A paper by David Steven, Joshua Meltzer and Claire Langley, published by the Brookings Institution, supported by the FutureWorld Foundation, on how the United States should respond to the aftermath of the recession in order to promote growth and sustainability in the coming years.
An options brief by David Steven, published by New York University’s Center on International Cooperation and funded by the UN Foundation, on the role that global goals can play after the Millennium Development Goals expire in 2015. Download Report
What should sustainability advocates aim for in the post-2015 international development agenda – and how should they go about it?
The first in a series of CIC case studies on the challenges that resource scarcity and climate change pose to poor countries – and how they, and their international partners, can build resilience to them. The report assesses both Ethiopia’s current policies on scarcity and climate, and a range of key gaps, vulnerabilities and exogenous risks that need to be taken account of in future planning.
There’s a consensus that any post-2015 global development framework should have more to say about the role of the private sector than the MDGs have done. But what does that actually mean in practice? This new report from the Overseas Development Institute explores some options for how the private sector might be represented in and contribute to a new set of global goals for development.
This report addresses the Arctic’s growing strategic relevance and conflict dynamic; offers background on, and assessment of, the existing institutions, and examines ongoing risks. Ultimately, the report concludes that the prospects for cooperation outstrip the potential for conflict, and that the Arctic offers lessons for tackling evolving challenges in other regions.
An edited and expanded version of talk given to the ‘Lessons from the Economic Troubles’ panel at an international workshop on systemic lessons from the global economic crisis, hosted by the Global Futures Forum.
Debate on what should follow the Millennium Development Goals after 2015 is now underway in earnest. This briefing paper by Alex Evans and David Steven, prepared for a closed session Brookings Institution meeting organised at the request of the US government, sets out an overview of the MDGs and their expected status in 2015; describes the background to, and options for, a post-2015 framework; and discusses the political challenges of agreeing a new framework and sets out considerations for governments and other stakeholders.
There’s a growing consensus among the countries, UN agencies and civil society organisations involved in discussions on the post-2015 development agenda that equity, or inequality, needs to be somehow integrated into any new framework. This paper considers the pros and cons of some current proposals for integrating inequality into a post-2015 framework, and offers a tentative [...]
Recent months have seen increasing interest in the idea that Rio+20 could be the launch pad for a new set of ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ (SDGs). But what would SDGs cover, what would a process to define and then implement them look like, and what would some of the key political challenges be? This short briefing [...]
Any global framework for development which is agreed after 2015 will be a political deal between states. This paper looks at recent trends in policy and politics in emerging economies and traditional donors to assess where a consenus might lie. It suggests some principles for a post-2015 agreement which emerge from recent policy developments
Paper from ODI and UNDP, authored by Claire Melamed and Andy Sumner, summarising the evidence on the impact of the MDGs, and looking at current trends in poverty and in global governance that will affect the shape and the scope of any future agreement on global development.
Why resource scarcity will be a game changer for global justice agendas, and what aid donors, NGOs and other development opinion formers need to do about it. WWF / Oxfam report by Alex Evans.
The Rio 2012 sustainable development summit is at risk of being the latest in a long line of damp squibs on environmental multilateralism – but could still make real progress, if it focuses on greening growth and building resilience to shocks and stresses, and above all faces up to the issues of fair shares that arise in a world of limits.
How national and international governance systems need to be reconfigured to meet the challenges of food security in a world of tighter supply and demand balances and increasing volatility. Report for Oxfam’s new Grow campaign by Alex Evans. (May 2011)
Article on scarcity of resources in Pakistan and what it means for the country.
