Which countries can broker a deal on the post-2015 development agenda?

When the High-level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda was announced, Alex Evans laid out a useful typology of the five kinds of people you find on high level panels. They were:

  1. Visionaries: Those who already know the overall message they want a panel to send and push the process towards that message (whether others buy in or not).
  2. Experts and Problem-solvers: Those who are capable of engaging on almost any issue, even if they don’t want to steer the overall storyline. They can be incredibly useful in brokering deals, challenging lazy thinking, and generally steering the process towards a successful conclusion.
  3. Single-issue evangelists: Those who care about one thing in this agenda, and one thing only.
  4. Blockers: Those who are more focused on their government’s redlines than on what they can bring to the table or what kind of overall story or deal can be crafted.
  5. Dead wood: Those who can’t be bothered to engage.

It strikes me that the typology is equally relevant to categorizing the potential role of UN member states in forging an agreement on the post-2015 development agenda and financing for development. While many activists are interested in identifying influencers and potential spoilers, I am more intrigued by the role that problem-solving nations could play. Who are the nations willing to challenge conventional wisdom, to bring evidence to bear, to do the diplomatic legwork required to understand member state positions and propose ways forward?

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Reactions to the Secretary-General’s synthesis report

UN Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon

UN Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon

The post-2015 synthesis report was never going to be an easy task. No one can envy UN Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon his responsibility, mandated by UN member states last September, of writing a synthesis report of the many strands of the post-2015 development agenda. He certainly had his work cut out for him in bringing together the proposal from the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals, the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing, the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons, the Independent Expert Advisory Group, and the many other inputs, consultations and discussions on post-2015 over the past couple of years.

The report is a fine effort in the face of these challenges, but fails to effectively deliver key messages. The criteria for a successful SG report at this stage are that it: 1) bring everyone together around an inspirational narrative; 2) galvanize support around the message that it is time to roll up our sleeves, because the work is far from done; 3) bring technical expertise or conceptual clarity to a complex process; 4) move the process forward. While the synthesis makes progress on some fronts, notably in starting to piece together an inspirational narrative, it largely fails to accomplish these aims. Partially that is because the report is too lengthy, thus mixing a few more solid, thoughtful messages with other, seemingly hastily constructed ones. At times it is more of a list than a synthesis. Continue reading

On Andrew Lansley as the UK’s candidate for UN Emergency Relief Coordinator

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A pretty good summary, one imagines, of how the UN Secretary-General’s team reacted when David Cameron let them know that former Health Secretary Andrew Lansley was to be the UK’s nominee for UN Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, a post traditionally held by the UK.

Let’s take a moment to have a look at Andrew Lansley’s CV, from his own website:

MP for South Cambridgeshire, May 1997 –
Leader of the House of Commons, Lord Privy Seal, 2012 – 2014
Member, House of Commons Commission, 2012 – 2014
Member, Speaker’s Committee for the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, 2012– 2014
Member, Public Accounts Commission, 2012 – 2014
Secretary of State for Health, 2010 – 2012
Shadow Secretary State for Health, 2003 – 2010
Vice-President of the Local Government Association, 1996 –
Member, Trade and Industry Select Committee, 2001 – 2004
Shadow Minister for the Cabinet Office and Policy Review, 1999 – 2001
Shadow Cnacellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 1999 – 2001
Vice Chairman of the Party responsible for Policy Renewal, 1998 – 1999
Member, Health Select Committee, 1997 – 1998
Director of the Conservative Research Department, 1990-1995
Deputy Director-General of the British Chambers of Commerce, 1987-1990
Principal Private Secretary to the Rt. Hon Norman Tebbit MP, 1984-1987

Now, since I’m clearly missing something here, perhaps someone would be kind enough to explain to me what would lead David Cameron to conclude that someone with this CV would be qualified to run the UN’s humanitarian relief and emergency response system at a time when it’s coping with ebola and coordinating no fewer than four L3 emergencies (Iraq, Syria, CAR, and South Sudan) – which is more than ever before?

