sportsmanship (after cheating, of course).

Instead, they shoot me three times, point-blank, right in the groin.

Against HMG travel advice, indeed. Read the whole thing. You’ll be glad you did.