Text of speech by Alex Evans to Institute for New Economic Thinking annual conference at Bretton Woods; the YouTube video is here. (April 2011) Download Speech
Article published on China Dialogue on reasons for the new food price spike, including potential implications of the current drought in China. (February 2011) Download Article
Eight critical uncertainties for development over the next decade, and ten recommendations for what ActionAid – who commissioned this report – should do to prepare for them
Article published in World Politics Review on current American foreign policy
Report asking how organisations can prosper in what will be a turbulent period for world order
Center on International Cooperation report on what forms of multilateral cooperation are needed to manage scarcity of resources
Background paper on whether resource scarcity and climate change will cause increased violent conflict
Chatham House report on how the UK’s new coalition government should upgrade and reform the way Britain conducts foreign policy
Introductory remarks by David Steven at a Brookings Institution seminar on risk and resilience in the global system (March 2010)
Talk given by David Steven at Gresham College on risk and resilience in the UK housing market, as part of a Long Finance Roundtable meeting (March 2010)
Report by David Steven in response to the FSA’s Mortgage Market Review
Brookings Institution report by Alex Evans, Bruce Jones and David Steven on how globalisation could fail – and how it could be made more resilient. Published to coincide with the 40th anniversary World Economic Forum in Davos.
Report by Alex Evans and David Steven analysing the post-Copenhagen context on climate change, including a proposed 12 point action plan. Written for the Brookings Institution / NYU Center on International Cooperation Managing Global Insecurity programme.
World Food Programme report on the state of the science on what climate change means for hunger, plus policy recommendations. Authored by IPCC Impacts Chair Martin Parry with Mark Rosengrant, Tim Wheeler and Global Dashboard’s Alex Evans (December 2009)
Presentation by Alex Evans to a seminar organised for the UN Department of Political Affairs by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (August 2009)
Article on risk and resilience by Alex Evans and David Steven – part of a special in World Politics Review on risk and resilience in a globalized age (July 2009)
Report by Alex Evans and David Steven exploring the future international institutional requirements for managing climate change, and including three scenarios for climate institutions between now and 2030. Commissioned by the UK Department for International Development. (May 2009)
Article by Alex Evans and David Steven exploring resilience as a political agenda – part of a special edition of Renewal on the transformation of foreign policy (February 2009)
Climate and cities think piece, co-authored by David Steven and the British Council’s Peter Upton (29 January 2009)
Chatham House pamphlet by Alex Evans on how scarcity issues will shape the outlook for global food production, and the actions that policymakers need to take at the international level and in developing countries to ensure food security in the 21st century
Paper by David Steven, presented to “Reforming International Institutions – Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century,” a conference organized by the United Nations University and the British Embassy in Tokyo (Jan 2009).
Speech by Alex Evans at the Tomorrow Network (25 November 2008)
Paper by Alex Evans and David Steven on financial reform and wider multilateralism, published ahead of the G20 ‘Bretton Woods II’ Summit (November 2008).
Speech by David Steven to RUSI Conference on UK Resilience (8 October 2008)
Chapter by Alex Evans and David Steven in the Foreign & Commonwealth Office publication, ‘Engagement: public diplomacy in a globalised world’ (July 2008). Download Chapter
Draft report by Alex Evans exploring multilateral system reforms needed in order to manage resource scarcity issues more effectively. The final version will be published in early 2010 (July 2008)
Speech by Alex Evans at UK Parliament (8 July 2008)
Speech by David Steven at the UNU G8 Symposium (4 July 2008)
Speech by Alex Evans to United Nations Association UK (7 June 2008)
Speech by David Steven to the UK Defence Academy’s Advanced Research and Assessment Group seminar on Strategic Communications, Public Diplomacy and Afghanistan (4 June 2008).
Speech by David Steven to the University of Westminster Symposium on Transformational Public Diplomacy (30 April 2008).
Briefing paper by Alex Evans, published through Chatham House’s food programme (April 2008).
Speech by David Steven to RUSI Conference on Critical National Infrastructure (16 April 2008).
Paper by Alex Evans and David Steven, commissioned by Gordon Brown and presented to heads of state at the Progressive Governance Summit (April 2008).
Articles and Publications
Oh, this should be fun!
As somebody with a fundamental hand in the http://collapsonomics.org group, and as one of the authors featured in Dark Mountain, I'd like to take this one, please.
