If people in the Middle East could democratically choose what country they lived in, would they choose the one they are in now?

Amidst all the talk of an Arab Spring, the fragility of the Arab state is often forgotten.

Whereas developed countries are almost always the product of an organic, internally driven process, in the Middle East’s case, the countries are mostly the product of a British-French agreement made in 1916 (Sykes-Picot) that paid little attention to local sociopolitical realities. As a result, few possess the historical roots, social cohesion, and legitimacy necessary to nurture the complex institutions that are a prerequisite for development and democracy. On the contrary, most suffer from both sectarian divisions and weak government—the causes of state fragility.

As Michael Hudson, Professor Emeritus at Georgetown University, explained in his classic study of the “legitimacy shortage” in Arab politics:

A legitimate political order . . . has to be [based on] some consensus about national identity, some agreement about the boundaries of the political community, and some collective understanding of national priorities. If the population within given political boundaries is so deeply divided within itself on ethnic or class [or, for that matter, religious or clan] lines, or if the demands of a larger supranational community are compelling to some [significant] portion of it, then it is extremely difficult to develop a legitimate order. [page 389-90]

Without authoritative political structures endowed with ‘rightness’ and efficacity, political life is certain to be violent and unpredictable. [page 4]

As I explained in my book on fragile states, these two structural problems—political identity fragmentation and weak national institutions—reinforce each other in a vicious cycle, severely undermining the legitimacy of the state and leading to political orders that are highly unstable and hard to reform.

Not all Arab countries suffer from these problems. Egypt, for instance, has deep historical roots and is therefore relatively cohesive. Morocco, Tunisia, and many of the small Gulf emirates (with the obvious exception of Bahrain) are also in pretty good shape by this standard.

The situation is most acute in places such as Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq—all of which potentially face years of instability. Iraq has the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Syria has five main groups—Sunni Arabs, Alawis, Christians, Kurds, and Druze—many of which have their own divisions. Libya has 140 tribes and clans. And none of these states have a robust government apparatus that can competently implement laws and regulations in an equitable, independent manner—which would reduce the tension between groups. Whatever capacity they had was—or is being—decimated by regime change.

Lebanon and Jordan are not necessarily stable, but in better condition. Residents of the former already know the dangers of sectarianism from the country’s long civil war—and therefore will work harder than others to avoid a repeat.

The real wild card in the region is Saudi Arabia. Although it is not a product of colonialism, the country does have religious and tribal divisions and a government that may be seen by some as illegitimate.

The social divisions, weak institutionalization, and artificiality that plague all these states begs the question that I posed at the top: If people in the Middle East could democratically choose what country they lived in, would they choose the one they are in now?

The ballot box has already produced two changes to the map in recent years. The West Bank and Gaza split up because of an election. Sudan has been divided by a referendum.

If the Kurds were given the right to choose, they would secede from Iraq (as well as from Syria, Iran, and Turkey). The same might hold true for the people of South Yemen (independent until 1990), eastern Saudi Arabia, and so on. Groups that have strong identities, have historically felt disadvantaged by their minority positions, and live in a relatively coherent and homogenous area pose the greatest risks to the unity of the region’s states.

One creative effort a few years back to identify how the Middle East might change if the people could choose their own country produced the above map.

Obviously, most of the changes suggested are not going to happen. The process would yield much bloodshed, destabilize neighboring countries, and disrupt oil supplies. Most powers inside and outside the region oppose changes to borders for precisely these reasons.

In some cases, however, if the transition could be done relatively peacefully (think Czechoslovakia, not Yugoslavia), the peoples of both the seceding and seceded from areas might be better off. Libyans, for instance, might have an easier time building a robust state if they were working with two or even three different entities, each of which would be much more cohesive than the country is in its current form.

