I think that change of emphasis implies:

a) The need for much more realism about how much external actors can really achieve: some influence at the margins, yes / a 180 degree turn, no

b) Less emphasis on institutions (elections, constitutions, capacity building in the executive branch) and more on political culture and the process of bargaining between states and citizens (DFID’s 2006 White Paper is actually pretty progressive on this, but the intellectual agenda set out there hasn’t been sufficiently followed up in implementation terms)

c) The need for a theory of how political cultures evolve. No, it won’t be one size fits all – but that’s not to say that there aren’t patterns that come up in very different contexts, that we can learn from if we’re smart.

Of course, a major failure of statebuilding – e.g. in Afghanistan, Darfur or Lebanon, as per one of Richard’s warnings, which I also agree with – could easily lead to massive public push back in OECD countries (or indeed major troop contributing countries in the case of UN peacekeeping ops), a context in which nuances about a change of approach could be lost to a broader enthusiasm for disengagement.

One last thought – I think the interdependence-based arguments made in 2002 – 2006 by people like Michael Ignatieff about why we should worry about fragile states (organised crime, drugs, terrorism, migration) were true but often overstated; it’s been interesting to watch the push back on some of these fronts more recently.