Put aside the fact that the appointment should obviously be merit-based; put aside the point that if the UK is determined to hang on to the post, then a better option might be, oh, I don’t know, call me crazy here, the former UK foreign secretary who now runs a major global humanitarian relief agency.

Put aside the truly incredible political Christmas present that David Cameron is giving to Labour, by taking an until-now pretty respectable record on global poverty and essentially setting fire to it before a group of startled bystanders, shortly before a general election.

And put aside the fact that the UK will make itself look ridiculous to every other member state of the United Nations by appointing to the post a person who manifestly has no qualifications for the job other than the fact that David Cameron owes him a favour.

Instead, just pause for a second to remind ourselves who this job, and the system it runs, is actually about: all the kids in refugee camps or schools made out of tents or makeshift hospitals. They deserve better than this kind of political patronage over such a crucial post.

The morning after the US-China climate announcement (updated)

Never have I seen such a wave of social media euphoria as the one that swept through my Twitter and Facebook feeds this time yesterday, as news broke about the US-China deal on climate change. But now that it’s the morning after, a few quick reflections.

China’s 2030 peak emissions date may be a big deal politically, but it won’t help the climate much. Since 2000, China’s carbon emissions from energy consumption have risen from 3 billion tonnes to around 9 billion tonnes today. They’ve tripled in ten years. China’s per capita emissions are now bigger than the EU’s (though still a long way off those of the US). So forgive me for not cracking open champagne at the news that China may be willing to taper off this unbelievable rate of emissions growth in another sixteen years. I admit that the 20% renewables target is a big deal – right now China’s at about 7% – but even this still leaves plenty of space for emissions to rise as energy demand and coal capacity continue to grow.

On the US side, too, all the hype about a 26-28% cut below 2005 levels by 2025 strikes me as overdone. Obama had already committed to 17% below 2005 levels by 2020. He made that announcement five years ago, at Copenhagen. So 26-28% by 2025 does no more than more or less extrapolate that forward another five years (in fact, as Maarten Hajer at PBL points out, yesterday’s commitment is actually a little less ambitious than the forward curve implied by the 2009 promise) – there’s no actual ratcheting up of ambition.

The policies and measures unveiled in yesterday’s US-China announcement are awfully thin. There’s a “renewed commitment” to technology cooperation, with no funding numbers attached. Some stuff about a demonstration project on carbon capture and sequestration, which people have been talking about for over a decade now – it’s starting to sound like nuclear fusion. More cooperation on reducing HFC emissions, which do have massive global warming potential, but are incredibly easy for China to reduce – cynics like me think that China was actively inflating them so as to score Clean Development Mechanism permits, and is only now talking about a phase out because demand for CDM permits has collapsed along with EUETS prices. There’s a “climate smart low carbon cities initiative” which is basically a plan to convene a summit. And that’s pretty much it.

It’s kind of amazing how European progressives coo about anything China does on climate, but give Europe and the UK zero credit for the vastly more impressive lead they’ve taken on climate change. There was a particular classic of the genre yesterday in an extraordinary blog post on LabourList by Sunny Hundal that called the targets of the US (which work out at 16% below 1990 by 2025) and China (emissions can rise for another 16 years) “historic” while slating the EU (40% below 1990 by 2030) as – get this – “weak and lazy”.

Even more breathtakingly, the post was entitled “It’s time Labour joined the world in fighting climate change”, without at any point mentioning the small matter that Labour passed legislation – so far retained by the Conservatives – that (a) commits the UK to an 80% emissions reduction by 2050, (b) frames this in terms of a legally binding carbon budget, and (c) mandates an independent Climate Change Committee – of scientists, mark you, not politicians – to monitor progress and advise on whether the carbon budget needs to be tightened. (“Where is Britain? Nowhere”, the post concludes.) Would that the world followed Britain’s lead by setting a global carbon budget, and creating an independent monitoring body.

On which note – regular readers will have seen this coming several paragraphs ago – this is still, as it always has been, about the need for a global carbon budget, which (as usual) no-one is talking about. Instead, the UNFCCC process lumbers on, with its usual focus on something called “momentum” (whatever that is) as opposed to actual results. Not one person I know in the UN process expects Paris to agree a global plan for limiting warming to 2 degrees. Not one.