Although democracy must remain the ultimate goal, strategies to help fragile states emerging from long periods of imposed stability must be highly flexible if they are to succeed. Inclusiveness in politics, economics, and culture need to take priority, especially during difficult transition periods. Finding mechanisms to increase the robustness and impartiality of crucial government institutions are key if the state is to gain any credibility. Although people clamor for fast transitions, their long-term interests may be better served by extending the process over many years.

The Arab Spring will take a long time to play out—and the challenges the return of history has brought to light will not be easy to overcome.

Tuesday should be a dramatic day in the UN Security Council.  Hillary Clinton, William Hague and Alan Juppé are all jetting in for a debate on Syria and the Europeans are set to table a resolution calling for a political transition in Damascus that Russia is determined to veto.  China will probably do so too.  Smash, bang, wallop.

What are the Europeans up to here?  Last week, I published a commentary for the EU Institute for Security Studies summarizing the European strategy towards Syria:

European policymakers have recognised that they are not best-placed to mediate a final political settlement to the crisis. Instead, they have ceded political responsibility to the Arab League, which has gradually hardened its stance against Assad and has even called for him to stand aside (although the League has not been firm enough for some of members, such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia). Meanwhile the EU’s policies have included (i) backing UN and League attempts to monitor the situation in Syria in an effort to restrain the Assad government; (ii) putting pressure on Damascus through sanctions; and (iii) using debates at the Security Council and the wider UN system to reinforce the case for pressure. 

Even though the Security Council debates have rendered almost nothing concrete (except for a mildly worded presidential statement cooked up by the IBSA countries last August) the Europeans have arguably utilized the UN route quite cleverly:

Although frustrated by Sino-Russian obstructionism, European diplomats have chosen to use the Security Council as a platform to publicise the case against Assad. In October, having tried to find compromise language on sanctions, they tabled a mildly-worded resolution in the knowledge that China and Russia would veto it. This ostensibly self-defeating strategy (which the U.S. had doubts about) has at least pushed Moscow and Beijing to try and legitimise their defense of Damascus. Russia has served up a series of resolutions of its own, calling for an end to violence but making no reference to sanctions. 

In the meantime, resolutions condemning Syria’s actions have been passed by large majorities in both the Human Right Council and UN General Assembly – forums that are usually hostile to Western positions. In the final quarter of 2011, the Arab League used the threat of pushing for Security Council action (as it did very effectively over Libya) to persuade Assad to accept its observer mission. 

So even if Russia and China use their veto again this week, the Europeans will keep coming back to the Council for public relations reasons.  I think this is a cunning strategy, although it will fuel talk about the decline of the Council as a serious decision-making body.  It’s remarkable to think that it’s only ten months since the Council was being praised for OK-ing the Libyan campaign.

There is a risk that the violence will spread southwards. A Boko  Haram assault on the United Nations building in Abuja killed 21. Southern Christians have avenged their northern counterparts by burning mosques and Islamic schools. A Yoruba militia group last month marched through Lagos threatening to fight back if the south is targeted. The writer Wole Soyinka has said the nation is heading for civil war.

Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan has responded to the escalation in violence by declaring a state of emergency in the north and announcing a massive increase in the security budget. So far this has proved fruitless, for it is not just policing that the north needs – mistrust of the security forces is so entrenched, indeed, that a response based on strengthening their power is likely to aggravate discontent.

Young northerners’ anger, whose most extreme manifestations have fuelled the unrest, is rooted less in religious sentiment than lack of opportunity. A polytechnic student I talked to in Kano in 2009 said that ‘the violence in the north is not because of religion but frustration about poverty and corruption.’ A Kano University professor agreed. ‘If we have a crisis or violence that they call religious,’ he said, ‘it’s really about poverty. It’s the poor who are easily recruited.’

Northern Nigeria lags behind the south. All ten of the country’s poorest states are in the north. The north has the lowest school attendance, lowest vaccination rates, highest infant and child mortality, and highest maternal mortality. In some instances the differences are stark. Under-5 mortality in the North West region is double that in the South East. Vaccination rates in the South East are seven times higher than in the North East. And while 90 percent of births in the South East are attended by skilled personnel, only 12 percent of northern mothers receive such care. These disparities, as the recent violence has proved, are unsustainable. In the face of glaring regional inequality, a burgeoning northern youth population will not remain placid; even if Boko Haram is defeated, others will come forward to take its place.

