by David Steven | May 14, 2008 | North America, Off topic
Earlier today, I noted George Bush’s cretinous and insulting claim that he had given up golf in solidarity with American soldiers who are dying in Iraq. The move, he said, was prompted by the death of UN envoy, Sergio Vieira de Mello:
“I don’t want some mom whose son may have recently died to see the commander in chief playing golf,” he said. “I feel I owe it to the families to be in solidarity as best as I can with them. And I think playing golf during a war just sends the wrong signal.”
Bush said he made that decision after the August 2003 bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad, which killed Sergio Vieira de Mello, the top U.N. official in Iraq and the organization’s high commissioner for human rights.
“I remember when de Mello, who was at the U.N., got killed in Baghdad as a result of these murderers taking this good man’s life,” he said. “I was playing golf — I think I was in central Texas — and they pulled me off the golf course and I said, ‘It’s just not worth it anymore to do.’”
Problem is de Mello was killed in August 2003 and Bush was still playing golf in October. Coincidentally, the President also had knee problems at the time though I am sure that had nothing to do with his decision…
by Charlie Edwards | May 14, 2008 | Global system, Influence and networks, UK
Tomorrow the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) will publish its annual report/ threat assessment. It will make for uncomfortable reading at the Home Office and No.10. The Agency is not living up to the great expectations officials placed upon it in 2006. In the febrile political atmosphere of Westminster you can be sure the Conservative and Lib Dems will want to scrutinize the organisation’s failings and the Government’s wider policy on organised crime (ironically called One Step Ahead). Failure to lower crime is still the political weapon of choice.
For a sense of what is to come its worth reading the transcript from Stephen Lander’s (former DG Security Service) and William (Bill) Hughes’ first visit to the Home Affairs select committee. But first the facts:
By the most conservative estimates, money laundering comprises between two and five percent of global gross domestic product (GDP).
The UNODC, roughly estimates that organised crime costs the global economy up to $1 trillion per year
In 2005, the UNODC estimated the global narcotics market at $322 billion—equivalent to a GDP ranking of roughly 30th in the world, measured against national economies, and roughly 75 percent of the total GDP of Sub-Saharan Africa
There has been a rapid expansion in the black market in counterfeit goods—now worth an estimated $400-$600 billion per year (before you stifle a yawn this includes parts for cars and areoplanes)
Preliminary research conducted by the Home Office into the economic cost of organised crime and estimated that the price could be as high as £40 billion a year – the abuse of Class A drugs estimated at £13 billion a year ‘at a highly conservative estimate’
These are serious numbers and show how big a business organised crime is. More than that it shows how organised crime acts as a cancer on society. But irrespective of how great the risk from organised crime is, the UK Government is in no position to do anything. SOCA’s budget has been frozen, resources and capabilities have been shifted elsewhere in Government to countering terorrism and enlarging the Intelligence agecnies; the MoD is focused on operational issues in Afghanistan and Iraq while the FCO recently dropped organised crime off its list of priorities. SOCA has become the orphan of Whitehall. A change of approach is needed.
by Daniel Korski | May 14, 2008 | Conflict and security, Influence and networks
Last night I had dinner with a group of security experts and sat next to Chatham House’s Robin Niblett . We got to talking about the role of Ministers and how they seem to struggle with their role in overseeing today’s counter-insurgency missions i.e. operations like in Iraq. They shy away from detail, but are forced into minutiae by events. They go for headline-grabbing figures – like withdrawal numbers – that rarely materialise. They oversell missions – does anyone remember John Reid’s comment that British soldiers would not fire a shot in Helmand? You get the point.
However, is this any different from the past; and if so, why?
Even a cursory reading of Churchill’s memoirs or those of any of his wartime colleagues (like his defense chief, Lord Alanbrooke) leaves you with the impression that no detail was too small, no maneuver too inconsequential for the PM to take an interest – and, frequently, a direct role. As we know, this did not always have the intended beneficial effects, but the PM’s involvement was clear, all-pervasive – and ultimately crucial for Britain’s war-time effort.
But in the 1950s, 60s and 70s as Britain fought countless battles against Soviet-backed, liberation movements – the heyday of counter-insurgency – the role of Whitehall seemed to decrease. Decisions were delegated to theatre level, as in the Malay campaign. It was only when the Troubles began – and the fight was brought home – that the day-to-day involvement of Whitehall began to increase.
But besides Northern Ireland, the Cold War did not include – indeed require – day-to-day ministerial oversight. Plans were laid to roll back a Red Army advance and the PM had to write a letter to submarine commanders bearing instructions for nuclear retaliation. But there was no day-today role. The Falklands War was may have been an exception to this hands-off, strategy-focused Cold War role.
In the modern world, however, wars like the Iraq War are fast-paced, cost billions of pounds, risk the lives of hundreds of soldiers and can cost ministers their careers. This drives greater ministerial involvement in decision-making than before. But, on the other hand, the complexity – and sometimes brutality – of modern counter-insurgency means many ministers are reluctant to get too involved in decisions, lest they be blamed for the choices made by a soldier in Basra or a diplomat in Kandahar. (more…)
by David Steven | May 14, 2008 | North America
No comment needed:
For the first time, Bush revealed a personal way in which he has tried to acknowledge the sacrifice of soldiers and their families: He has given up golf.
“I don’t want some mom whose son may have recently died to see the commander in chief playing golf,” he said. “I feel I owe it to the families to be in solidarity as best as I can with them. And I think playing golf during a war just sends the wrong signal.”
Bush said he made that decision after the August 2003 bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad, which killed Sergio Vieira de Mello, the top U.N. official in Iraq and the organization’s high commissioner for human rights.
“I remember when de Mello, who was at the U.N., got killed in Baghdad as a result of these murderers taking this good man’s life,” he said. “I was playing golf — I think I was in central Texas — and they pulled me off the golf course and I said, ‘It’s just not worth it anymore to do.'”
by Alex Evans | May 14, 2008 | Climate and resource scarcity
Just back from ten gorgeous days on holiday in Cornwall – hence radio silence on the blogging front, and a much-needed break from frenetic activity on the food prices research front.
(As I found, Cornwall is actually about the best place you could go to get some fresh perspective on food. The Lost Gardens of Heligan have the most impressive kitchen gardens I’ve ever seen; the Eden Project fizzes with thoughts about how we’ll feed ourselves through this century; and Tim Smit – who led the construction of Eden and the restoration of Heligan – and Tony Kendle, director of the Eden Foundation, were both full of ideas about the future of food. Plus, just over the Devon border is Totnes, home of the transition towns movement – which John Robb admires as an exemplar of the idea of the resilient community.)
So with last month’s briefing paper on food prices out of the way, I’m starting to think in earnest about the content of the main pamphlet that I’ll be writing over the summer.
Although we’re not out of the woods yet on gearing up the humanitarian response to immediate term food price impacts, the issue is firmly on the agenda; by the time of the G8 at the start of July, most governments should have made their initial pledges of increased assistance. Meanwhile, the UN’s new task force on food prices met for the first time on Monday, and will pull together a framework for action over the next few months.
But what about the longer term? What are the big questions we need to think through between now and the Italian G8 in 2009, by which time we’ll need to have thought through a global plan for the longer term challenge of meeting 50 per cent higher demand by 2030 – and a population of nearly ten billion by 2050?
I’m tentatively organising my thoughts into three main clusters: questions about the future of agriculture; questions about the future of trade; and questions about the future of demand for food among wealthier consumers. (more…)
