by David Steven | Oct 12, 2007 | Conflict and security, Global system, Middle East and North Africa
David Kilcullen on how to run a successful counter-insurgency:
In counterinsurgency, the initiative is everything. If the enemy is reacting to you, you control the environment. Provided you mobilize the population, you will win. If you are reacting to the enemy – even if you are killing or capturing him in large numbers – then he is controlling the environment and you will eventually lose. In counterinsurgency, the enemy initiates most attacks, targets you unexpectedly and withdraws too fast for you to react. Do not be drawn into purely reactive operations: focus on the population, build your own solution, further your game plan and fight the enemy only when he gets in the way. This gains and keeps the initiative.
by Alex Evans | Oct 12, 2007 | Conflict and security, Global system, Middle East and North Africa
From Wired.com: former US infantry officer Robert Bateman has an op-ed in the Chicago Tribune today, which has some interesting insights into Blackwater’s modus operandi in Iraq (see also earlier GD post here):
I know something about Blackwater USA. This opinion is both intellectually driven as well as moderately emotional. You see, during my own yearlong tour in Iraq, the bad boys of Blackwater twice came closer to killing me than did any of the insurgents or Al Qaeda types. That sort of thing sticks with you. One story will suffice to make my point.
The first time it happened was in the spring of 2005. For various reasons, none of which bear repeating, I was moving through downtown Baghdad in an unmarked civilian sedan. I was with two other men, but they had the native look, while I was in my uniform, hunched in the back seat and partially covered by a blanket, hoping that the curtains on the window were enough to conceal my incongruous presence, not to mention my weapons. It was not the normal manner in which an Army infantry major moved around the city, but it was what the situation called for, so there I was. We were in normal Baghdad traffic, with the flow such as it was, in the hubbub of confusion that is generated when you suddenly introduce more than 1 million extra vehicles in the course of two years into a city that previously had only a few hundred thousand vehicles, and no real licensing authority.
As we approached one semi-infamous intersection along the main route used by Blackwater between the International Zone (a.k.a. the Green Zone) and the Ministry of Interior, one of Blackwater’s convoys roared through. Apparently, Blackwater’s agents did not like the look of us, the main body of cars in front of them. Their response was, to say the least, contrary to the best interests of the United States effort in Iraq. Barreling through in their huge, black armored Suburbans and Expeditions, they drove other cars onto the sidewalk even as they popped off rounds from at least one weapon, though I cannot say if the shots were aimed at us or fired into the sky as a warning. I do know one thing: It enraged me … and Blackwater is, at least nominally, on our side.
But imagining that incident from an Iraqi perspective made it clear to me that though Blackwater USA draws its paycheck from Uncle Sam, it’s not working in Uncle Sam’s best interests. If I was this angry, I can only imagine the reactions of the tens of thousands of Iraqis who encounter Blackwater personnel on a regular basis.
But of course, you’d be an idiot to suggest that Blackwater is in any way trigger-happy.
by David Steven | Oct 12, 2007 | Climate and resource scarcity, North America
A UN body and a US Democrat – it’s the reddest of red rags for the American right…
Update: Breaking:
Although former Vice President Al Gore won the Nobel Peace Prize this week for his work as a global-warming performance artist, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled early today that President George Bush would receive the gold medal, the diploma and the $750,000.
Update II: Jonas Kyratzes:
Seriously, people. There are certainly more disgusting figures than Gore – Bush, Kerry, Blair, etc. But just because he’s occasionally put forth an idea which isn’t catastrophically idiotic (Bush), appallingly opportunistic (Kerry) or just butt-crawlingly evil (Blair), doesn’t mean he should be elevated to being the god of the Vaguely Progressive There’s Something Wrong With The World But We Refuse To Use Our Brains To Analyze It movement.
Pajamas Media has a huge round-up, which is mostly in the same vein.
It’s the Gore-problem in a nutshell. He’s persuaded a lot of Americans to take climate seriously, but left others even more entrenched in their belief that it’s a ‘vast left-wing plot‘.
Update III: Time to consult the Goracle…
Update IV: Rush Limbaugh: Gore should hand the award over to “genuine agents of peace: General Petraeus, the U.S. military, and its commander-in-chief [George Bush].
Iain Murray has an especially helpful suggestion: “Who Else Should Al Gore Share the Prize With? How about that well known peace campaigner Osama Bin Laden, who implicitly endorsed Gore’s stance – and that of the Nobel committee – in his September rant from the cave.”
Melanie Phillips: “Awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Gore— along with the wretched Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change whose own untruths would fill a book — perfectly symbolises a western world that has lost its reason and its capacity to tell truth from lies.”