To neutralise the threat and dilute the appeal of extremism, Nigeria’s government needs a program for northern development – only by closing the north-south divide will deep-seated resentments be quelled. Enhanced policing in the short-term must be combined with sustained commitment to social and economic reforms. A long view is important – decades of underdevelopment will not be reversed overnight – but quick wins are also needed, to show that the government means what it says and that new promises, unlike old ones, have substance. An Agenda for the North should be based on five principles:

1. An honest assessment of the problem: Goodluck Jonathan must publicly admit that the north has been left behind. He must be candid about the gaps in wealth, education and access to services, and accept that his government and its predecessors have done too little for the region. Northerners, of course, know all this already, but their cynicism will only be blunted if past errors are acknowledged.
2. A grand plan for change: To begin to regain ground in the propaganda war with Boko Haram, big and well publicised commitments are needed. Raising school attendance to southern levels, matching southern infrastructure, and equalising employment rates and incomes nationwide are daunting challenges, but nothing less will be acceptable to young northerners. The north needs its own Development Goals, with ambitious deadlines, milestones and concrete investment plans.
3. Youth involvement: Development Goals in obvious improvement areas like transport and power can be announced immediately, but other objectives should be developed in consultation with northern youth. The latter too want electricity and roads, but what are their other priorities? Research among young people for the British Council and Harvard’s Next Generation Nigeria project threw up widely varying demands, from agricultural extension programmes to support for small businesses to teacher training and school toilets. But unless the government engages systematically with young northerners it will not know what the region needs. Nigerian politicians have cut themselves off from the wider society – giving angry young people an outlet other than violence will help diffuse tensions and make reforms relevant.
4. Small wins: Northerners, understandably wearied by years of broken promises, will have no faith in grand Development Goals unless they quickly see their fruits. While the federal government announces overarching objectives, state governments must spell out which roads will be built and when, how many teachers will be trained, how they will engage with young people, and so on. Then they must take prompt action – begin work on that road, equip a hundred schools with fans, achieve small, quick wins to show that a start has been made.
5. Accountability: When they make targets, federal and state governments must stick to them.  Those who fail to deliver must be held to account, making it clear that business as usual will not be tolerated. Next Generation Nigeria argued for the creation of a national youth forum that would hold regular discussions with policy makers. A Northern Forum could be charged with monitoring compliance with the Agenda for the North, and given free rein to demand action when progress slows.

Goodluck Jonathan is floundering – yesterday he feebly pleaded with Boko Haram to identify themselves and spell out their demands. He has run out of ideas. An Agenda for the North, desirable and necessary even without the emergence of the terror group to give it urgency, has the potential to break the impasse. It might be Mr Jonathan’s best hope of proving the doomsayers wrong.

Although it is extremely hard to predict the actions of a terrorist group such as Boko Haram, Lagos, Nigeria’s commercial capital, may be a looming target.

The organization’s capacity and ambition have grown swiftly, probably due to assistance from extremist groups in the Maghreb, Somalia, or farther afield.

And, as I wrote in December,

The country’s weak institutions make it ill-prepared to deal with threats like this. It is unlikely to have the capacity to meet the challenge. Expect more attacks in the coming months.

According to Human Rights Watch, Boko Haram has killed 935 people since 2009 in 164 attacks, including more than 250 in the first weeks of this year. It has bombed churches, police stations, military facilities, banks, and beer parlors. It attacked the United Nations headquarters in Abuja in August.

Last Friday’s devastating attack on Kano, Nigeria’s second largest city, went well beyond what any analyst predicted it was capable of. The Financial Times reported:

Eyewitnesses said hundreds of Boko Haram operatives were involved in the raids on eight police, intelligence and government targets that lasted several hours.