In March of 2009 we published a series of articles on managing the UK with 20% across the board cuts. We did not go after meaningless gibberish about public service innovation, we went after the hard stuff: end of life healthcare costs, prison policy, energy strategy and more. Stuff that could scale from 20% cuts to the 40% cuts which are now being discussed.
My own record as a merchant of doom goes back further. In 2002 I started to worry about a global financial system meltdown, and put the outer horizon of that event at one decade. We've come very, very close – certainly close enough that a 2002 fear was rational, and those who followed my advice at the time have profited from it. In 2005 I figured out the biofuels-food price spike issue, and that it would lead to civil unrest in the developing world, and started to raise hell about it in the appropriate circles, years before the action got moving.
So at this point, I have a fairly simple risk of issues to watch: anarchists in Greece pushing it into a new kind of state failure, where the currency stays up, but the government becomes patchy. Contagion pushing Spain, Portugal and Italy into a similar mess, with resulting political pressures on the euro. The US dollar coming under concerted attack as governance risks in the US exceed acceptable levels as individual States like California break their societies through service cuts. China stalling economically, and then experiencing political problems as a result. A rebalancing of the political umbrellas generated by the world's nuclear stockpiles.
And, finally, in the latter part of the decade, a world with two billion people with broadband internet access and no toilet begins to evolve dangerous, possibly violent, new ideologies.
I'd say the odds for most of the items on this list are about 50/50. We'll see about half of it, hard to say which half. A lot will happen that isn't on it – I've been deeply surprised by the ferocity of the gulf oil spill. But a good deal of the stuff on this list will happen, I don't think it's anything other than basic realism to say so.
Thoughts?
you mean you want more of a "can do" and positive approach?
Hi Alex –
For a better sense of the conversations going on around Dark Mountain and http://collapsonomics.org – here's the interview I did with @leashless for the first DM book:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/30711287/Dougald-Hine-B…
Look forward to your next post.
Dougald
OK, OK, sorry for implying collapsitarians are socially inadequate. Some of my best friends are collapsitarians! I just thought it was a funny article. (Come on, it WAS a funny article.) I’m laughing at myself as much as anyone, as I have collapsitarian tendencies of my own; my wife is still dining out on how, after the credit crunch, I bought Tesco's entire stock of red lentils to prepare for the impending demise of western civilisation. (They’re still haunting our kitchen cupboard like a high-protein Banquo’s ghost.)
But when all’s said and done, I’m not a collapsitarian – and at the risk of relighting the blue touchpaper, I think collapsitarianism is actually straight up irresponsible.
I agree with collapsitarianism on quite a lot. I think most people (and just about all policymakers) *drastically* underestimate the risks that trends like resource scarcity or climate change pose. I’d go so far as to agree that the risk factors are substantial enough to threaten a generalised collapse of globalisation as we know it (as David and I argued in our Brookings paper in January and our Chatham House paper last month – http://is.gd/dirBD and http://is.gd/dirCR respectively). I agree very much that this makes it imperative that we spend a lot more time thinking about resilience.
Above all – and here's where I and the Dark Mountain project are as one – I think that the key issue in all this is *narratives*. As the Dark Mountain manifesto (http://is.gd/dhPwh) puts it, "It is through stories that we weave reality". Or as David and I argued in our work for the UK Foreign Office on theories of influence (http://is.gd/dhaj3), "only compelling narratives and visions of the future can animate networks over the long term". Framing really, really matters.
But if we agree that collective narratives are deeply powerful and creative things – engines for self-fulfilling prophecies, if you will – then surely it follows that weaving stories about “collapse”, “descent” or (heaven help us) “uncivilisation” introduces the potential for positive feedback loops that tend heavily towards downside rather than upside scenarios.
We're about to go into a period of very pronounced turbulence. It'll be full of political opportunity, but also the risk of panic and kneejerk measures. Remember what it was like after 9/11, or after Lehman Brothers. What happens after big shocks is that suddenly, vast swathes of public opinion become aware of risks they hadn't really considered or taken seriously – and start looking for *narratives*.