I was talking last night to a veteran climate negotiator from a developed country government, who observed that the climate priesthood has, for years, been having far too nice a time meeting up every six months for drinks and per diems. No one wants the party to end. There is no sense of urgency. No real deadline. She’s absolutely, 100% right. I started going to UN climate summits when I was a student. Next summer I’m 40. And the conversations in Warsaw last winter had basically not moved on since the first one I went to in the Hague a decade a half ago.

The only way this will ever end, she continued, is if policymakers give them six months to work out a solution, and make clear at the outset that at the end of this period, they can all piss off home. For good.  She’s right about that too. This is what they should agree, on a full global basis. I’m really not sure what else there is to say.

Updated: news is just emerging that there are some flickers of discussion of a carbon budget in the UN process. This has the potential to be a much bigger deal than the US-China announcement – more on this later.

How about this as a headline outcome from the Addis FFD summit?

Here’s a conundrum if you like riddles: how on earth is next summer’s Finance For Development summit in Addis Ababa supposed to take account of the vexed issue of reform of international financial institutions?

On one hand, the issue is almost impossible for the summit to ignore. IFI reform is a key ‘systemic issue’ in financing for development, and one that figures prominently in the Monterrey Consensus that emerged from the first FFD summit over a decade ago.

On the other hand, though, what exactly can governments say about the issue? An IMF reform package has already been agreed, after all – the problem is that it’s logjammed in the US Congress, and the results of the midterm elections have done nothing whatsoever to change that.

But what if, at Addis next July, European governments made a formal declaration that the next Managing Director of the IMF should be from a developing country – preferably, but not necessarily, matched by a declaration from the US that the next President of the World Bank should also be from the South? (Christine Lagarde’s five year term ends in July 2016; if Jim Kim also does a five year term, as Robert Zoellick did, then he would be due for replacement in July 2017.)

This declaration wouldn’t cost the EU (or US) any expenditure. It wouldn’t require approval by their legislatures. But it would send a real statement of seriousness about IFI reform by overturning the conventions of a European to run the Fund and an American to run the Bank.

Moreover, it would also be an outcome from the summit that would lead the front page of the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal the following day – something that wouldn’t happen if the key summit outcome is (say) better targeting of ODA, or a new investment facility of some sort.

The key likely objection to the idea is that it would be at odds with the idea of merit-based appointments. I take that objection seriously, and especially agree that it would be essential to avoid the posts of IMF MD and World Bank President becoming subject to regions ‘taking turns’, as they already do on the post of UN Secretary-General.

But on the other hand, the EU and US already had positions saying they supported merit-based appointments before the last appointments to these jobs, and then promptly put forward Lagarde and Jim Kim – which didn’t exactly make them look open to breaking with tradition.

The political bottom line here is that IFI reform is one of the few issues within the post-2015 ‘means of implementation’ agenda that the BRICs actually care about. And the BRICs are already showing their frustration at the glacial pace of change with the creation of their new BRICs Bank.

If governments have nothing to say on IFI reform at Addis, then there’s a real risk that it’ll look like they’re simply giving up on the reform agenda. But by sending a strong message about continued commitment to change in spite of the awkward squad on Capitol Hill, the EU and US could take a big step towards changing the difficult political mood on post-2015.

In post-2015, as in life – it’s safety first

Nobel Peace Prize winner, Malala Yousafzai is exceptional. She fearlessly brought the campaign for girls’ education to the centre of the world stage. There is a UN global initiative, former Prime Ministers are taking up the cause and it is an uncontested fact amongst policy makers, academics and practitioners alike that we cannot ‘do development’ unless boys and girls have equal and universal access to a quality education.

But, how do you teach a girl to read and write if she’s too scared to go to school for fear of being raped; or shot in the head for simply trying to claim the education she is due? How do you teach a boy the social and emotional skills he needs if the only lesson he learns is violent discipline and the streets are too dangerous for him to play?

