by David Steven | May 20, 2008 | Conflict and security, Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, North America
I’ve been at the Brookings Institution in Washington today for its conference on the transatlantic relationship.
In the chair, Daniel Benjamin, who runs Brookings’ Center on the United States and Europe, and who wrote The Age of Sacred Terror and The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right with the Council on Foreign Relations’ Steven Simon.
In The Next Attack, Benjamin and Simon argued that:
It is unlikely that even in his feverish reveries, Usama bin Laden could have imagined that America would stumble so badly and wound itself so grievously. By occupying Iraq, the United States has played into the hands of its opponents, affirming the story they have been telling to the Muslim world and adding to their aura as true warriors in defence of Islam…
There is, as has so often been said, a war of ideas going on, a battle for hearts and minds. Unfortunately, America has wound up on the wrong side.
Of course, this was pretty predictable. Every effective terror movement in history has been fuelled by the adverse reaction of its host society. The Bush administration has simply proved particularly obtuse and self-destructive- a fact for which Al Qaeda is appropriately grateful. In 2004, bin Laden mischievously quoted an unnamed British diplomat speaking at Chatham House (!) to support his assertion that ‘it seems as if we and the White House are on the same team shooting at the United States’ own goal’.
Benjamin and Simon’s policy prescription for the US can be summed simply as: stop scoring own goals. They call for a ‘deep and dramatic’ engagement with the Islamic world and point to Turkey’s relationship with the EU as a model. It has moved from military repression to relative liberalism, they suggest, albeit a liberalism that has an Islamic hue.
‘These changes, as well as the speed with which they have taken hold, are nothing short of remarkable,’ they write. ‘That they have happened at all is due to one thing: the prospect of membership in the European Union. The transformative potential this prospect has held has been clear to American policy makers for years, and, wisely, they have supported Turkey’s bid consistently and vocally.’
Of course, US support for Turkish accession to the EU is somewhat problematic. George Bush pushed this line in 2004 despite attempts from the French and others to warn him off. ‘Including Turkey in the E.U. would prove that Europe is not the exclusive club of a single religion, and it would expose the clash of civilizations as a passing myth in history,’ he said.
It’s hard for Europeans to be lectured on this issue by a man who believes that the US is in the midst of a Christian revival prompted by the ‘confrontation between good and evil’ (his words) that America finds itself in. Or from a guy who said this in 2001:
Oh, I know there’s some voices who want to wall us off from Mexico. They want to build a wall. I say to them, they want to condemn our neighbours to the south in poverty, and I refuse to accept that type of isolationist and protectionist attitude.
And then signed a bill to build a 700 mile fence along the Mexican border in 2006 – part of a desperate attempt to shore up his approval rating with the shrinking portion of Americans who represent his base.
But I digress. (more…)
by Richard Gowan | May 20, 2008 | Conflict and security, Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, UK
Since time immemorial, or at least the 1970s, British soldiers have liked to point out that they can “do” counter-insurgency thanks to their Northern Irish experience. When David Petraeus was attempting to drum up British interest in his Iraqi surge plan last year, he was quick to say that the Brits “really understand this kind of operation” because of their time in Ireland. But now British troops, no longer required to battle the IRA, stake their claim to expertise on, er, Iraq.
The Ministry of Defence has just published some rousing interviews with troops off to “reassure” Kosovo. Here’s a selection of the reassuring things they had to say:
“We’ve taken on Basra so Kosovo will have to seriously flare up for us to be put under pressure.”
“There’s nothing new or more difficult than what we will have done in Basra. The likelihood of enemy action will be significantly different to Basra; KFOR (the NATO Kosovo Force) is not in contact the way MND(SE) [Multi-National Division South East – Iraq] was in contact on an hourly basis.”
“Iraq was a bit of a surprise. The level of action increased from three or four mortar attacks a week to three or four a night by the time we left. My company fired 40,000 rounds in Iraq. That level of combat and experience is quite different. By and large it should be quiet in Kosovo, but if it does kick off, after Iraq I think people will be surprised by our robustness.”