In such circumstances – and again, we agree that we ain’t seen nothing yet – the risks will be multiplied if the narratives lying around are all variations on the theme of “we’re all gonna die”. Millennarian movements have existed throughout history, and are not generally noted for playing a terribly helpful role. Conversely, there will be a huge premium on ambitious stories about transformation, renewal, renaissance etc (as I’ve argued here before – see for example http://is.gd/dhQsq and http://is.gd/dirXo).
As I say, I used to tend towards collapsitarian thinking myself. These days, I’m more chirpy. I do think we’re headed for a rough time, and I do worry that existing governance structures (especially international ones) are going to creak heavily when they come under more serious pressure.
But I also think humans are at their best under pressure; that we’ve already developed a whole lot of the tools that we’ll need to deal with the challenges we’re increasingly facing; and that the key determinant of success will be the degree to which we can tip towards non-zero-sum cooperation rather than zero sum competition, above all at the global level. Towards seeing, if you will, a “larger us”.
Stories that support and develop that kind of cooperation are helpful.
Stories that don’t, aren’t.
I put ‘collapse’ in the latter category.
Alex, at his last article about collapsy things: "Most of all, though, we lack narratives. Images. Metaphors. Stories that explain where we are; how we got here; where we might decide to go next; and how we might get there."
Funny, that's what dark mountain says.
Also, Alex, I note your "tee hee." You're clearly aware that this sorf of ad hom attack is, er, "naughty" – but, really, it's pretty indecent concluding other people are misguided because "socially inadequate." It's a shame, your last piece was interesting. This one is just flamebait – as indeed you note at the end.
Trying to bring it back to actual, interesting things: a nice ten minute summary of Barbara Ehrenreich's work on 'the dark side of positive thinking' –
http://comment.rsablogs.org.uk/2010/03/17/rsa-ani…
Note the end sections particularly – people sacked from finance houses for the temerity of being realistic about risk. Brilliant stuff: people being sacked while having "who moved my cheese" shoved in their gobs.
I'm a (hopefully) friendly critic of dark mountain; they're absolutely right that the space for stories is way, waaay too narrow. I'm a modeller; models are stories too, and they also are way, way too narrow. Alex, you seem to agree. You might want to try and find some common ground rather than deliberately riling people with personal insults.
Alex, I think the key here is that the people who're facing the facts about the global situation – and David and you are clearly doing so – agree we're headed into major turbulence.
The question is "when does it settle down again? what does the world look like then?"
I think there's very, very little evidence of long term loss of social cohesion – the "mad max" narrative. Warlords mature into mayors given a generation or even 5 years.
On the other hand, the stability radiating out from the US-USSR nuclear polarization is gone. The decisive productivity advantage of the US economy is gone. The empires of Europe are gone. But the feeling that Americans and Europeans somehow run the world and are entitled to be rich while the rest of the world is poor is not gone.
It's the rebalancing of the global order – the global _financial_ order – to place wealth where true productivity is which is the core driver of the "rapids" period, and to people who aren't accustomed to generation-on-generation financial decline, a "collapse" narrative is the eeek-a-mouse! first approximation of "wow, we're getting *poorer*!"
We're getting poorer as a culture and as individuals. Real wages are down, housing costs are up, disposable income is down, governments are borrowing to pay for what they used to be able to afford, and the global middle class are all competing for the same iron, tin, oil and holiday destinations. The collapse risk is for the societies which absorbed huge risk and don't have a descent path. The US and China are the leading candidates, and in both cases it's internal political disunion that may get them.
Anyway, this is long and not to the point: the point being I think that it's extremely important to distinguish between financial decline narratives (likely true) and social collapse narratives (likely false, at least in Europe.) You can believe the former and deny the later, and I think most people watching the data do just that!
