A very British revolution: The UK’s National Security Strategy
Last week Gordon Brown announced the publication of the UK’s first national security strategy in a statement to the House of Commons. Most analysts and commentators in the media welcomed the strategy like an ungracious three year old receiving a complicated birthday present; instead of playing with the new toy opts for the relative simplicity of the box it came in. And so it was with Brown’s statement.
The debate on the Strategy was muted because Brown and his advisers had packed the PM’s statement full of ideas and initiatives (some of which had already been announced before – allowing opposition parties to suggest, quite legitimately, that this was more than spin than substance). However this was clearly what No.10 and the media wanted, No.10 because they could point to what the government was planning to do and the media because they could report how the Government was protecting the public.
What was so disappointing was that we missed a valuable opportunity to debate the contents of the Strategy and instead had to make do with stories about Private Pike, Dad’s Army and civil defence networks mixed with musings from pundits about what a national risk assessment might actually include. But before delving into the strategy and highlighting some of the more obtuse media commentary its worth highlighting a recent post by John Robb on the future of national security:
Imagination: A deficit in imagination will soon be the critical determinant on whether the national security bureaucracy remains relevant in a rapidly changing global security environment.
National security architecture and black swan events: When another unanticipated situation occurs again (and it will, likely in a increasingly rapid succession as small group warfare climbs an exponential ramp of productivity improvements), the public will not be as generous as they were the first time to a legacy organization that can’t/won’t do the job we pay it for. In fact, the public’s displeasure will likely be expressed in a series of major defunding events for the national security bureaucracy.
Funding will already be very scarce: The combination of demographically driven entitlement spending (the first baby boomers retire this year), ballooning deficits (funded by harder to get and more expensive debt), and an inability to raise new federal revenue (money under pressure moves global) means that money will be very tight. As a result, the Federal government’s discretionary budget will suffer significant and prolonged shrinkage.
A need to show results: Given insufficient funding over a prolonged period, much more attention will be paid to the returns of investment from government programs (a result of too many programs chasing an ever tighter budget in an increasingly transparent society). Those programs that don’t perform well, will fall under the axe. Further, citizens, who increasingly view themselves as customers of government security services rather than passive recipients, will be increasingly critical of failures from programs that cost plenty but deliver little.
Competition from below: New, grass roots efforts at the state and local levels will compete favorably against national programs. As in: if the federal bureaucracy can’t protect us, we will do the job ourselves locally (New York City has already paved that pathway with its own counter-terrorism center). Expect a fight between local and federal, a fight where the local wins.
Robb concludes: The smart money is on a failure to change, irrelevance, and organizational dissolution – here’s why…