I take your point Alex, that the quantity of spend may not be relevant, but at the moment I do think we are underfunding the Pools / Stabilisation Aid Fund.

Without getting into arguments about DFID’s relationship with the FCO or the Int’l Development Act, I think there is a case to be made for a much larger budget aimed at preventing/recovering from conflict which does not have to meet ODA requirements. And then make sure there is a proper board, on which all three departments are represented, to administer the spend.

Ok, I take your point – but in that case, Jackson’s implied assumption is that in fragile states, the key issue is (as International Alert put it) “how much?” rather than “how?” – whereas in fact, it’s not clear that size of budget is going to be the key question in the most fragile contexts.

Instead, I think the issue there is really about harmonising different parts of the resilience jigsaw – which would include (for instance) political economy analysis, natural resource governance, social protection systems, climate adaptation, conflict risk assessment systems, mediation, institutional capacity building, effective systems for political participation, security sector reform, etc etc – none of which are primarily about spending cash.

I’d be the first to say that DFID needs to be much more proactive in negotiating a renewed relationship with the FCO and vice versa (see http://www.globaldashboard.org/2009/01/13/the-tories-and-dfid/), and also think that the role of spending money in delivering development is generally overstated (by aid’s critics as well as its boosters); but I think Jackson’s remarks fall under the ‘easy grandstanding’ heading (especially when the audience for the speech was the Henry Jackson society), rather than in the category of ‘serious attempt to get to grips with highly complex issue’.

>One might have thought there was a small clue in the fact of there being more >poor people there than any other country in the world.

>This man used to be in charge of strategy for Britain’s entire armed forces. I >don’t understand the logic.

But the likelihood of state failure in India is low. As the Indian economy grows, it should slowly develop a greater capacity to help its people climb out of poverty. What Jackson seems to alluding to is the idea that aid should be focused on those countries that are most likely to collapse and to offer potential security threats.

One might have thought there was a small clue in the fact of there being more poor people there than any other country in the world.

This man used to be in charge of strategy for Britain’s entire armed forces. I don’t understand the logic.