Larry the Cable Guy (a kind of American Roy Chubby Brown) said "depression is just anger without the enthusiasm." You can hardly call the Dark Mountain people unenthusiastic can you?
I'm going to suggest that there are two outstanding points here, and that they are substantially both the same. The first question, coming off the lead article, is, 'Are collapsitarians socially inadequate?'. The second, coming off Alex's more considered response above, is, 'Need heaven help us from the narrative of uncivilisation?'
I posit that the answer to both of these questions is no, and that it is the answer to both for the same reason. As I understand collapsitarianism, and uncivilisation, neither concept is a nihilistic proposal to be afraid of – in the language of the 'Leading causes of life' (http://www.appropedia.org/The_FWD_BlueChris) both concepts hold anticipative life (hope) and supported life (connection) at their core.
Collapsitarians do not predict Armageddon and look forward in dark glee to spending their retirement years sitting in the shadow of a pile of skulls besides the throne of Bear Grylls, rather they foresee a fundamental shift in power relationships, economic relationships and patterns of living, and challenge themselves and others to build a narrative of hope, but a narrative that is hopeful not through its insistence on positing the continuation of what passes for modern civilisation, but through its recognition that out of collapse something wonderful can be raised.
Uncivilisation is not about vegan hermit survivalists (exclusively…), it is about recognising that so much of the things we call civilisation are not life affirming or necessary, and moving forward from that realisation.
So yes, the trailblazers of collapsitarianism may well be exercising their internal Doomers, but not in a way that courts social inadequacy – it is a movement that builds rather than despises relationships. And uncivilisation is not, as Alex implies, a narrative of despair and calamity that threatens self-fulfilling apocalypse. On the contrary, it aims to give us 'The Future We Deserve' (http://thefuturewedeserve.com/).
P.S. Collapsitarians with beards are obviously a different matter entirely, light blue touchpaper…
For narratives, making a distinction between *influence* and *analysis* is useful. If you're trying to influence the public a collapse narrative probably won't get you very far and may have negative spinoffs. I f you're doing analysis then framing it with a collapse narrative and looking for differences and subtleties can be useful. I find this more compelling than a "great transition" framing. As Joseph Tainter says "Societies don't transition, they collapse."
I’ve been right too early and too often to think that a narrative about hard realities will have any influence on the public discourse.
It’s hard enough to get policy makers to get their heads out of the sand, let alone the public.
But building a community of truth – where the facts can be discussed, and the news read, discussed and understood – that is worth doing.
And that can change the world.
Small ground-dwelling mammals were inadequate… by dinosaur standards.
Hi Alex – thanks for coming back in less troll-like form.
And, since I was quick to seek umbrage after your original post, sorry it's taken a while for me to respond in kind.
We can agree on the importance of narratives, although I'll come back to the differences between our understandings of this. But only a rather skewed reading of the Dark Mountain manifesto can represent it as claiming that "we're all gonna die" – except in the sense that, unless you're a believer in The Singularity, we *are* all going to die.
DM is not a "millenarian movement." One of the key claims of the manifesto is that "the end of the world as we know it is not the end of the world full stop." As you say, we are about to live through "a period of very pronounced turbulence" – or, in the more resonant rhetorical register to which DM is inclined, "an age of global disruption." The ways of living with which we are familiar will not magically become sustainable. We are likely to find ourselves saying goodbye to much that we grew up taking for granted. In a real sense, we face the end of the world as we have known it.
A great deal of "collapse" writing is an attempt to articulate clearly an apprehension of the scale of the coming disruption. Where it gets into difficulty is that it has swallowed the contemporary assumption that life without all the trappings of "the world as we know it" is unliveable. (When Marks & Spencer proclaim "Plan A: Because there is no Plan B," I ask, for whom? For upmarket high street retailers, or for liveable human existence? Or did we stop making the distinction?) Part of the reason, I suspect, for the phenomenal success of Cormac McCarthy's apocalyptic vision, 'The Road', is that it appears to validate this questionable assumption.