So watch out Kosovo Serbs: you may think you’re in Mitrovica, but from now on you’re in Basra.
by Charlie Edwards | May 20, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Economics and development, Influence and networks
I’ve just been sent an invitation from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) to their Land Warfare Conference (VIII). It strikes me (an idea not the invite) that this should be an illuminating and insightful conference – certainly worth the £800 ‘I’ would have to fork out. The conference agenda is ambitious:
examine the role of armed forces in helping to defuse complex crises in the world today and will ask how the Army, the government and the nation at large can better support its soldiers to meet the challenges of these operational theatres
But it doesn’t take long, while reading through the conference agenda, to become thoroughly depressed. This is a conference for the Army by the Army.
While it’s important for the armed forces to discuss their respective roles, debate the merits of new doctrine and network with like minded souls, surely if you are serious about wanting to understand the role of the armed forces in defusing complex crises it would be sensible to look beyond MoD HQ, and the General Staff to other organisations and individuals who play a role. At the very least invite speakers from DFID, or USAID, the Red Cross or perhaps a senior police officer – after all as the armed forces constantly remind us their role is to create the space for political, economic and social change to flourish – so one might think having some other views around the table might be useful.
by Alex Evans | May 20, 2008 | Climate and resource scarcity, Conflict and security, Global system
A whole page, no less (including transition towns, too). Not much new content here, but what’s interesting is that the FT now reckon the concept of peak oil is respectable enough to give it the space to cover it in such detail.
I still maintain that you don’t have to be a peak oiler to be very worried indeed about the medium to long term outlook on energy, even more so when climate’s added to the mix. Even so, very interesting to watch peak oil making its way slowly from the fringes to the centre.
by Alex Evans | May 20, 2008 | Climate and resource scarcity
For all the media comment criticising biofuels lately, you might have thought that the tide had clearly turned against the increasing trend of using crops for fuel. But you’d be wrong. In fact, as Javier Blas repoted in the FT last week, the proportion of American corn going to biofuels is going up: from 22 per cent of the crop last year to a third this time around.
The reason why is simple: oil price. With oil now at $126 – that’s up $10 just since the start of the month – and lots of analysts pondering $200 by year end, biofuels look like part of a route that leads towards energy independence. And even though corn-based ethanol is about the most idiotic substitute for oil imaginable (on a climate change as well as an energy independence basis), the truth is that in its messed-up way, it kind of works.
The proof: look at the front of today’s FT, where the headline is “US begins to break foreign oil ‘addiction’“. Foreign oil made up 57.9 per cent of imports in the first quarter of this year – as opposed to 58.2 last year. A small drop, you might think, but the Department of Energy is already forecasting a fall to 50 per cent by 2015. And here’s the grim bit:
Although the reduction in oil demand growth is partly because of slower economic growth and a projected 1m-barrel-a-day rise in output from the US’s Gulf of Mexico oil fields by 2012, experts also believe that legislation will accelerate the trend. The Energy Information Administration expects the energy act to help boost biofuel production from 8bn gallons this year to at least 32bn by 2030…
And that’s not all: even as the US starts the long hike towards weaning itself, the oil price is expected to keep on going up, as demand in China continues its ascent skywards. In the background, the International Energy Agency is warning that “the world can not easily afford to retreat from bio-fuels in spite of their possible role in driving up food prices”:
Biofuels already make up about 50 per cent of the extra fuel coming to the market from sources from outside of the Opec oil cartel this year. This explains why fears of a retreat this week helped drive oil prices to record levels. William Ramsey, deputy executive director of the IEA, said: “If we didn’t have those barrels, I am not sure where we would be getting those half a million barrels.”
Bottom line: we must not kid ourselves that we can deal with the food security issue separately from the energy security issue. They’re fundamentally intertwined in over a dozen ways – and the fact that hardly any multilateral institutions cover both energy and food is something that should worry us a lot…
