by Richard Gowan | Feb 23, 2008 | Conflict and security, Europe and Central Asia
While everyone still seems to be aghast that Kosovo’s declaration of independence somehow hasn’t resulted in unrestrained Sweetness and Light flooding across the Western Balkans, the general media line that “we are teetering on the edge of a precipice” isn’t entirely sustainable. Yes, sustained violence by the Kosovo Serbs has made life exceedingly difficult for the international presence. And yes, the assault on the U.S. embassy in Belgrade is a reminder that this isn’t just about a few weeks of posturing and rhetoric – people are very angry.
And as I noted a few days ago, the Kosovo Serbs may have identified clever tactics to exploit NATO’s weaknesses. But for all that, I’d still be pretty satisfied with how things have gone if I were a Kosovo Albanian. Five reasons why:
- The thuggish faction among the Kosovo Albanians has been kept in check: it’s clear that a lot of the Serb provocations over the last week have been aimed at getting the Kosovo Albanians to reply in kind. Before independence, UN officials almost all assumed that “some idiot will burn down a Serb’s house in week one”. That would give Belgrade a huge publicity boost. But that hasn’t happened – yet.
- The thuggish faction in Serbia is winning all the attention: Belgrade’s best hope for managing the crisis was to keep looking like the injured party. The huge peaceful rally that preceded the assault on the U.S. embassy was a good example of how to get that message across: a nation mourns, etc. But then a few cretins go after the embassy, and the headline is: a nation riots. No wonder that moderate President Boris Tadic and his allies have been lamenting “one of Belgrade’s saddest days”.
- Russian rhetoric is already starting to look bankrupt: there’s been much excitement because Russia’s ambassador to NATO has talked of using “brute force” if the EU and NATO break with the UN. Well, perhaps we are on the road to World War III, but another interpretation is that Moscow is actually pretty short on leverage and has thus had to play this card extremely early. Remember, Boris Yeltsin warned in 1999 that a NATO intervention in Kosovo would result in “a European war for sure and maybe a world war.” New crisis, same old play-book – even if the smell of vodka is less these days.
- The Europeans aren’t making utter fools of themselves: things looked bad at the start of the week when Spain signaled that it couldn’t support independence, but Spanish NATO troops have still been involved in handling disturbances. The big question was whether Germany would waver – it hasn’t. I’m not as confident as Daniel Korski that the EU has crossed a rubicon, but it hasn’t turned tail either.
- Lots of money is coming Kosovo’s way: welcoming Kosovo’s independence, George Bush pledged $335 million in aid – that’s about three times the level of U.S. aid last year. And there’ll be more to come from the EU. Of course, much of it will disappear one way or another, but would you say no?
It may all go horribly wrong tomorrow, or in a week, or a month or whatever. But don’t be fooled by all the shots of burning border-posts – by the (admittedly low) standards of post-Yugoslav state formation, this isn’t a bad start.
by Richard Gowan | Feb 23, 2008 | Europe and Central Asia, UK
Further to my rant against the legion of poltroons who have made comments on Kosovo on the Guardian website, Martin Kettle has restored my faith that there’s still some room for nuance on the British Left:
Surely British liberals have room for more than one idea in their heads at a time. How can a sense of shame over Iraq really justify getting into an anti-Kosovan menage a trois with Vladimir Putin – the Slav Ahmadinajad – and with the Islamophobic states of the southern Balkans? How can liberals from a country that was forced to concede the independence of Ireland, our very own Kosovo, less than a century ago – a move which their predecessors championed – now become ideological fellow travellers of Putin and Hu Jintao?
Britain was right to play its part in the Kosovo intervention. We have to stick with the consequences. And we have to uphold the difficult principle of humanitarian intervention now and in the future, as circumstances arise – as they well might under President Obama. Don’t throw the interventionist baby out with the post-Bush bathwater. The world is a difficult place – but we don’t make it any easier by pulling up the drawbridge, hoping it will all go away and then wringing our hands when the next call for justice goes unheeded.
by David Steven | Feb 23, 2008 | Conflict and security, North America
Yesterday, I blogged on Dallas’s bid to stage another high profile political assassination. Now the Secret Service has tried to explain its decision to let people into an Obama rally without searching them for weapons.
“There were no security lapses at that venue,” said Eric Zahren, a spokesman for the Secret Service in Washington. He added there was “no deviation” from the “comprehensive and layered” security plan, implemented in “very close cooperation with our law enforcement partners.”
Zahren rebutted suggestions by several Dallas police officers at the rally who thought the Secret Service ordered a halt to the time-consuming weapons check because long lines were moving slowly, and many seats remained empty as time neared for Obama to appear.
“It was never a part of the plan at this particular venue to have each and every person in the crowd pass through the Magnetometer,” said Zahren, referring to the device used to detect metal in clothing and bags.
He declined to give the reason for checking people for weapons at the front of the lines and letting those farther back go in without inspection.
“We would not want, by providing those details, to have people trying to derive ways in which they could defeat the security at any particular venue,” Zahren said.
So, bottom line: if you fancy killing Barack, just make sure you arrive late.
by David Steven | Feb 23, 2008 | Conflict and security
The New Scientist has an interesting interview with Darius Rejali, author of Torture and Democracy. Rejali identifies a competitive dynamic which, he believes, can drive torture through a law enforcement system:
Usually the top authorizes it and the bottom delivers. Then it’s a slippery slope as torturers quickly become less responsive to centralised authority.
One reason is competition between interrogators. When policemen track down information, they cooperate. In torture it’s different. The guy who breaks the prisoner gets the reward. If you were the guy softening him up, would you hand him over for the next guy to get all the glory?