The police discovered 10 car bombs and hundreds of other unexploded devices on Monday in Kano.

The group, loosely modeled on the Taliban, seems intent on provoking greater religious conflict in a deeply divided country. Its members even talk of overthrowing the state. As Shehu Sani, a civil society activist, said,

They will attack again. It’s now a war that’s going on.

President Goodluck Jonathan has called Boko Haram the greatest threat to Nigeria since the Biafra War in the late 1960s.

The group is benefitting at least indirectly from a deep sense of frustration among Muslims in the north at southern (Christian) domination of the central government at a time when it was assumed it was their turn to rule. The inability of the state to promote development in any form compounds the alienation.

Venturing deep into the south—as an attack on Lagos would require—may be difficult to accomplish. All the attacks so far have come in the north or middle of the country, places either predominantly or partially Muslim. But as the Kano attack indicates, the group has reached a new level of sophistication, which could allow it to go where it could not previously.

Lagos offers more Western targets and important government institutions than anyplace else. Attacking the former capital city would help Boko Haram demonstrate that it can strike anywhere it wants and that the southern led administration cannot govern the country, important goals for the group.

The stability of Nigeria matters. The country is the dominant power in West Africa. It is on track to become one of the world’s five most populated countries by 2050. It exports more than 2 million barrels of oil a day, and has vast gas reserves. It is an increasingly important emerging market, receiving an estimated $6.5 billion in foreign direct investment last year. It is expected to soon overtake South Africa to become the continent’s largest economy.

Reversing this ominous trend line will not be easy. It requires a mixture of political, developmental, and security measures, all executed effectively.

But this is probably well beyond the capacity of a government well known for its dysfunction. Right now, the Jonathan administration seems overwhelmed and unsure how to respond. The intelligence agencies and police have shown little indication that they are ready to protect the country. A number of captured suspects, including the one accused of orchestrating the Christmas Day bombing, have even escaped custody.

As John Campbell of the Council on Foreign Relations explains:

If the Jonathan government persists in dealing with Boko Haram as a security issue without acknowledging and addressing the political dimension to the insurrection, it is likely that the conflict will intensify. The impotence of the police, military and security services so far indicates that the Abuja government does not have the ability or resources to destroy Boko Haram. . . .

Money will not solve the Boko Haram problem, and a political settlement would require a restructuring of Nigerian politics that would be difficult for any presidential administration to achieve.

As an ex-resident of Lagos who cares for the future of the country I hope my analysis is wrong.

Photo courtesy of Pan-African News Wire File Photos.

Good news: Ban Ki-moon will save Antarctica!

Ban Ki-moon has just set out his plans for his second five year term. He is not unambitious:

“Today I want to share with you an action agenda for the coming five years,” he told the Assembly as he returned to the rostrum to brief Member States on his vision for his second term.

“A plan to make the most of the opportunities before us. A plan to help create a safer, more secure, more sustainable, more equitable future. A plan to build the future we want,” he said.

The “action agenda” presented today describes specific measures regarding each of the five imperatives, including an unprecedented campaign to wipe out five of the world’s major killers – malaria, polio, paediatric HIV infections, maternal and neonatal tetanus, and measles.

Mr. Ban also announced that the UN will work with Member States to make Antarctica a World Nature Preserve and that he will appoint a new special representative for youth.

Hm… a year ago, I published an article in which I noted that “Ban has oscillated between bouts of fatalism about the UN’s decline and curious bursts of overheated rhetoric about its importance.”  We seem to be in one the latter periods:

“Waves of change are surging around us,” he told the Assembly. “If we navigate wisely, we can create a more secure and sustainable future for all. The United Nations is the ship to navigate these waters…

“We are the venue for partnerships and action. Now is our moment. Now is the time to create the future we want,” he stated.