Fox News’ Greg Gutfeld: He’s killing the planet through hypocrisy and blame. If you disagree with him, you’re a heretic and if you agree with him, you’re doomed.
by Alex Evans | Oct 12, 2007 | Middle East and North Africa, North America
While we’re on the subject of US policy on the Middle East, take a look at the letter to Bush and Condi in the new edition of the NYRB from Brent Scowcroft, Zbigniew Brzezinksi, the ISG’s Lee Hamilton, Ted Sorensen, Paul Volcker and others (co-ordinated behind the scenes by Scowcroft, Gareth Evans and Steve Clemons).
It’s essentially a stiff a pep talk in advance of Bush’s Israeli-Palestinian peace conference in late November. “Failure,” they say, “risks devastating consequences”. And in blunt contrast to the more incrementally focussed Road Map, the signatories say that the talks need to cut to the chase on final status issues: “Because a comprehensive peace accord is unattainable by November, the conference should focus on the endgame and endorse the contours of a permanent peace, which in turn should be enshrined in a Security Council resolution.” In practice:
- “Two states, based on the lines of June 4, 1967, with minor, reciprocal, and agreed-upon modifications as expressed in a 1:1 land swap;
- “Jerusalem as home to two capitals, with Jewish neighborhoods falling under Israeli sovereignty and Arab neighborhoods under Palestinian sovereignty;
- “Special arrangements for the Old City, providing each side control of its respective holy places and unimpeded access by each community to them;
- “A solution to the refugee problem that is consistent with the two-state solution, addresses the Palestinian refugees’ deep sense of injustice, as well as provides them with meaningful financial compensation and resettlement assistance;
- “Security mechanisms that address Israeli concerns while respecting Palestinian sovereignty.”
And while the letter welcomes the administration’s decision to invite Syria to the talks, they say there’s still some way to go as far as relations with Hamas are concerned: “we believe that a genuine dialogue with the organisation is far preferable to its isolation”.
by Alex Evans | Oct 12, 2007 | Middle East and North Africa, North America
I’m wading through Bob Woodward’s outstanding State of Denial. The first few chapters are almost entirely devoted to a detailed discussion of the early years of the Pentagon under Donald Rumsfeld, who must surely win some kind of prize for the boss from hell. But then (page 75) comes a fascinating vignette about Saudi Arabia’s posture on US-Israeli relations, during an episode in August 2001.
According to Woodward, Crown Prince Abdullah was so appalled by seeing an Israeli soldier first push and then step on an elderly Palestinian woman that he dispatched Bandar bin Sultan – Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the US and all-purpose political fixer – to the White House with an unprecedented message:
“Mr President,” Bandar began, “this is the most difficult message I have had to convey to you that I have every conveyed between the two governments since I started working here in Washington in 1982.”
Bandar’s message continued that while US policy on Israel had in the past been balanced – as when Bush senior had suspended loan guarantees to Israel over illegal settlements – this was no longer the case. “The Crown Prince has tried to find many excuses for this administration and we couldn’t.” Ariel Sharon had been permitted to “determine everything in the Middle East”. The message wenton, “What pained the Crown Prince more is the continuance of American ignorance of Israel upholding policies as if a drop of Jewish blood is equal to thousands of Palestinian lives.”
Then came the action line. “Therefore the Crown Prince will not communicate in any form, type or shape with you, and Saudi Arabia will take all its political, economic and security decisions based on how it sees its own interest in the region without taking into account American interests anymore because it is obvious that the United States has taken a strategic decision adopting Sharon’s policy.”
Naturally, the Administration was stunned. Colin Powell is quoted as demanding of Bandar, “What the fuck are you doing? You’re putting the fear of God in everybody here. You scared the shit out of everybody.” But by August 29, Bush had sent a two page letter to Abdullah that began, “Let me make one thing clear up front: nothing should ever break the relationship between us. ” The letter went on:
“I firmly believe the Palestinian people have a right to self-determination and to live peacefully and securely in their own state, in their own homeland, just as the Israelis have the right to live peacefully and safely in their own state.”
As Woodward observes, “it was a much bigger step than President Clinton had ever taken. Even as Clinton had tried to fashion a Middle East peace agreement as his legacy, he had never directly supported a separate Palestinian state.” Crown Prince Abdullah, Woodward continues, was relieved. But he had one further ask: “…it is very essential that you declare your position publicly which was stated in your letter. Such a declaration at this level will eliminate the common impression prevailing in the region of the US bias to Israel.” And then:
Bush agreed to come out publicly for a Palestinian state. A big rollout was planned for the week of September 10, 2001.
In the event, Bush would not make his speech calling for a Palestinian state until June the following year, and it would be April 2003 before details of the ‘Road Map’ were released following the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas as Palestinian Prime Minister – by which time the intifada had been fermenting for another eighteen months.