Where the DM focus on stories diverges from yours is that, besides seeking to construct narratives which give us a better chance of living well through difficult times, we also seek to interrogate the deep narrative assumptions that have got us into this mess. Thus, "uncivilisation" – which you seem to interpret as us being gung-ho for a Mad Max future – is clearly defined in the manifesto as a conscious unweaving of a set of myths and ways of understanding the world which have served us badly. Not least, the mythic opposition between "civilisation" and "barbarism", which underlies our concepts of progress and "development", making it as difficult for us to learn from those "less developed" than us as it would be for a Victorian clergyman to take theology lessons from an African villager.
Without this kind of radical unweaving of the stories we have inherited, the lessons that @leashless draws from Kerala and elsewhere are unintelligible: however clear the data he presents, people cannot incorporate it into their worldview. Without such interrogation – without, for example, a radically more honest acceptance of the fact that, in a non-apocalyptic sense, we are all going to die – whatever new narratives we construct are likely to be founded on wishful thinking. This is a different kind of project to yours – it exists at several removes from the policy world – but we should be in dialogue with, rather than caricaturing, each other.
Where we agree, I suspect, is that we both have a great deal of faith in the basic human ability to muddle through. Also that the stories we tell about scarcity (and thus cooperation/competition) are particularly critical to how good or bad a collective job we are likely to make of navigating the unknown world we're heading into.
Dougald: "navigating the unknown world we're heading into."
I've only just watched the Pianist for the first time; it's been about 12 years since I last had such a gut-strong sense of the people that actually lived through (and died in) the horrors of the 20th century. (Phew! Nearly said "nazi" then!) Going back and reading about it, I wonder, when one pulls historical focus, what is going to be exceptional about the coming century? Every time is unique. But that's kind of the point. I wonder if we're cultivating an unncessary exceptionalism – except an historical, rather than nation-state one?
think alex's central point here is about real human sensitivity versus pretend human macho-ness. think he's implying that once we all admit our need for stability, continuity and security, we can then quietly go about ensuring that such conditions will carry on.
would say that the above criticism is probably most fairly aimed at supernationals, as they, once in the 'corporate' environment, seem to lose all social responsibility and exploit and rape the earth violently and aggressively, leaving it barren. This is thought to be acceptable behaviour because it's in search of profit . Such pursuit is believed to be a virtuous (or at least adaptive/pragmatic) endeavour, by certain capitalist -theory-supporting economists, as they concur that without the incentives of profit, nothing would happen in the world, leading to its economic (and consequently societal etc) collapse.
Of course, the problem with the above capitalist argument is that it does not take into account the fact that the earth has finite resources: it does not magically replenish itself with them every millenium. Surely, this fact renders capitalist theory immediately invalid?
Therefore, i posit that supernationals are the really socially inadequate, because they operate under a status of societal respectabilty, whilst their theories are invalid and, moreover, destructive of our habitat and global society.
I laughed. Loud. And sent it on to my psychologist partner to have a laugh at my expense. Seriously, when collapsitarians can't laugh at articles like this anymore, we're doomed.
Now here is something very interesting: nobody on this thread has mentioned climate change.
This is what throws everything up in the air. This is what renders all assumptions about the future questionable. Everything is moving faster, and deeper, already, than the science suggested it would. There is already enough carbon locked into the system to create major chaos, and much of that is already being created. I recommend Bill McKibben's new book 'Eaarth' as a useful corrective.
One of the key challenges of Dark Mountain is this: we need to learn – and really understand – that humans are not at the centre of the world, and need to stop being at the centre of our narratives. We are not in control of the world we are creating. Nature is going to be a lot harder on us than she has been for 10,000 years. The interregnum is over. Climate change of more than a couple of degrees – and that now looks almost inevitable – means that many, many bets are off.
I've never met a 'collapsitarian'. This sounds to me like name-calling, of the kind that is generally a substitute for having to look facts, or likely outcomes, in the face.