Whilst Malala is unique, the violence committed against her is certainly not. Millions of children have suffered physical abuse in, or on route to, school. But it doesn’t end there. The places children should feel most safe are often the most dangerous. In the home and community children are being subjected to violence which impacts their physical and mental health with often permanent effects.

The problem is not limited to the Swat Valley or the gang ridden streets of San Salvador. The epidemic of violence against children is global and it thrives off inequality. No matter where you are in the world, if you are poor, marginalised or young, your vulnerability to violence is increased and your power to seek justice is reduced. In Nairobi’s largest informal settlement, Kibera, last week, I heard stories from children about unimaginable abuse and violence – like nine year old ‘Charles’, repeatedly raped by a neighbour who has evaded justice because of his influence in the community and with local officials, who he is able to pay off. Whilst each trauma was different, the common theme of impunity for the richer, older, more powerful perpetrators was common. Children in particular have limited access to and voice within justice systems, and their abuse and exploitation often goes unreported or is not investigated, leaving those who need most protection receiving the least. This cycle must be broken.

That every five minutes a child will die because of violence, as a new report from Unicef UK shows, is intolerable. The fact that this this has the potential to undo the vast progress we have seen in child survival in the last 20 years is inexcusable. Huge gains have been made since 2000 in keeping children alive to their fifth birthday, but these risk being offset by stubbornly high murder rates in adolescence. For example, in Brazil nearly 35,000 under-fives have been saved, but over the same period, more than 12,000 lives of adolescents were lost to homicide. Furthermore, child victims and survivors of violence have been left behind by global social and economic progress, with violence creating barriers to economic development. A survivor of violence in childhood is 60% more likely to be living in poverty than a neighbour who was not victimised.

As member states negotiate the successor to the Millennium Development Goals, we have an opportunity to redress this. Violence was not tackled by the MDGs and the most vulnerable, at highest risk, were left behind. In the post-2015 framework, a target to end abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture against children, with accompanying targets of access to justice and the rule of law, will help ensure we can finish the job of the MDGs and eliminate preventable child mortality and extreme poverty for good. In post-2015, as in life, we can follow the mantra of safety first.

But we don’t have to wait for the negotiations to finish before we act to end violence. The experience of Unicef’s work in many countries shows that there are effective strategies to prevent it – including providing support and services for children and their families, changing social norms through education and enforcing laws to keep children safe – that can be scaled up now. We need leaders to commit to doing this and to demonstrate the political will is there to facilitate the practical solutions. A global partnership of governments, international institutions and civil society, to build momentum on this crucial issue will help ensure the opportunity the post-2015 framework presents to turn the tide against violence isn’t lost.

We can’t rely on all children being heroes, to show remarkable courage, to defy the odds, to take the fight to the perpetrators of violence the way Malala did. They shouldn’t have to. They have a right to grow up free from fear and violence. We need to start planning now for that world.

The political deal on post-2015 ‘means of implementation’

The post-2015 agenda is at a turning point, with the intense discussions of the last year about Goals and targets giving way to a new focus on how the world will achieve the high ambitions set out in the draft Sustainable Development Goals.

Over the next eighteen months, we’ll see a veritable blizzard of summitry, including a critical OECD meeting looking at the definition of aid this December, a major summit on financing for development in Addis Ababa next July, the key final decision moment on the shape of the new Sustainable Development Goals in September 2015, a make-or-break climate summit and a WTO trade ministerial in December 2015, and high-potential summits of the G7/G8 in Germany, and the G20 in Turkey.

All of these moments have the potential to yield elements of a global political deal on ‘means of implementation’ for the post-2015 agenda. But what are the options for those elements – and which of them offer the highest potential in terms of development impact and political achievability?

These are the questions I address in a new paper, commissioned by the UN Foundation, and published today as a working draft ahead of next week’s UN General Assembly and climate summit, and in advance of a final version in October.

It includes both a 10 point ‘straw man’ package of measures on means of implementation that ranges from ODA, domestic resource mobilisation, and the role of the private sector through to trade, sustainability, and transparency; and a long-list of potential outcomes and asks – in each case with a brief discussion of the political and developmental pros and cons.