Interestingly, Ban didn’t use the words “South Sudan” once in his main speech (he nodded to it in a post-speech press conference) despite the evidence that the country may be falling apart on the UN’s watch.  But then he didn’t mention Syria either.  Still, he didn’t overlook the UN’s crisis management operations completely:

Our operations build bridges — literally and among communities.

Clever, huh?

Playboy magazine is not the most obvious choice for those preoccupied with nuclear proliferation. Yet, Joshua Pollock’s article on “The Secret Treachery of A.Q. Khan” in the January/February 2012 issue has proved to be as titillating as the all-revealing photos that made the publication infamous.

The article, written in the whodunit oeuvre, uncovers that in addition to the three known customers of the Khan network—Iran, North Korea and Libya— there was a fourth hitherto unknown customer and reveals the “last country on the list: India, Pakistan’s foe.”

It’s worth reading the whole column.  But I want to know whether the publication of Pollock’s piece resulted in a big rise of sales of Playboy in news agents around the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Vienna headquarters.  Was some aspiring Hans Blix sent out in a grubby mack to purchase copies of the top shelf magazine for his superiors?   Did IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano have to flick through pages of poorly-clad minor celebrities to find the article (curiously, there is no mention of it in his “Director’s Corner”)?  Is the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, which has a slightly stronger pedigree on nuclear issues, going to change its approach to illustrations now?

These are all puerile questions.  But you know you want them answered.

Click here to view the embedded video.

European ministers are meeting today to discuss an oil embargo on Iran.  The run-up to the meeting has been dogged by reports that some impoverished EU members – notably Italy and Greece – have questioned the initiative.  The Iranians may think that the EU won’t do them real damage, as I point out in a new column for E!Sharp:

There is a general impression that the EU would not hurt a fly.  Instead, it might launch a strategic partnership with the fly, hold annual meetings with the little creature, and possibly fund a Brussels-based think-tank to produce a report entitled “Achieving a Sustainable EU-Fly Relationship by 2025”.

That is the image that many EU officials want to project.  “The strength of the EU lies, paradoxically, in its inability to throw its weight around,” Catherine Ashton declared in February last year. “In short, the EU has soft power with a hard edge – more than the power to set a good example and promote our values. But less than the power to impose its will.”  Yet the EU was throwing its weight around just then.

The EU’s top target one year ago was Laurent Gbagbo, who was refusing to accept the UN’s decision that he had lost elections in Côte d’Ivoire in November 2010.  A brutal but wily operator, Gbagbo had unleashed thugs on his opponents, menaced UN peacekeepers and bamboozled African mediators.

But the UN had mandated sanctions against his regime and the EU took the lead in implementing them.  In a very un-European moment of nastiness, Ashton’s spokesperson told a reporter that the “priority is on the economic asphyxia of Gbagbo’s regime.”  When I read that menacing line, I wanted to cheer.

Things turned out pretty badly for Mr Gbagbo, who was undercut by the EU sanctions and is now at the ICC.  The Syrian regime is also struggling with Euro-sanctions:

The EU first imposed sanctions on individual Syrian officials as violence in the country escalated in May last year, but raised the stakes by deciding to stop importing Syrian oil in the autumn.  Although the Syrian regime has held on to power – and continued its vicious campaign against protestors – the EU’s sanctions have had an impact.  Companies like Shell have pulled out.  With its energy sector under siege, Damascus has struggled to supply its own population with fuel.  The Financial Times reports that the price of subsidized cooking gas for normal Syrians had now tripled.

Syria’s President Assad has accused the Europeans of persecuting innocent civilians.  Nobody should be proud that poor Syrians have been affected by the price hikes – even leaving ethical issues aside, it is arguable that some citizens feel greater solidarity with the regime in the face of EU pressure.   But Côte d’Ivoire and Syria both show that, at least when it comes to sanctions, the EU has more than “soft power with a hard edge”.  It has straightforward hard power – even if it is economic not military.

Iran is, of course, a rather tougher target.  But the EU may do it real damage.